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This paper argues that the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to prevent
against systemic risks in response to the financial crisis of 2008, but poses
over-regulation dangers on private equity real estate, which the regulators
acknowledged weren’t the cause of the financial crisis. The author
examines private equity real estate along three axes of systemic risk
contributors, aggregate industry size, financial connections, and
synchronization with other schemes and markets. It further compares
private equity real estate funds to hedge funds, which have been viewed by
some as posing systemic risks. The unraveled evidence strongly suggests
that private equity real estate doesn’t give rise to systemic risk concerns,
yet the Dodd-Frank Act threatens to subject private equity real estate
advisers to tightened regulations, which impose considerable compliance
costs and particularly burden small and/or start-up firms. To assist private
equity real estate advisers with their new paths through the regulatory
landscape, this article provides a complex compliance framework that
could potentially help them restructure their funds to minimize the impact
of the Dodd-Frank on their compliance burdens. This article argues that
the SEC should accept these new paths as part of the new regulatory
landscape for private equity real estate, given the policy reasons expressed
in this article. It further recommends that the regulators not apply the
Volcker Rule against private equity real estate. Recognitions of these new
paths and limiting the application of the Volcker Rule would increase
transactional certainty for private equity real estate, foster their freedom of
choice to select the best regulatory path, and most importantly, avoid the
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act" or "Dodd-Frank" or “the
Act”).1 Dodd-Frank was a sweeping financial legislation that, among other
things, drastically altered the regulatory landscape for private equity and
subjected many private equity advisers to much tighter regulation.
Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity
investment advisers had been largely unregulated under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”)2 and the Investment Company Act
of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”).3 During the years leading up the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity flourished. As of March
2012, private equity funds’ global assets under management, including dry
powder (capital commitments not employed in investments) totaled
approximately $3 trillion.4 Note, however, that private equity real estate
(also “PERE”) funds, which are the subject of this article, have a much
smaller industry size, evidenced by the fact that there were, as of the third
quarter of 2013, only “468 private equity real estate funds (targeting assets
rather than other funds) seeking an aggregate of $154 [billion] in capital
commitments.”5
Looking deeper, one may also postulate that the freedom of private
equity investment strategies lies inherently in the free regulatory pass that
many private equity advisers and private equity funds received prior to the
inauguration of the Dodd-Frank Act. For example, it is widely known that
Yale University’s private equity investments from 1973 to 2006 had a
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.)
[hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
2. The Advisers Act is a body of federal securities laws that regulates “investment
advisers.”
3. The Investment Company Act is a body of federal securities laws that regulates the
funds with which investment advisers work.
4. See Global Private Equity Report 2012, BAIN & COMPANY, INC., iii, (Feb. 2012),
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/pdfs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report_20
12.pdf (explaining that there was nearly $1 trillion dollars in dry powder and nearly $2
trillion dollars of assets in private equity for 2011).
5. John Mather, Private Equity Real Estate Funds – Q3 2012 Fundraising Update,
PREQIN (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.preqin.com/blog/101/5823/re-q3-fundraising-update.
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greater than 30% rate of return overall.6 Many scholars attribute such
impressive, above-market returns to the fluidity of private equity funds’
investment strategies.
Admittedly, some studies suggest that private equity, as an industry at
large, does not generate above-market returns.7 Yet, many successful
individual private equity players who outperform in one fund have been
observed to persistently outperform in future funds.8 Thus, the fluidity of
private equity, at a minimum, provides many talented private equity
advisers with the possibility of consistently outperforming the market,
which may be advantageous for investors.
In light of these economic benefits, private equity advisers clearly
have solid grounds for viewing private equity as an important tool for
society, especially for investors. Private equity advisers may therefore
likely consider less regulation as a significant contributing factor for the
success of private equity, and hence the success and growth of investors’
wealth and the national economy.
Following the financial crisis of 2008, stampeded by poor mortgage
lending practices, regulators across the country reached a heightened state
of alert. This motivated Congress to enact the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010,
primarily to address systemic risk concerns:
Congress [held] hearings on systemic risk in response to the . . .
subprime mortgage crisis and its impact on the mortgage-backed
securities and commercial paper markets. The U.S. Federal
Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other monetary
agencies worldwide . . . likewise expressed concern about this
crisis and its potential systemic effects, dramatically illustrated
by the collapse of the investment bank Bear Stearns.
Governments also [were] concerned about the potential for
systemic failure stemming from hedge-fund collapses, originally
raised by the near-failure of Long-Term Capital Management and
more recently prompted by the unregulated spread of hedge funds
as a favored investment tool.9
6. Josh Lerner, Private Equity Returns: Myth and Reality, HARV. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/Session%20III%20-%20Lerner%20FINAL.pdf
(last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
7. See, e.g., Steve Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns,
Persistence and Capital Flows, CHI. BOOTH 2, http://www.chicagobooth.edu/news/2004-1112kaplan/pereturns-1.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)(“On average, LBO fund returns net of
fees are slightly less than those of the S&P 500; VC fund returns are lower than the S&P
500 on an equal-weighted basis, but higher than the S&P 500 on a capital weighted basis.”).
8. See id. (“General partners (GPs) whose funds outperform the industry in one fund
are likely to outperform the industry in the next and vice versa.”).
9. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 194-96 (2008) (internal
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The financial crisis of 2008 clearly had the potential to bring down the
economy. However, private equity did not contribute to this financial
crisis. The legislative history for the Volcker Rule10 notes, “The erosion of
lending standards and the Federal Government’s poorly conceived efforts
to subsidize mortgage lending caused the financial crisis . . . .”11 The
massive mortgage defaults and the resulting decline of mortgage-backed
securities (“MBS”) eventually caused the collapses of several major
financial institutions in September 2008, signaling how mortgage defaults
and MBS could give rise to systemic risk concerns. The subprime
mortgage crisis threatened to trigger a systemic collapse by weakening
large financial institutions:
Governments responding to the financial crisis initially
concluded that these financial institutions were “too big to fail.”
[However, after 2008,] [m]any government officials believed
that, because of the interconnectedness of each firm with the rest
of the American and global economy, the failure of the financial
institutions could cause the entire global financial system to
collapse.12
This prompted Congress to take preventative measures against systemic
risks, as a prudent doctor is apt to prescribe preventative medicines against
potential heart and kidney damage for a patient with a diagnosed liver
disease. Accordingly, the Dodd-Frank Act imposed substantial rules that
regulated the financial system beyond mortgage lending practices.
The primary goal of the Dodd-Frank Act was to cure the problem of
poor mortgage lending practices and the subsequent issues of the MBS
markets. The Act “enact[ed] numerous provisions intended to reform the
mortgage lending industry with an eye towards consumer protection. Many
of these provisions are contained within Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act,
[and] the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (the
‘Mortgage Act’ . . . ).”13 In addition,
citations omitted).
10. The Volcker Rule, a part of the Dodd-Frank Act, prohibits banks from sponsoring
or owning private equity funds exempt under Sections 3(c)(1) and (3)(c)(7) of the
Investment Company Act.
11. Examining the Impact of the Volcker Rule on Markets, Businesses, Investors and
Job Creation, Part II: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 2
(2012) (Statement of Spencer Bachus, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.).
12. Lindsay C. McAfee & Nichole Johnson, Major Financial Institutions in the Crisis:
What Happened and Governments’ Responses, THE U. OF IOWA C. OF L. 1, 3 (Mar. 2010),
http://blogs.law.uiowa.edu/ebook/sites/default/files/Part_5_4.pdf.
13. Bradley K. Sabel, Mortgage Lending Practice after the Dodd-Frank Act, posting in
The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
WEBLOGS AT HARV. L. SCH. (Nov. 16, 2010, 10:03 AM),

104

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:1

Congress passed comprehensive mortgage reform legislation
beginning in 2007 including the Secure and Fair Enforcement for
Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 1501 et seq., “SAFE
Act”). The Mortgage Act continues these legislative efforts by
amending provisions of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C.
1601 et seq., “TILA”) in order to reform consumer mortgage
practices and provide accountability for such practices.14
Even though the Dodd-Frank Act was intended to fix the cause of the
financial crisis, two portions of the Act substantially impact the private
equity industry, which was not the cause of the crisis. The two portions are
Title IV and the Volcker Rule. Title IV amends the registration regime of
the Advisers Act in a way that forces many private equity advisers, who
were previously unregistered, to register thereunder.15 The Volcker Rule
prohibits banks from sponsoring or owning private equity funds exempt
under Sections 3(c)(1) and (3)(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act, but
the Dodd-Frank Act grants the joint agencies the discretion to also apply
the Volcker Rule directly against non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds.16
The legislative history for Title IV notes that Title IV requires many
previously exempt advisers to register in order to monitor hedge fund
systemic risks:
While hedge funds are generally not thought to have caused the
current financial crisis, information regarding their size,
strategies, and positions could be crucial to regulatory attempts to
deal with a future crisis. The case of Long-Term Capital
Management, a hedge fund that was rescued through Federal
Reserve intervention in 1998 because of concerns that it was
“too-interconnected-to-fail,” indicates that the activities of even a
single hedge fund may have systemic consequences.17
The legislative history thus indicates that Title IV seeks to apply the
Advisers Act against hedge funds and other types of “private funds” that
may give rise to systemic risks.
The legislative history for the Volcker Rule begins by noting that the
Volcker Rule prohibits banking activities “that are high-risk or which
create significant conflicts of interest between these institutions and their
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/11/16/mortgage-lending-practice-after-the-doddfrank-act/.
14. Id.
15. Information about general issues regarding investment adviser jurisdiction,
registration, statutory floors, exemptions, and compliance under the Advisers Act and the
Dodd-Frank Act can be found in a companion article. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 1, §
619(a)(2)(B).
16. Id. § 619(h)(2).
17. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010).
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customers,”18 such as “the possibility that firms will favor inside funds
when placing funds for clients.”19 “When losses from high-risk activities
are significant, they can threaten the safety and soundness of individual
firms and contribute to overall financial instability. Moreover, when the
losses accrue to insured depositories or their holding companies, they can
cause taxpayer losses.”20 An additional point in the legislative history of
the Volcker Rule is that “[t]he prohibitions also will reduce the scale,
complexity, and interconnectedness of those banks that . . . have hedge
fund or private equity exposure.”21 Clearly, the primary focus of the
Volcker Rule is to prevent systemic risks to the economy as a whole.
Following the Dodd-Frank Act, all private equity advisers, including
hedge fund advisers, are now subject to new, burdensome regulation. This
new regulation seems inconsistent with the historical reasons for private
equity’s regulatory free pass as well as the fluidity of private equity funds’
investment strategies. In particular, regulators felt duty-bound to take
preventative measures and increase oversight of private equity investment
advisers in order to minimize potential systemic risks; although, as
discussed above, the legislators recognized that private equity funds were
not the cause of the financial crisis.
Increased regulation of private equity potentially presents dangers,
considering that “[o]ver-regulation of economic markets acts as a drag on
investment and entrepreneurial enterprise”22 and that “over[-]regulation
will suffocate the economy and deepen the crisis.”23 Moreover, “overregulation may prevent financial institutions from doing business in a costeffective manner and drive financial activity to other, more favorably
regulated markets.”24 In particular, Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, which
threatens to subject private equity real estate advisers to the Advisers Act,
will impose considerable compliance costs, which could be particularly
burdensome for small and/or start-up firms. For example, one fund “took
about 2,000 hours to prepare its first Form PF filing. Another . . . fund
[had] about 140 employees, eight to ten of whom work[ed] full time on
regulatory compliance.”25 In addition, “[c]ompliance is very expensive for
18. Id. at 8.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Rodney A. Smolla, Reflections on the Rule of Law America’s 400th Anniversary at
Jamestown — Foreword: Contemplating the Meaning of the “Rule of Law,” 42 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2007).
23. Chelsea P. Ferrette, The Myth of Investor Protection: The Dodd-Frank Act and the
Office of the Investor Advocate, 12 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 61, 67 (2011).
24. Eric J. Pan, Structural Reform of Financial Regulation, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 796, 812 (2011).
25. Lloyd Dixon, Noreen Clancy & Krishna B. Kumar, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk,
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[small] firms because they either have to dedicate some of their small staff
to compliance or pay to outsource the compliance to another firm. At the
same time, these firms are pressured by their investors to reduce fee-related
expenses.”26 Additionally, too much regulation could potentially cause
private equity funds that cannot cope with the compliance costs and efforts
to relocate to jurisdictions where regulation is less intense, which is not
advantageous for the U.S. economy.
On the side of the Volcker Rule, applying the Volcker Rule against
PERE would cut off a significant source of capital to PERE funds, even
though banks are not a gigantic percentage of PERE’s investors. This is
problematic, since PERE has had a significant role in paving the way to the
recovery of the real estate markets after various financial crises.27 Further,
PERE funds that invest in land should help lead the way to recovery of
development activities for the country’s GDP, which is also particularly
important. Cutting off that source of capital might also put PERE in the
United States at a competitive disadvantage with global PERE funds.
Given that the Dodd-Frank Act took preventative measures beyond
mortgage lending practices, and even beyond subjecting hedge funds to
tightened regulations, there is a great possibility of over-regulation dangers
- just as taking medicines before multi-organ failure could ultimately
damage a patient’s health.
In the face of these changes, this paper predicts that private equity
advisers will not only comply, but also adapt. This article predicts that
traditional private equity investment advisers, who largely advise about
investments in non-real estate securities, will have a very limited ability to
adapt to the Dodd-Frank Act, and will have to comply in a rather
straightforward way.
The lack of adaptability for traditional private equity investment
advisers derives, foremost, from the fact that such advisers focus on
investments in “securities,” and, according to the Advisers Act, they fall
into the category of “investment advisers.” The Advisers Act defines
“investment advisers” as “any person who . . . engages in the business of
advising others . . . as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.”28 Consequently, traditional
and Dodd-Frank: The Road Ahead, RAND CORP. 5,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF308/RAND_CF30
8.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)[hereinafter Dodd-Frank: The Road Ahead].
26. Id.
27. DAVID M. GELTNER, ET. AL, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE ANALYSIS AND
INVESTMENTS 148 (Sara Glassmeyer et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014) (“As in the 1990s, the recovery
[after the financial crisis of 2008] in the commercial property market was once again led by
private equity funds and REITs seeking to buy distressed assets at bargain prices or to place
capital into safe, income-generating and potentially inflation-hedging assets.”).
28. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006).
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private equity investment advisers will have no ability to sidestep the
Advisers Act.
In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes new, additional regulations
on investment advisers to funds exempt under Sections 3(c)(1)29 and
3(c)(7).30 One such regulation is the filing of Form PF, required of
investment advisers who manage one or more “private funds” if the adviser
or its related persons, collectively, “have at least $150 million in private
fund assets under management as of the last day of [the adviser’s] most
recently completed fiscal year.”31 Another such regulation is the Volcker
Rule, which prohibits banks from sponsoring or owning Sections 3(c)(1)
and 3(c)(7) exempt funds. Traditional private equity funds typically have
no choice but to rely upon the Investment Company Act’s Sections 3(c)(1)
and 3(c)(7) exemptions. This is because several important non-(c)(1)/(c)(7)
exemptions are primarily aimed at unconventional funds, which invest in
non-securities or real estate. As a result, traditional private equity advisers
will be unable to sidestep the new regulations of the Dodd-Frank Act, most
notably the Volcker Rule and Form PF, which apply to advisers who advise
Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exempt funds.
However, this article predicts a more flexible adaptive approach for
private equity real estate investment advisers, rather than rigid compliance
with the new rules. In order to alleviate over-regulation dangers for private
equity real estate, especially in light of the fact that private equity real
estate does not pose systemic risk concerns and possesses typically only
moderate investment risks, this paper sets forth new paths for private equity
real estate advisers through the new regulatory landscape. This paper
shows how private equity real estate investment advisers will likely forge
new strategies in the new regulatory landscape following Dodd-Frank,
which will lighten their compliance and administrative costs. It is
important to realize that such trailblazing possibilities are beneficial to
society; private equity real estate should not bear substantial costs because
it does not generate systemic risks. Otherwise, the Dodd-Frank Act will
The interpretation of Section 202(a)(11) is subject to considerable nuance.
29. Section 3(c)(1) generally exempts from the definition of “investment company,”
“Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially
owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not
presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.” Investment Company Act of
1940 § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006).
30. Section 3(c)(7) generally exempts “[a]ny issuer, the outstanding securities of which
are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are
qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a
public offering of such securities.” Id. § 80a-3(7)(A).
31. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF 1, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013)
(emphasis in original).

108

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:1

over-regulate private equity real estate.
Private equity real estate advisers will naturally feel inclined to
navigate the regulatory landscape in the most advantageous way possible,
given their liberal view that light regulation is essential for faster economic
growth and given the considerable compliance costs Dodd-Frank would
otherwise impose on them. This paper attempts to provide the groundwork
for regulatory navigation and to explain why this behavior will help avoid
the dangers of private equity over-regulation, since private equity real
estate does not pose systemic risk concerns.
In regards to the Advisers Act generally, private equity real estate
investment advisers might be able to sidestep the Act by avoiding
investment advice about “securities.” In addition, private equity real estate
advisers might be able to sidestep the Volcker Rule or other new additional
regulations applicable to advisers to (c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds, by
restructuring their funds into non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds. As discussed
above, many important non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act
exemptions are aimed at funds that invest in non-securities or real estate.
This article posits that these new paths will be acceptable to the
regulators, given the long-standing tradition of regulators’ classifying nonsecurities real estate investments as falling outside the scope of the
Advisers Act, and given both the absence of systemic risk concerns as well
as the typically merely moderate investment risks of private equity real
estate in general. The absence of systemic risk concerns posed by private
equity real estate is further evidenced by the fact that the finalized version
of Form PF mandates certain registered investment advisers to report risk
exposure statistics but there is no indication that it applies to private equity
real estate funds that utilize non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions.
More specifically, Part II expounds the policy analysis for the
legitimacy of these side roads through the new regulatory landscape, given
the lack of systemic risk concerns posed by private equity real estate. It
explains the meaning of systemic risks and presents strong evidence for the
low systemic risks posed by private equity real estate. With respect to the
Advisers Act, the author argues for the validity of the private equity real
estate advisers’ intention to be exempt from the Advisers Act by
exclusively investing in non-securities, which regulators have
acknowledged as falling outside the scope of the Advisers Act.32
Regarding regulations applicable to investment advisers of “private funds”
(i.e., (c)(1)/(c)(7) funds), the author postulates that it was likely the
32. See Regulation of Investment Advisers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N 3 (Mar. 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf [hereinafter
Regulation of Investment Advisers] (“The SEC staff has stated that advice about real estate,
coins, precious metals, or commodities is not advice about securities.”).
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regulators’ intention to have left non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions in the hands
of private equity real estate to bypass such regulations, since, for example,
the SEC’s finalization of Form PF did not apply to private equity real estate
funds utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions.
Regarding the Volcker Rule, this paper provides compelling evidence
that the regulators should not use their discretion to apply the Volcker Rule
against private equity real estate advisers utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7)
exemptions, since private equity real estate does not generate systemic risk
concerns and possesses typically only moderate investment risks. The
author strongly urges the joint agencies charged with issuing a final ruling
on the Volcker Rule not to apply the Volcker Rule against private equity
real estate utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds. Further, it would not
be in the best interest of society to apply the Volcker Rule against private
equity real estate, given that private equity real estate has had a central role
in the recovery of the real estate markets following the financial crisis of
2008.
In order to assist private equity real estate advisers with the new
regulatory landscape, this article sets forth the compliance framework for
how private equity real estate advisers could determine whether they are
advising about “securities” under the Advisers Act. Part III of this article
begins by explaining how private equity real estate investment advisers,
who would otherwise fall within the definition of an “investment adviser”
and be subject to U.S. jurisdiction,33 may structure their operations so as
not to be subject to the Advisers Act - or potentially even to applicable
state law.34 Avoiding advising about “securities” would theoretically
prevent private equity real estate investment advisers from having to
register with the SEC, and would likely prevent them from being subject to
relevant Advisers Act regulations, both of which they would otherwise find
burdensome. In principle, this type of structuring would also likely permit
the funds that private equity real estate advisers advise to bypass the
Investment Company Act and the Volcker Rule, since these funds would
become non-securities funds, and thus usually not “investment companies”
within the meaning of the Investment Company Act.
However, the downside of this type of structuring is that it could
severely limit the types of investments about which a private equity real

33. The analysis in Part I of this article assumes that a real estate investment adviser is
subject to U.S. jurisdiction. See Seth Chertok, A Comprehensive Guide to Title IV of the
Dodd-Frank Act and the Rules Promulgated Thereunder, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 125
(2012) for a discussion of how investment advisers become subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
One way of avoiding the issues raised by this article is to structure the investment adviser so
that it is not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, in which case the Advisers Act would not apply.
34. The definition of “investment adviser,” according to most states’ securities laws, is
similar to that found in the Advisers Act.
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estate investment adviser could provide investment advice. Many types of
real estate investments potentially have a securities aspect to them, such as,
without limitation, passive entity investments, mortgage-backed securities
and mortgage participation interests.35 This limitation might be workable
for many types of private equity real estate advisers, since most types of
private equity real estate funds really strive to engage in operating and
developing real properties, and don’t target securities investments.
Nonetheless determining whether a real estate investment is a security
often entails resolutions of complex, fact-specific securities questions under
federal and state law, although hopefully the guidance provided by this
article will ease some of that burden. Inexperienced investment advisers
may want to consult with experienced counsel to recognize and address
these issues.
Part IV considers how, in the event that a private equity real estate
investment adviser could not shed the title of an “investment adviser” as
defined by the Advisers Act, the adviser may want to restructure its real
estate funds to benefit from non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act
exemptions. The Dodd-Frank Act contains several provisions that regulate
investment advisers to “private funds,” including, without limitation, Form
PF and the Volcker Rule.36 “Private funds,” a term added to the Advisers
Act by the Dodd-Frank Act, includes an investment fund “that would be an
investment company, as defined in Section 3 of the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that
Act.”37 By only advising funds that are non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds,
such as funds exempt under Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C),
3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) of the Investment Company Act, private equity real
estate advisers may benefit in two ways. The advisers may (1) be able to
avoid provisions under the Advisers Act created by the Dodd-Frank Act
that regulate “private funds” and (2) possibly bypass the Volcker Rule,
should the joint agencies limit their discretion by not applying the Volcker
Rule against non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds.
The author strongly
recommends that the joint agencies limit their discretion in this regard,
35. See infra Part II for a discussion of when these investments are considered to
involve securities.
36. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 404, 415-16, 124 Stat. 1376,
1571, 1578-79, 1620 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections and titles of
U.S.C.)(limiting investment advisers to “private funds”).
37. Dodd-Frank Act § 402(a). The definition of an “investment company” is beyond
the scope of this article, but subject to certain exceptions, the term generally includes,
without limitation, most types of companies that (i) invest more than forty percent of their
total assets (excluding government securities and cash) in securities on an unconsolidated
basis or (ii) hold themselves out as primarily engaged in the business of investing in
securities. Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(A), (C)(1940). The interpretation of these
requirements is very complex and subject to considerable nuance.
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which is what they have proposed to do.
Last, in Part V, this article analyzes the complex securities structuring
considerations for private equity real estate funds seeking to rely upon the
exemptions in Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and
3(c)(9) of the Investment Company Act. Traditionally, many private equity
real estate funds have relied upon Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the
Investment Company Act due to the fact that the exemptions under
Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) require a
more complicated securities analysis. Relying upon the Section 3(a)(1),
3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) exemptions would therefore
entail considerable compliance hurdles. By laying down the compliance
groundwork for private equity real estate investment advisers seeking to
rely upon non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions, the author hopes to ease the
burdens of the complexity of the relevant securities analysis. Private equity
real estate investment advisers seeking to avoid their funds being deemed
“private funds” will have to balance the burden of these compliance hurdles
against any potential benefits under the Dodd-Frank Act.
I.

POLICY ANALYSIS

This article focuses on two major aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act’s
impact on private equity real estate regulation: (1) the Advisers Act
registration; and (2) the portions of the Dodd-Frank Act that regulate
investment advisers to “private funds,” most significantly, but not limited
to, the Volcker Rule and Form PF. If private equity real estate advisers are
able to sidestep the Advisers Act, they will avoid the Advisers Act
registration and regulatory impact created by the Dodd-Frank entirely
(including very likely the Volcker Rule). If this cannot be accomplished,
the private equity real estate advisers could still seek alternative solutions,
such as seeking non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exemptions, to
sidestep the portions of the Dodd-Frank Act pertinent to “private funds”
investment advisers.
As summarized in the introduction, the author argues for the
legitimacy of the advisers seeking to sidestep both (1) and (2) mentioned
above, because of the liberal stance taken by the SEC toward non-securities
real estate investments and because of the SEC’s finalization of Form PF,
which does not apply to private equity real estate funds utilizing non(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions.
Furthermore, the author believes that regulators likely intended these
new side paths, since private equity real estate does not generate systemic
risk concerns.
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A. Systemic Risk Concerns of Private Equity Real Estate
Before tackling new routes to navigate through the rocky regulatory
landscape, one must ask whether adapting to regulation is positive for
society from a policy perspective. This article answers in the affirmative.
In order to arrive at this answer, it is necessary to recap the legislative
history of Title IV and the Volcker Rule of Dodd-Frank.
As discussed in the introduction, the legislative history for Title IV
notes that Title IV requires many previously exempt advisers to register
with a primary intention to monitor hedge fund systemic risks. The
legislative history for the Volcker Rule suggests that Congress sought to
apply the Volcker Rule to (1) banking investments that might be too risky,
(2) banking investments that might threaten American financial stability or
give rise to systemic risks and (3) banking investments that might result in
the need for another bank bailout at the expense of taxpayers.
This section will ultimately show that none of the concerns of Title IV
or the Volcker Rule applies to private equity real estate. However, in order
to show that this is true, we must first understand the exact meaning of
“systemic risks.”
1. Systemic Risks Defined
“There is . . . a great deal of confusion about what types of risk are
truly ‘systemic’ – the term meaning ‘[o]f or pertaining to a system’. . . .”38
“As a result, the ‘very definition [of systemic risk] is still somewhat
unsettled.’”39 This is problematic for society. “If a problem cannot be
defined, it cannot be solved – or, at least, it cannot be efficiently solved –
because confusion over the nature of the problem can obscure attempts to
provide solutions.”40
In his 2008 paper “Systemic Risk,” Professor Schwarcz sorts through
the different threads of “systemic risk” definitions to create a synthesized
definition that functions for regulatory purposes. The article begins by
noting:
A common factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is
that a trigger event, such as an economic shock or institutional
failure, causes a chain of bad economic consequences –
sometimes referred to as a domino effect. These consequences
could include (a chain of) financial institution and/or market
failures. Less dramatically, these consequences might include (a
38. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 196.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 197.
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chain of) significant losses to financial institutions or substantial
financial-market price volatility. In either case, the consequences
impact financial institutions, markets, or both.41
Schwarcz describes the most serious direct consequences of systemic
failure as the failure of banks and other financial institutions, which,
“[E]specially in large numbers, can deprive society of capital and increase
its cost.”42 While Schwarcz’s ideas are very helpful, they do not provide a
tool to assess whether an investment scheme generates systemic risks.
One simple analogy to the financial systemic effect is a physical
network of nodes, composed of metal balls and linked by metal chains,
where the vibration of one node is violent enough to break the whole
network of chains and balls. The physical property of the network is such
that three characteristics of its components would determine the
breakability of the whole network: (1) The weight of a given ball, relative
to the total mass of the network; the heavier it is, the larger percentage of
its weight is in the total weight of the network, the more likely its vibration
will lead to the breakage of the network; (2) The strength of a given ball’s
connections to the rest of the nodes along the chains; the stronger its
connections to the other nodes, the higher the chance is for it to exert a
systemic impact on the whole network; (3) The resonant tendency between
a given ball and other balls across the chains; the more closely the ball’s
oscillations match the system’s natural frequency of vibration, the more
likely that its own violent motions may lead to a catastrophic collapse of
the whole system, a phenomenon known in physics as “resonance disaster.”
So, what significance does a physical chain of nodes carry for the
financial systemic effect of our interest? Interestingly, many financial
phenomena operate under similar laws as physical phenomena in life. The
translation of the above three characteristics into economic terms would be:
(1) The industry size of an investment scheme or group of financial
institutions, relative to the markets in which they operate, and possibly
other markets that might subsequently be affected by them; (2) The
financial and operational connections between one investment scheme and
other markets as well as the causal relationship between them; (3) The
synchronization between one investment scheme’s gain/loss and other
types of schemes’ gain/loss across the markets, with or without possible
time delays.
A classic example of financial institution systemic failure often
referred to by economic scholars is “a ‘bank run,’ in which the inability of
a bank to satisfy withdrawal-demands causes its failure, in turn causing

41. Id. at 198.
42. Id.
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other banks or their creditors to fail.”43 If a bank cannot pay all
withdrawal-demands, it will default and ultimately fail, possibly causing a
“chain of subsequent failures [to] occur because banks are closely
intertwined financially. They lend to and borrow from each other, hold
deposit balances with each other, and make payments through the interbank
clearing system . . . .”44 This example suits the aforementioned second
characteristic of a financial network component that is prone to generate a
systemic effect on the whole network.
2. Why PERE Itself Poses No Direct Systemic Risks
Unlike banks, private equity real estate does not seem to suit any one
of the three characteristics mentioned above. First, it constitutes a very
small industry size in comparison to many other types of investment
schemes, such as hedge funds and banks. PERE likely has less than onetenth of the assets of the private equity industry as a whole, and a tiny
fraction of the trillions of dollars in assets that banks possess.45
Second, the financial connections between private equity real estate
and markets are significantly weaker than, say, hedge funds and banks.
Hedge funds have exposure to a wide variety of markets via derivatives
transactions and their broad investment strategies, but PERE strategies are
much narrower and they don’t do much with derivatives. Banks have
inherent exposure to many markets via derivatives transactions and
interbank lending, among other things.
In terms of synchronization, PERE has often desynchronized
investment returns with other investment schemes. David Geltner, Norman
G. Miller, Jim Clayton, and Piet Eichholtz observed stocks, real estate
long-term bonds, and t-bills, concluding:
[T]he four major asset classes . . . do not all “move together” in
their investment performance. That is, they do not always tend to
all do well at the same time, or all do poorly at the same time.
The correlation among their periodic returns is generally only
moderately positive.46
Therefore, it is unlikely that private equity real estate will pose
systemic risks through its sheer industry size, its financial connections or
the synchronization of its investment returns with other investment
schemes’ returns across the markets.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 199.
Id.
See infra Part I.A.3.a.
DAVID M. GELTNER, ET AL., COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE: ANALYSIS
INVESTMENTS 137-38 (Sara Glassmeyer et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014).
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3. Comparisons Between Hedge Funds And Private Equity Real
Estate Funds
Private equity real estate funds are a type of “private funds,” meaning
funds exempt from the Investment Company Act, just like hedge funds. It
is important to compare hedge funds and private equity real estate funds,
which are, in many respects, regulated similarly and thus tend to be seen by
inexperienced financial or legal personnel as imposing the same level of
risks, either on their investments or on the capital markets as a whole. It is
worth noting that the risk of a particular type of investment is different
from the risk it imposes on the whole financial system; the former is
investment risk, and the latter is systemic risk.
Some view the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act as not only a cure
for poor mortgage lending practices but also as providing necessary
preventative measures against any systemic risks posed by hedge funds,
especially because a parallel could be drawn between bank systemic risk
and the kind of risk posed by hedge funds. For example, in either instance,
market shocks triggered institutional failures which in turn led, or
could have led, to a chain of institutional and market failures. . . .
Both also were transmitted through linkages in a chain of
relationships: in bank systemic risk, the linkages are interbank
borrowings and the interbank clearing system for payments; in
LTCM, the linkages arose from its derivatives-based hedging
strategy with other institutions, which, in turn, had linkages with
yet other institutions and markets.47
Such a view is possibly further strengthened by additional explanations for
why hedge funds might give rise to systemic risk: (1) derivatives trades, (2)
the size of industry, (3) runs on prime brokers, (4) short selling, (5) usage
of leverage, (6) illiquidity, (7) mortgage-backed securities exposure, and
(8) lack of adequate information.48 Of course, not everyone agrees that
hedge funds do give rise to systemic risks, but if they were to generate
systemic risk concerns, the foregoing explains why they might do so.
But the same systemic risks concerns are not applicable to private
equity real estate funds, which have a much smaller industry size, as well
as far fewer financial connections and the absence of synchronization.
Private equity real estate funds have several key structural differences from
hedge funds.
47. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 201 (internal footnotes omitted).
48. See generally Lloyd Dixon, Noreen Clancy & Krishna B. Kumar, Hedge Funds
and Systemic Risk, RAND CORP. 63,
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1236.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2013) (identifying “six areas of concern regarding hedge funds’ potential
contribution to systemic risk . . . .”).
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a. Derivatives Trades
Compared to hedge funds, which many believe carry a large-size
exposure to other institutions and market participants by virtue of their
derivatives activities,49 the real estate derivatives market for private equity
real estate is very slim in the United States.
Before the financial crisis,
In the U.K., [real estate] derivatives trading has been growing,
with GBP 3.9 billion, or about $7.9 billion, in trades in the first
six months of this year matching the total for all of 2006. In
contrast, the U.S. market has struggled to take off. While there
are no formal data, experts suggest that trades total in the
hundreds of millions of dollars rather than billions.50
This is a tiny fraction of the notional value of U.S. total derivatives, which
was estimated estimated as $182.2 trillion in 2008.51 While it might be
possible in the future that private equity real estate could be sufficiently
exposed to derivatives, we are an extremely long way off from such an
occurrence.
It should also be noted that Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act subjects
OTC derivatives (i.e., one counterparty faces another counterparty), “even
hedges executed by non-financial end users,” to “regulatory oversight and
new requirements.”52 That should plug the regulatory gap in derivatives.
Title VII, combined with the very tiny size of the real derivatives market,
makes it highly unlikely for private equity real estate to pose systemic
risks.

49. See Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 203 (“In [Long-Term Capital Management], the
potential for systemic risk existed not by reason of its intrinsic status as a hedge fund but by
the sheer size of its exposure to other institutions and market participants.”).
50. Molly Dover, Real-Estate Finance: How Derivatives Give Shelter – FinancialMarket Uncertainty May be Catalyst for Big Boost in Instruments in U.S., U.K., WALL ST.
J., Sep. 26, 2007, at B7.
51. OCC Reports Second Quarter Bank Trading Revenue of $1.6 Billion, OFFICE OF
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.occ.gov/newsissuances/news-releases/2008/nr-occ-2008-115.html
[hereinafter
OFFICE
OF
THE
COMPTROLLER] (“[T]he notional amount of derivatives held by insured U.S. commercial
banks increased by $1.8 trillion in the second quarter, or 1 percent, to $182 trillion.”).
52. Dodd-Frank’s Title VII – OTC Derivatives Reform: Important Answers for Board
Members as Companies Begin the Road to Reform, ERNST & YOUNG 1,
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Key_questions_board_members_should_ask_a
bout_Title_VII/$FILE/Americas_FAAS_Dodd_Frank_derivatives_reform.pdf (last visited
Oct. 20, 2013).
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b. The Size of Industry
Given the small real estate derivatives market, the size of private
equity real estate’s exposure to other institutions and market participants is
most likely to be minimal. The small exposure of private equity real estate
is further supported by the small industry size of private equity real estate
compared to the size of hedge funds. As mentioned previously, as of the
third quarter of 2013, there were “468 private equity real estate funds
(targeting assets rather than other funds) seeking an aggregate of $154
[billion] in capital commitments].”53 Compare that number to hedge funds.
As of late 2012, “[g]lobal hedge funds now [oversaw] $2.2 trillion in
assets. . . .”54 Even hedge funds as an industry represent a relatively small
size. “As of September 30, 2010, the global mutual fund industry managed
$23.7 trillion in assets, and the top 50 U.S. bank holding companies alone
had $14.4 trillion in assets.”55
In addition, hedge funds account for a very large percentage of trading
activity in many markets. “A 2007 study found that hedge funds accounted
for 25 to 60 percent of the turnover in the markets examined.”56 Private
equity real estate, however, accounts for only a small percentage of
transactions in the real estate markets. Even Public Real Estate Investment
Trusts (“REITs”), which potentially carry a much bigger industry market
capitalization (approximately $603.4153 billion57 in 2012) than private
equity real estate, “control only a fraction of all commercial property
investment. In real estate, it is not uncommon for individual or institutional
investors to effectively own the underlying productive assets directly, with
no corporate-level entity involved in the investment decision-making
process.”58 It is estimated that “[t]he [“pure-play”] real estate asset class
total value [is] approximately $17 trillion . . . [including] residential as well
as commercial property. . . .”59
Therefore, the industry size of private equity real estate is quite small,
compared to that of other types of industries and investment schemes. The
small size of private equity real estate gauged from several different
53. Mather, supra note 5.
54. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Hedge Funds Reach Record Size Thanks to Recent Strong
Returns, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2012, 10:59 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/18/us-hedgefunds-flowsidUSBRE89H0XT20121018.
55. Dixon et al., supra note 48, at 14.
56. Id. at 14-15.
57. Historical REIT Industry Market Capitalization: 1972-2012, REIT.COM,
http://www.reit.com/DataAndResearch/US-REIT-Industry-MarketCap.aspx (last visited
Sep. 20, 2013).
58. GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 287.
59. Id. at 136, n.16.
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perspectives suggests that it doesn’t generate systemic risks.
c. Use of Prime Brokers
Hedge funds may have contributed to systemic risk during 2008
partially because “hedge fund managers withdrew tens of billions of dollars
in assets from prime brokers and their parent investment banks. These
withdrawals were essentially a run on the bank, analogous to bank runs by
individual depositors during the Great Depression, and contributed to the
financial crisis.”60 “Prime brokers provide a centralized securities clearing
facility, handle a hedge fund’s collateral, and may provide financing to
hedge fund clients to facilitate trades.”61 However, not all believe that
hedge funds contributed to significant losses at prime brokers. “[T]here is
little indication that hedge fund losses led to significant losses at prime
brokers and other creditors. It appears that prime brokers and other hedge
fund creditors required adequate margin and collateral to protect
themselves against hedge fund losses.”62
It is also worth mentioning that:
The reforms go a long way in addressing factors that can lead to
hedge fund runs on prime brokers. Dodd-Frank contains
provisions that protect the margin that hedge funds post with
prime brokers on their derivatives positions. A prime broker
must segregate these assets from its own account for certain types
of swaps and give a party the option of segregating the assets for
others. These new provisions should reduce the incentives for
hedge funds to withdraw funds from their prime brokers at the
first sign of trouble.63
In contrast to hedge funds, private equity real estate funds typically do
not use prime brokers, so another potential avenue of systemic risk would
not occur in the case of private equity real estate.
d. Short Selling
Short selling (or “shorting”) is a central part of many hedge fund
investment strategies, and hedge fund shorting has been blamed for
contributing to the financial crisis. The U.S. Securities and Exchange

60. Dixon et al., supra note 48, at xviii.
61. Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability:
Regulating Prime Brokers will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 283, 290 (2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1297188.
62. Dixon et al., supra note 48, at xv-xvi.
63. Id. at xx.
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Commission’s (SEC’s) ban on shorting financial stocks between September
19 and October 8, 2008, indicates that at least some in government were
concerned about the impact of short selling.64
Concern remains that short selling by a large hedge fund or multiple
hedge funds can result in an unjustified fall in stock prices or can cause a
decline in the real value of the firm. The decline might be so rapid that
there is no opportunity for the firm to dispel rumors about its financial
health or for investors to provide additional capital before the firm
collapses. Such collapses can pose a risk to the financial system and
reduce the level of economic activity.65
However, “[a]lthough some studies identify short selling as a
significant contributor to the financial crisis, the bulk of research does not
conclude that short selling played a major role.”66 Nonetheless, the DoddFrank Act does contain provisions to regulate short selling.
Whatever the merits of this position, private equity real estate funds
invest the vast majority of their funds in real estate properties, for which
there is no real short selling market. As Geltner et al. pointed out, “[i]n real
estate, short sales are impossible in reality. . . .”67 While it is possible that
private equity real estate funds might do some short selling of mortgagebacked securities, redirecting private equity real estate toward the non(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions, several of which are aimed at funds that invest in
non-securities and real estate investments, would generally limit the
amount of mortgage-backed securities that a private equity real estate fund
could invest in, and would consequently limit the amount of mortgagebacked securities short sales.
e. Usage of Leverage
“The use of debt to finance an equity investment creates what is called
‘leverage’ in the equity investment, because it allows equity investors to
magnify the amount of underlying physical capital they control (which may
also magnify the risk and return performance of the equity).”68 “Leverage
affects the ex ante equity risk premium in just such a way that the benefit of
the additional expected return is exactly offset by the cost of the additional
risk, as evaluated by the capital market.”69
King and Maier, who discussed the potential systemic risks posed by
hedge fund leverage, explained:
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at xvii.
Id. at xxi.
Id. at xvii.
GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 711, n.6.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 296.
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A direct channel occurs when a collapse of a hedge fund (or
group of hedge funds) leads to forced liquidations of their
positions at fire-sale prices. The impact on asset prices may be
amplified through the use of leverage – whether created directly
using margin or indirectly using derivatives. If the positions are
large, relative to the liquidity of the asset, a disorderly unwinding
could generate heavy losses to counterparties, and ultimately
contribute to financial distress at one or more systematically
important financial institutions.70
Their article further noted that “[i]n the indirect channel, forced hedge fund
liquidation exacerbates market volatility and reduces liquidity in other
financial markets, potentially leading to contagion.”71
In contrast, the typical leverage used by private equity real estate
funds is generally very moderate, which would decrease the risk of forced
liquidations. Ernst and Young reports that in 2007, private equity real
estate funds averaged leverage in the 65%-75% range, while their 2011
trend averaged leverage in the 60%-70% range.72 In practice, though, many
private equity real estate funds utilize even lower leverage than that.
“Traditionally core investment funds employed little or no financial
leverage, but by the 2000s they were often using modest amounts of debt,
up to 20%-30% loan-to-value ratios (LTVs).”73
“Perhaps most
significantly, the value-added style traditionally allows considerably more
financial leverage than the core style, with typical LTVs in the
neighborhood of 50 percent or slightly more. This is still conservative by
the standards of many real estate investors . . . .”74 In contrast, for hedge
funds, one recent article noted that “hedge fund managers reported leverage
of 3.4 [i.e. 340%], on average.”75
This said, Dixon et al. suggested that even hedge funds don’t
necessarily even pose systemic risks on account of leverage: “[I]t appears
that hedge funds typically have a much lower rate of leverage on average
(two to three times leveraged) than other segments of the financial sector

70. King & Maier, supra note 61, at 286.
71. Id.
72. Trends Facing Real Estate Private Equity: Changes to Fund Structuring Terms,
ERNST & YOUNG, http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/Real-Estate/Trends-facing-realestate-private-equity—-Changes-to-fund-structuring-terms (last visited Oct. 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Changes to Fund Structuring Terms].
73. GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 680.
74. Id.
75. Katya Wachtel, Unstructured Finance: Hedge Funds Love Affair with Leverage
Still on Hiatus, for Now, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://blogs.reuters.com/unstructuredfinance/2012/10/05/hedge-funds-love-affair-withleverage-still-on-hiatus-for-now.
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(investment banks are often leveraged between 14 and 40 times).”76
Therefore, given that private equity real estate fund leverage is
typically very moderate, it further supports the argument that private equity
real estate doesn’t generate systemic risks.
f.

Illiquidity

Recent academic research suggests that it is increasingly important to
pay attention to the liquidity of hedge fund investments, and regulators
should realize that, even if no one hedge fund may be large enough to pose
a systemic risk to the financial system, negative shocks can cause hedge
funds as a group to unwind their positions at the same time, with
ramifications cascading through the economy.77
In other words, the concern is that “the buildup of highly leveraged,
illiquid hedge fund portfolios and massive deleveraging when prime
brokers or investors withdraw credit and capital in response to a financial
shock.”78 As noted above, “If the positions are large, relative to the
liquidity of the asset, a disorderly unwinding could generate heavy losses to
counterparties, and ultimately contribute to financial distress at one or more
systematically important financial institutions.”79
Although private equity real estate investments may also be illiquid,
meaning that they might be difficult to easily sell without a substantial loss
in value, given the tiny size of the industry, and the fact that it accounts for
only a fraction of the activities that occur in the real estate markets, it is
highly unlikely that the illiquidity of its investments would pose systemic
risks. As discussed in the introduction, the weak financial connection and
absence of synchronization would also support the argument that private
equity real estate doesn’t generate systemic risks.
g. Mortgage-Backed Securities
Some argue that hedge funds give rise to systemic concerns because
“hedge funds invested in the mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”s) and
collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”s) that contributed to the buildup of
the housing bubble.”80 However, others also argue that hedge funds did not
contribute to systemic risks in this respect:
[B]y shorting subprime mortgages and banks that were heavily
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Dodd-Frank: The Road Ahead, supra note 25, at 2.
Dixon et al., supra note 48, at xxiii.
Id. at xxv.
King & Maier, supra note 61, at 286.
Dixon et al., supra note 48, at xvi.
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exposed to subprime debt, hedge funds called attention to the
growing bubble. They also provided funds to this market at the
trough of the crash, possibly limiting further declines. In light of
these opposing factors, no strong case can be made that hedge
funds were a significant contributor to the financial crisis through
the buildup of the housing bubble.81
Whatever the merits of the above arguments, despite the possibility of
private equity real estate funds investing in mortgages and mortgagebacked securities, it is highly improbable that private equity real estate
would lead to systemic risk by virtue of its investments in mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities. This is because the Dodd-Frank Act should
cure any problems with poor mortgage lending practices and the resulting
problems with mortgage-backed securities. In addition, by redirecting
private equity real estate funds toward non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions,
several of which are aimed at funds that invest in non-securities and real
estate, it would further limit the ability of private equity real estate to
become involved in mortgage-backed securities. Finally, it’s unusual for
private equity real estate funds to focus on investing in mortgages and
mortgage-backed securities. Instead, the vast majority of their investments
are in various types of real properties.
h. Lack of Information
“Following the LTCM collapse and during the financial crisis,
regulators complained about the lack of transparency in hedge fund
positions, leverage, and asset valuation and were frustrated by their
inability to collect data on hedge funds.”82 Form PF “aggressively
addresses gaps in the information available to regulators on hedge fund
operations, investment strategies, and investment positions. The legislation
will also result in far more information being available on derivatives
trades, trades that were at the heart of the financial crisis, and short sales.”83
The regulators have already finalized Form PF, and they haven’t sought to
apply it against private equity real estate. As shown above, private equity
real estate doesn’t engage in many derivatives trades, and engages in no
short sales. Further, as demonstrated through all the evidence presented
above, private equity real estate doesn’t generate systemic risks. Therefore,
a lack of information concern doesn’t apply to private equity real estate.
i.

Summary of Comparisons Between Hedge Funds and Private

81. Id.
82. Id. at xviii-xix.
83. Id. at xix.
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Equity Real Estate Funds
The table below summarizes the key differences between the two
types of funds, in terms of the systemic risk concerns of either fund. It is
worth noting that the systemic risk concerns of hedge funds don’t
necessarily indicate that they really do give rise to systemic risks, but only
reflect some scholarly opinions that they may raise concerns about such
potential risks.
HEDGE FUNDS
(HF)

PRIVATE EQUITY
REAL ESTATE
FUNDS (PEREF)

SYSTEMIC
CONCERNS
HF

RISK
PEREF

SIZE OF
INDUSTRY

Relatively
Large
(~2.2 trillion)84

Relatively Small
(~$154 billion)85

Yes

No

DERIVATIVES
MARKET

25-60%86

Very Small87

Yes

No

USE OF PRIME
BROKERS

Relatively
Large Exposure

Tiny Exposure

Yes

No

SHORT
SELLING

Yes

No

Yes

No

USE OF
LEVERAGE

Moderate
High
(Average
~340%)88
Yes

Low to Moderate
(Average is ~6070%)89

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Unlikely90

ILLIQUIDITY

to
is

84. Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 54.
85. Mather, supra note 5.
86. Dixon et al., supra note 48.
87. Even for REITs, which are a type of public real estate investment trusts that
potentially carries a much bigger industry market capitalization (approximately $603.4153
billion in 2012) than private equity real estate, according to Geltner, “REITs control only a
fraction of all commercial property investment. In real estate, it is not uncommon for
individual or institutional investors to effectively own the underlying productive assets
directly, with no corporate-level entity involved in the investment decision-making
process.” Geltner et al., supra note 46, at 287. Geltner, et al. estimate that “[t]he [“pureplay”] real estate asset class total value [is] approximately $17 trillion … [including]
residential as well as commercial property….” Id. at 136.
88. Wachtel, supra note 75.
89. Changes to Fund Structuring Terms, supra note 72.
90. Due to small size, lack of connections and no synchronization.
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Yes

Very Limited

Yes

No

Yes (before
Dodd-Frank)

No

Yes

No

4. Indirect Systemic Risk Concerns of Banking Investments in PERE
We have just shown that PERE itself poses no direct systemic risk
concerns. Let’s now do the following thought experiment. Suppose that
the markets are a body of water, which consists of streams, rivers, lakes,
seas and oceans, and suppose that the banks are rivers feeding into the seas
and oceans, and that PERE is a stream. We already know that the stream
itself has minimal effects on the whole water body, and therefore must not
be directly connected with the big oceans in any major way. But still, even
though the stream doesn’t join the oceans by itself, the stream is still
connected to the rivers, which feed into the seas and oceans. Thus,
although PERE itself poses no systemic risk concerns, could banking
investments in PERE induce failures of banks, which would in turn give
rise to a different form of systemic risk?
Let’s consider a flow chart that demonstrates our problem at hand:
Economy  Market  Banks  PERE  Real Estate Investments

As we mentioned earlier, because of the strong connections between
banks and various other financial entities in the markets, banks carry
inherent systemic risks. If we were to determine the possibility of a risk
“ripple effect” across the flow chart illustrated above, namely, the back
propagation of banks’ inherent risks through the market via potential
contributing factors of PERE, what would be the factors we considered?
Obviously, the inherent risks of PERE investments could potentially
feed backward to the banks and propagate along the whole chain of the
financial markets. Most comfortingly, thus far our analysis of systemic
risks has ruled out any direct systemic risk concerns of PERE itself. But
what about the investment risks of such funds, which conduct real estate
investments?
Last, but not least, recall one of the points in the legislative history of
the Volcker Rule, which concerns the prohibitive effect of the Volcker
Rule to “reduce the scale, complexity, and interconnectedness of those
banks that . . . have hedge fund or private equity exposure.”91 What are the
91. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 8 (2010).
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nature and strength of PERE’s connection with the banks? In the ensuing
subsections, we will examine these factors, one by one.
5. The Typically Moderate Investment Risks of Private Equity Real
Estate.
The portfolio of each PERE fund varies from case to case, but in
general, most PERE funds largely invest in operational real estate
(including improvement properties), and then moderately in land.
However, many types of PERE funds don’t invest in land at all. The local
investment risks of these real estate investments are examined below.
6. Risk Assessment of Real Estate Investments
One point that greatly favors real estate as an investment target is that,
like most investments that carry a cyclical characteristic, it is historically an
investment with a low to moderate risk profile in comparison with many
other types of investments. A book entitled Commercial Real Estate
Analysis and Investments provides a table on the stereotypical
characterization of major investment asset classes.
INVESTMENT
STOCKS
REAL
LONGCASH(T-BILLS)
CONCERN
ESTATE*
TERM
BONDS**
Risk
High
Moderate to Moderate to Lowest
Low***
Low***
Total Return
High
Moderate
Moderate
Lowest
Current Yield
Low
High
Highest
Moderate
Growth
High
Low
None
None****
Inflation
LR.
Good
Bad
Best (if
Protection
Good
reinvested)
* Unlevered institutional quality commercial property (fully
operational, “stabilized”).
** Investment grade corporate or government bonds.
*** Low risk for investors with long-term horizons and deep pockets,
so they can hold the assets to maturity or until prices are favorable.
Moderate risk for investors fully exposed to asset market price volatility.
**** Unless the investment is rolled over (reinvested), in which case
there is no current yield.92
The authors of this book go on to note:
92. GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 137.
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[I]n the risk and return dimensions, unlevered investment in real
estate tends to fall between stocks at one extreme and cash (or
short-term bonds such as T-bills) at the other extreme. In this
regard, real estate is much like long-term bonds. Unlike bonds,
however, real estate provides some capital growth and relatively
good inflation protection.93
In addition, this table demonstrates that an asset class with low to moderate
risks, fully operational unlevered institutional quality commercial property
real estate offers an excellent combination of total return and current yield.
The authors of the book make an additional observation: They studied
both the average annual total return from 1970-2010 as well as the annual
volatility from 1970-2010 and noted that real estate had approximately an
11% annual volatility level, while stocks had approximately an 18% annual
volatility level.94 The authors note that volatility “is a basic way to measure
the risk in an investment, because it indicates the range of variability in the
investment performance outcomes across time.”95 On the side of the
average annual total return, real estate had approximately a 10% return
level, while stocks had an approximately 12% return level.96 While stocks
exhibited volatility that was approximately 63.64% greater than real estate,
they only appeared to generate returns that were 20% greater.97 That
suggests that real estate likely delivers excellent risk-adjusted returns.
Of course, the chart discussed above evaluates the characteristics of
real estate on an unlevered basis. But even in the leveraged case, the fact
that PERE typically uses moderate leverage keeps the risks of leverage
relatively moderate. The observation that PERE funds averaged leverage
in the 60-70% range in 2011,98 combined with the generally low volatility
of the real estate markets, suggests only a moderate risk of leveraged assets
for PERE investors. The architects of the Volcker Rule were likely
concerned about the amount of leverage used by hedge funds.99 One article
noted that Long Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), a hedge fund that
collapsed during the late 1990s, “had borrowed . . . a leverage factor of

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Changes to Fund Structuring Terms, supra note 72.
99. Study and Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain
Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL 56 (Jan. 2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20fin
al%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.
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roughly thirty to one.”100 Of course, today hedge funds don’t typically
borrow at that level. One recent article noted that “hedge fund managers
reported leverage of 3.4, on average.”101 It is therefore apparent that even
the most leveraged variety of PERE funds are typically much less
leveraged than hedge funds.
Furthermore, when the volatility of PERE investments is computed
with the consideration of leverage, leverage appears to increase the
volatilities of PERE funds by a moderate amount. For example, when a
side-by-side comparison was made between the cumulative total returns
(income plus capital appreciation) from 2000 through early 2012 as tracked
by the NCREF Property Index (NPI)102 and by two institutional investor
fund-level indices published by NCREIF in cooperation with the Townsend
Group (an institutional investment consultancy),103 the NPI had quarterly
volatility of 2.9%, the core funds index had quarterly volatility of 4.0% and
the value-added funds index had quarterly volatility of 5.6%.104 This
suggests that even compared to the unlevered commercial property
investments, private equity real estate funds carry only moderately higher
risks. Given all this, one may view PERE as a relatively safe investment
tool, even with the consideration of leverage.105
The chart also only evaluates the investment characteristics of
institutional quality commercial property, rather than other types of real
estate investments. Many private equity real estate funds invest in
institutional quality commercial property, but some may invest in land or
properties to be improved, which not only is riskier, but also carries the
potential for greater returns that are commensurate with the additional
risks. As noted above, value-added funds, which invest in some property
improvements, still exhibit moderate volatility.
Land as an investment class is considerably riskier than other types of
naked real estate investments. Under the call option model of land value,
“land is viewed as obtaining its value through the option it gives its owner

100. Alison K. Gary, Creating a Future Economic Crisis: Political Failure and the
Loopholes of the Volcker Rule, 90 OR. L. REV. 1339, 1380 (2012) (internal citation omitted).
101. Wachtel, supra note 75.
102. The NCREIF Property Index (NPI), available at http://www.ncreif.org/propertyindex-returns.aspx, is a quarterly time series composite total rate of return measure of
investment performance of a very large pool of individual commercial real estate properties
(unlevered) acquired in the private market for investment purposes only.
103. Unlike the NPI index, the NCREIF / Townsend indices are private equity real
estate fund-level indices, which exemplify an “attempt to track the performance actually
realized by investors in funds that invest in properties, rather than the performance achieved
directly by the underlying properties.” GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 679.
104. Id. at 680.
105. Occasionally, a private equity real estate fund could use higher leverage that raises
the investment risks, but the industry doesn’t trend in that direction.
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to develop a structure on the land. The land owner can obtain a valuable
rent-paying asset upon the payment of the construction cost necessary to
build the structure.”106 It’s worth noting that land effectively adds leverage
to the funds’ investments. When investing in land, the,
[P]ortfolio of investments includes a long position in the
underlying real estate asset (the forward commitment) and a short
position in the construction costs (the leverage).
The
combination of short and long cash flows is inherently levered
because the cash outflows do not occur at the same time and
because the construction costs are not perfectly and positively
correlated with the value of the underlying asset.107
Although land effectively adds leverage, “the option enables the landowner
to avoid much of the negative consequences of the downside outcome of
future market volatility, while still retaining the ability to profit from the
upside.”108 Nonetheless, land has a risky side to it, since the decision to
hold off on developing the land involves risks about what the future might
bring. The value of the land option depends very sensitively on the
difference between the construction costs and the value of what can be
built. “As investments, call options are much more risky than their
underlying assets (in this case, the usage value of the built property), and
hence require a much higher expected return.”109
Despite the fact that land investments might significantly increase the
risks of PERE, a footnote in the above chart noted that real estate is lower
risk “for investors with long-term horizons and deep pockets, so they can
hold the assets to maturity or until prices are favorable.”110 This is
auspicious news for PERE, since PERE usually does have long-term
investment horizons.111 The long-term horizon of PERE will clearly help
offset short-term real estate market fluctuations, and therefore help ease the
risks of land investments, even though land investments are still relatively
risky. Keep in mind, however, that many types of PERE funds have
nothing to do with land investments.
Another point worth noting is that Dodd-Frank requires
banks to develop in-depth internal ratings methodologies to
assess investment risk. As a result, regulators and boards will
likely have higher expectations for the investment due diligence
106. GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 707.
107. Matthew S. Flowers, Show Me the Money: A Study of Real Estate Development
Returns (July 31, 2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology),
available at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/58645/315888415.pdf.
108 . GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 709.
109. Id. at 96.
110. Id. at 137.
111. Id.
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processes banks and their external service provides have in place.
Banks without the resources to develop these internal processes
may be forced to significantly limit their investment opportunity
set, possibly limiting earnings and diversification potential in the
securities portfolio.112
As a result, there is every reason to expect that banks will be reasonable
about limiting their investments in PERE with higher investment risk
profiles.
During the financial crisis of 2008, it is highly likely that mortgagebacked securities were even more toxic as an asset class than real estate
itself. During the crisis, banks had many trillions of dollars in exposure to
toxic mortgage assets. In contrast, the PERE industry focuses primarily on
operating and developing real properties, and not on investing in mortgagebacked securities. Furthermore, banks already have so much exposure to
mortgage-backed securities that it is highly improbable that any secondary
exposure from rare types of PERE funds would “tip the scales” and raise
systemic risk concerns.
There is more favorable news for PERE. One of the investments that
arguably made hedge funds high risk was derivatives. For PERE, the real
estate derivatives market is currently very slim in the United States. While
there is no formal data, experts suggest that trades total in the hundreds of
millions of dollars rather than billions.113 This is obviously an extremely
tiny fraction of the notional value of U.S. total derivatives, which was
estimated to be $182.2 trillion in 2008.114
Another source of risk for hedge funds that makes them very risky is
short selling. “In real estate, short sales are impossible in reality . . . .” 115
That fact is also comforting.
Some naysayers might argue that the financial crisis of 2008 was
caused by the fact that banks were exposed to real estate investments.
However, while real estate did suffer a particularly sharp decline after the
financial crisis of 2008, that was an anomalous drop. No other real estate
crises since 1969 resulted in a drop of an even remotely comparable
magnitude. Figure 1 below shows the history of U.S. commercial real
estate from December 1969 until December 2009.

112. Sabrina C. Callin and Justin J. Ayre, Rethinking Best Practices for Bank Investment
Portfolios, PIMCO (May 2012), http://pimco.com/EN/insights/pages/rethinking-bestpractices-for-bank-investment-portfolios.aspx.
113. Dover, supra note 50.
114. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, supra note 51.
115. GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 711.
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FIGURE 1. The U.S. Institutional Commercial Property Prices over Recent
Decades.
More importantly, the sharp decline in the real estate markets after the 2008
financial crisis was caused primarily by poor mortgage lending practices,
which had both induced the real estate bubble and then burst it. But the
inauguration of the Dodd-Frank Act was intended to solve the root of these
problems. If the Dodd-Frank succeeds in its goals, in light of the history of
real estate as an asset class and its characteristically low volatility, there is
no reason to anticipate real estate will perform inconsistently with its
historical characteristics. However, if by any chance, the sweeping
financial legislation suffers from an incomplete success and the nation
encounters another large-scale market crash, it would be extremely difficult
to envision real estate investment as the leading culprit of the potential
crisis, given the fact that it wasn’t real estate investment itself but poor
mortgage lending practices that triggered the 2008 financial crisis and that
real estate has typically been one of the lower risk investment types in the
nation’s financial history. Keep in mind that if there were ever a future real
estate crisis, banks would suffer great exposure to real estate risks via their
mortgage practices, and any secondary exposure to real estate from PERE
would be minimal. Thus, the regulators should focus on the root of the
problem, toxic mortgages, and avoid over-regulating PERE.
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7. The Interconnectedness of Banks with PERE Funds and Other
Investment Schemes
Given the scope and magnitude of banks’ connections with other
financial institutions as well as investment schemes, the connection
between banks and PERE, depending on its strength, could potentially
exaggerate the risks of PERE through bank’s multi-channeled connections
with the whole financial market. But would such a connection be so strong
that systemic risks could stem from such a typically moderate-risk
investment scheme as PERE, or even from a higher risk investment scheme
if a PERE fund were to invest in land?
In order to answer this question, we will first inspect the percentage of
banks’ investments in PERE relative to their whole investment portfolio,
and then examine the fund contributions of banks to PERE.
Overall, much evidence supports that BHCs are not too heavily
invested in PERE. First of all, below is a pie chart (Fig. 2) that illustrates
the distribution of various investment targets in BHC investment portfolios.
BHC investment portfolios, as of the end of 2011, accounted for $2.85
trillion, which amounted to 21% of BHC total assets.116

Banking investment portfolio
Corporate 3%
Other 1%
Treasuries 6%
Str Prod / ABS
6%
Non Agency
RMBS / CMBS
8%

Agency MBS
46%

Muni 8%

Foreign 10%
Agency 12%

116. Callin & Ayre, supra note 112.
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FIGURE 2. The distribution of investment targets in banks’ investment
portfolios
As the reader can see, 8% of banks’ investment portfolios are exposed
to non-agency mortgage-backed securities, which aren’t guaranteed. That
gives banks exposure to real estate, regardless of their exposure to PERE.
Outside of their investments, banks are also very often exposed to real
estate through their mortgage lending practices. In addition, banks invest
3% of their portfolios in corporations and 10% of their portfolios in foreign
securities. Among all types of investment activities of banks, PERE is by
no means the “frontrunner” of all others.
Secondly, out of the “1% Other” banking investments shown above,
only a small fraction of it has been invested in PERE. Preqin has noted that
“[b]anks accounted for 11% ($115bn) of the total capital invested in private
equity funds in 2008, whereas this figure fell to 8% ($110bn) in 2011.”117
This figure accounts for banking investments in all types of private equity
funds. The PERE industry is significantly smaller than the private equity
industry. Bain Capital recently noted that in 2012, the global private equity
industry had “[a]lmost $2 trillion worth of assets on general partners’ books
. . . .”118 One article notes that, as of Q3 2013, there were “468 private
equity real estate funds (targeting assets rather than other funds) seeking an
aggregate of $154 [billion] in capital commitments].”119 Thus, it appears
that the aggregate size of PERE is less than 10% of the aggregate size of
private equity as a whole. In turn, that suggests that if banks have $110
billion invested in private equity, they may only have as little as $10 billion
invested in PERE. Given that the investment assets of BHCs are likely
around $2.85 trillion, that means that PERE may likely constitute as little
as one-third of one percent of the investment assets of banks. As a result,
the connections between banks and PERE are very weak, and thus the
potential for systemic risk is very low.
Compare this figure to the level of banks’ exposure to mortgage loans
and mortgage-backed securities. Clearly, banks had and continue to have
trillions and trillions of dollars in combined mortgage and MBS exposure.
Banks as of 2012 had “two and a half trillion dollars in residential
mortgage exposure” alone on its balance sheets.120 In 2009, “banks and

117. Preqin Special Report: Banks as Investors in Private Equity, PREQIN 3,
https://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/Preqin_Special_Report_Banks_as_Investors_in_Privat
e_Equity.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
118. Global Private Equity Report 2012, supra note 4.
119. Mather, supra note 5.
120. Examining the Impact of the Proposed Rules to Implement Basel III Capital
Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Insurance, Housing & Community
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thrifts [held] about $1.7 trillion of commercial mortgages.”121 Commercial
banks as of 2011 had $1.3 trillion in MBS exposure as well.122 Another
article noted that banks probably lost “around half a trillion dollars” on
“subprime mortgages.”123 Thus, banks were exposed to various mortgage
dangers in an amount which exceeded banks’ exposure to PERE by a great
many orders of magnitude.
Currently banking investments in PERE is very low, but will this trend
change over time, if regulations remain lenient? The answer is that it is
unlikely. First off, as discussed above, banks in 2008 only invested $115
billion in private equity funds as a whole. There is every reason to think
that, in spite of the Volcker Rule, banks will continue to allocate their
private equity investments to a certain amount of non-real estate private
equity, since the Volcker Rule contains a quite generous de minimis carveout on banking investments in non-real estate private equity. Because of
that carve-out, the connections between banks (the river) and traditional
private equity funds (other streams) aren’t dammed, so there’s no reason to
expect that the upstream waters from all the banking funds previously
allocated to private equity funds would flood into PERE.
Thus, even in the unlikely event that PERE went up from one-third of
one percent to, say, hypothetically, one percent of banking investments,
that still wouldn’t be a large enough exposure to create systemic risk
concerns.
Moreover, it’s important to remember that if banks were prohibited
from investing in PERE, they would delegate their extra funds to other
investment revenues, which most likely carry equal levels of investment
risks as PERE, if not greater. As we know from the experiences of water
navigations, when damming one watercourse downstream, the upstream
stretch of water would reroute and flow into different brooks or rivers,
which could carry flood risks themselves. Therefore it’s important to study
the whole map of tributaries and understand the risks of all alternative
waterways before plugging the connection between the estuary and a
particular stream, if such a measure is absolutely necessary. However, in
the case of PERE, as we discussed earlier, it poses no systemic risks and
typically only moderate investment risks. Accordingly, from a regulatory
perspective, there is no reason to believe that other choices of banking
Opportunity and the Subcomm. On Financial Institutions & Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. of Financial Services, 112th Cong. 2 (Nov. 29, 2012).
121. Heard on the Street / Financial Analysis and Commentary, WALL ST. J.,, Apr. 24,
2009, at C12.
122. Yali, N’Diaye, Fitch Warns of Rising Rates, Slower MBS Prepay Risk, MARKET
NEWS INT’L, Apr. 15, 2011, available at LEXIS.
123. Felix Salmon, The Downside of CDS Demonization, UPSTART BUS. J. (Oct. 15,
2008), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2008/11/06/the-downsideof-cds-demonization.html?page=all,
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investment targets, which take up much bigger proportions of banking
funds, carry less investment risks than PERE and should be placed as more
optimal investment options than PERE.
In conclusion, banks investing in PERE might create some
interconnectedness between banks and PERE, but this interconnectedness,
in light of the small percentage of PERE investment relative to the banks’
whole investment portfolio and the insubstantial capital contribution of
banks to PERE, should not give rise to systemic risk concerns.
Furthermore, it’s unlikely for these connections to become strengthened in
the future.
8. Conflicts of Interest
Besides preventing systemic risk problems, the Volcker Rule sought
to avoid conflicts of interest between banks and their clients. Even if banks
are not permitted to sponsor their own PERE funds, they might still have
conflicts of interest when placing clients funds with outside PERE. For
example, a bank could have any number of relationships with outside
PERE funds, which might cause a bank to suffer from a conflict of interest
when placing client funds. Furthermore, conflicts of interest in the
securities context are a prevalent phenomenon in the market. Although the
solutions for this problem vary from case to case, the general principle
from a regulatory viewpoint is not to eliminate the financial activity that
entails conflicts of interest, but to disclose the conflicts to the parties
involved, so that both the financial freedom of the institutions and the
customers’ rights could be protected.
Given that the Volcker Rule presents over-regulation dangers for
PERE, the better solution would be to require banks to disclose their
conflicts of interest, especially considering the minimal systemic risk
concerns of banking investments in PERE.
9. The Dangers of Too Quickly Concluding that Private Equity Real
Estate Funds Give Rise to System Risk Concerns
Discretion should be exercised in deciding whether there are systemic
risks. It is important to understand that normal market swings do not
translate into systemic risk.124 Rather, normal market swings are an
example of “systematic risk.” Obviously, private equity real estate
investments will be subject to normal market swings, but that doesn’t
124. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 204.

2013]

THE RISE OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT

135

translate into systemic risk. Schwarcz cautioned that “it is important not to
constrain market freedom in ways that deter systematic risk, which
facilitates market equilibrium and curbs excessive interest rates or periods
of inflation.”125 He also cautioned that systemic risk “is an economic, not a
political definition.”126 Thus, one must take care not to conclude too
quickly that private equity real estate may give rise to systemic risk
concerns for political reasons, as some might be inclined to do in the face
of a heightened state of alert.
10. The Regulator’s Perspective
It is highly likely that the SEC agrees with the view that private equity
real estate doesn’t generate systemic risks. The fact that the SEC recently
finalized Form PF, but did not require private equity real estate advisers to
file Form PF, is a strong indication that the regulators don’t believe that
private equity real estate poses systemic risks. It is also promising, as
discussed above, that the joint agencies in their proposed rule didn’t plan to
apply the Volcker Rule against private equity real estate advisers utilizing
non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions.
II. THE ABILITY OF A PRIVATE EQUITY REAL ESTATE ADVISER TO
SIDESTEP THE ADVISERS ACT
The Advisers Act, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, exposes many
“investment advisers” within the meaning of the statute to registration and
regulation under the Advisers Act. Private equity advisers who are
mandated to register under the Advisers Act may feel overburdened by the
requirement to file a public disclosure document, Form ADV, with the
SEC. Part 1 of Form ADV, among other things, requires registered
investment advisers to disclose information about the number of their
employees, the number and types of their clients, compensation structures,
assets under management, types of advisory services provided, the scope of
business activities in which the adviser engages, financial industry
affiliations, conflicts of interest, custody, control persons, and disciplinary
history. Part 2 of Form ADV, among other things, requires information
about services provided, fees, portfolio manager selection and evaluation,
information about clients provided to portfolio managers, restrictions on
clients’ ability to contact portfolio managers, information about the

125. Id.
126. Id.
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background, business activities and conflicts of interest of supervised
persons (officers, partners, directors and employees).127
Private equity advisers who are mandated to register may also likely
have concerns about being subject to the full scope of regulation as
registered “investment advisers” under the Advisers Act, which will
impose compliance and administrative costs on their operations. The
regulations under the Advisers Act are complex enough that private equity
real estate advisers would have to invest in considerable compliance
resources in order to be in a position to comply, which might burden their
operations, especially for private equity real estate advisers that are not
very large. For example, as mentioned in the introduction, a small fund
delegated eight to ten of their total 140 employees to work full time on
regulatory compliance.128 This is problematic from the perspective of the
society as well. Scholars have noted that regulations are currently so
complex and numerous that society is generally inundated with a great deal
of good faith non-compliance.129
The Advisers Act defines an “investment adviser,” subject to certain
exceptions, generally to include any person (including a natural person or
an entity) who (1) for compensation; (2) is engaged in the business; (3) of
providing advice to others or issuing reports or analyses regarding
securities.130 “Historically, these elements have been broadly construed . . .
.”131
The SEC staff “has traditionally taken an expansive view of what
activities” will be considered “in the business.”132 “Generally speaking,
this element will be satisfied if a person gives specific advice about
securities other than in rare, isolated, and non-periodic instances.”133 A
person could potentially qualify as an investment adviser even though
giving investment advice is not his primary or even major business
activity.134 In determining whether a person is an investment adviser, “the
SEC staff looks at all the circumstances surrounding a person’s

127. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv.pdf (last visited Dec. 23 2013).
128. Dodd-Frank: The Road Ahead, supra note 25.
129. See J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 766-768 (2003) (noting
that “the sheer number or mass of rules” may hinder compliance and that “‘good faith
noncompliance’ does indeed incur . . . .”).
130. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2006).
131. See THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS
§ 1:3 (Westlaw 2013).
132. Id. § 1:5.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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activities,”135 including, without limitation, the following factors: “whether
the person represents or otherwise holds himself out to the public as an
investment adviser . . . whether the person receives compensation for
rendering investment advice . . . [and] the frequency or regularity of the
investment advice given.”136
“Security” is defined under the Advisers Act as:
Any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security (including a certificate of deposit) or on any group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,
guaranty of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of
the foregoing.137
What is a security under the Advisers Act can also be ascertained from
relevant case law and SEC staff no-action letter positions. A private equity
real estate investment adviser who advises about “securities” is usually
considered to be in the business of providing investment advice and is
therefore an “investment adviser” within the meaning of the Advisers Act.
That is why private equity real estate investment advisers may seek to
sidestep the Advisers Act by advising their funds only about real estate
investments that are not “securities.” As discussed in the introduction, this
sidestepping would likely also allow the funds they advised to bypass the
Investment Company Act and the Volcker Rule, since these types of funds
wouldn’t likely be “investment companies” within the meaning of the
Investment Company Act. However, private equity real estate advisers
may find it difficult to structure their operations so that they are not
engaged in the business of advising about “securities,” since many types of
real estate investments could potentially be “securities.”138 On the other
hand, as noted in the introduction, most types of private equity real estate
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also College Resource Network, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 630, at *2-3 (Apr. 9, 1993) (echoing these factors).
137. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006).
138. See infra notes 164–243 and accompanying text.
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funds really do seek to invest in operating and developing real properties,
and not on securities investments. Below, this section explains how some
of the most common real estate investments could potentially fall within
the meaning of “securities” under the Advisers Act.
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A. Investments in Traditional Real Estate Investments
Real estate advisers will generally not be considered to advise persons
or entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about
investing in traditional real estate investments.
An offer of real estate without any collateral arrangements with
the seller or others does not involve the offer of a security. . . .
Accordingly, interests in an apartment cooperative, even if in the
form of stock, or in a residential condominium normally will not
be securities. As is usually the case, substance governs rather
than form; that is, just as some things that look like real estate are
securities, some things that look like securities are real estate.
Similarly, the sale of commercial realty normally will not be
viewed as a security if the purchaser directly retains control over
the property and is not reliant on the efforts of others.139
However, even with traditional real estate investments, there is always a
risk that they can become securities.
B. Investment in Stock
If real estate advisers advise about investing in corporate stock, they
would likely be advising about securities, since the definition of “security”
under Section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act includes “stock.”140 In the
event a real estate investment adviser invests in a corporation, the general
rule, as established in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, is that
“stock” is considered a “security” if it has the major characteristics of
stock: “dividends conditioned on an apportionment of profits, subjection to
pledge, voting rights proportional to number of shares owned, and
possibility of appreciation in value.”141 As Loss et al. note,
The subsequent Supreme Court decision in Landreth Timber
Company v. Lambreth[sic] added that, when stock possesses “all
of the characteristics we identified in Forman as traditionally
associated with common stock . . . , the plain meaning of the
statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as

139. 2 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION § 3-A1(d)(iv), at 987-90 (4th ed. 2006) (internal footnotes and italics omitted).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006).
141. LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1 (e)(i), at 1,014.
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‘securities’ subject to the coverage of the Acts.”142
“The investment contract analysis of an instrument bearing the label stock
is thus appropriate only when the ‘stock’ bears none or few of the
characteristics usually associated with traditional stock.”143 When stock
does not have these characteristics, the Supreme Court has employed the
“investment contract” approach, which usually results in a finding that
there is no security if the instrument involves no horizontal or vertical
commonality.144
C. Investments in Investment Contracts.
Real estate interests have also been held to be “securities” under the
investment contract theory if the conditions of an investment contract
apply.145 In SEC v. W. J. Howey & Co., the Supreme Court held that the
elements of an investment contract are: (1) an investment of money; (2) in
a common enterprise; (3) when a person is led to expect profits; (4) solely
from the efforts of others.146 In that quintessential investment contract case,
the Supreme Court concluded that “an offering of units of a citrus grove
development coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing and
remitting the net proceeds to the investor” was an “investment contract.”147
Howey reveals how certain types of real estate investments could be
deemed “securities.” Professor Paredes notes that an investment of money
within the meaning of Howey merely means that “‘the purchaser gave up
some tangible and definable consideration in return for an interest that had
substantially the characteristics of a security.’”148
In order to determine for the purpose of the “investment contract”
whether there is a “common enterprise,” “subsequent lower court[s] . . .
have focused on whether a common enterprise involves horizontal
commonality . . . or vertical commonality. . . .”149 “The Third, Sixth and
Seventh Circuits . . . subscribe[] to the horizontal commonality

142. Id. at 1,015-16.
143. Id. at 1,016.
144. See generally SEC v. W. J. Howey & Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (noting
that an “investment contract” is a “contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests
his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party . . . .”).
145. See, e.g., id. at 293 (holding that a share of ownership in a real estate development
meets the conditions of an “investment contract” and therefore qualifies as “securities”).
146. Id. at 301.
147. Id. at 293-94.
148. LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(i)(1), at 928 (quoting Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979)).
149. Id. § 3-A-1(d)(i)(2), at 930-31.
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approach.”150 Under this approach, courts will usually not conclude that
there is an “investment contract” without pooling of investor funds.151
Paredes takes the view that a strict horizontal commonality approach
“would not reach instances in which investors . . . invest in individual
property . . . along with a management, development, or marketing
contract.”152 In addition, Paredes notes that horizontal commonality may
not reach a limited partnership with only a single investor, since there
would be no pooling.153 Thus, it is possible that certain types of real estate
investments could be structured to avoid this view of horizontal
commonality.
According to the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits, vertical commonality
hinges on whether the “fortunes of all investors [are] dependent upon the
promoter’s expertise.”154 Paredes notes that under this view of vertical
commonality, “[u]nless two or more persons in some sense share in the
profitability of an undertaking, it is difficult to argue that there is a common
enterprise.”155 Thus, it is possible that certain types of real estate
investments could be structured to avoid this view of vertical commonality.
In the Ninth Circuit’s view, vertical commonality should be more
restrictively defined as one in which the “‘fortunes of the investor are
interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those
seeking the investment or of third parties.’”156 Professor Paredes notes that
the Ninth Circuit’s view “will embrace common enterprises both of a
horizontal and of a vertical type whenever some form of profit sharing can
be shown.”157 He continues:
Thus, when two or more investors pool their resources, there
would be a common enterprise even if the promoter did no more
than receive a broker's commission. Or when the income of one
investor and one promoter was each dependent upon the profits
of an undertaking, there would be a common enterprise. Under
this approach, a conventional discretionary commodities account
would not involve an investment contract if the broker only
received commissions, but profit sharing by a broker in a
discretionary account would create a security, as would profit
sharing by a single promoter and a single investor in a

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 932.
See id. (providing examples supporting this principle).
Id. at 933-34.
Id.
Id. at 934.
Id. at 936.
Id.
Id. at 937.
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partnership, franchise arrangement, or pyramid scheme.158
Under the Ninth Circuit’s view, it is more difficult to structure certain types
of real estate investments to avoid the common enterprise requirement of
Howey.
In Forman,159 the Supreme Court analyzed whether there was a
reasonable expectation of profits for “investment contract” purposes.160
The Forman Court explained:
[b]y profits, the Court has meant either capital appreciation
resulting from the development of the initial investment, as in
Joiner . . . or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of
investors’ funds, as in Tcherepnin v. Knight . . . (dividends on the
investment based on savings and loan association's profits).161
Today, the requirement that profits come solely from the efforts of
others should not be read literally with respect to the “investment contract”
analysis.162 Instead, the prevailing view is that “the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.”163
The above discussion of investment contracts is only a preliminary
and general analysis of the considerations involved in determining whether
a particular investment is an investment contract. Needless to say, any
number of circumstances could cause real estate to be considered an
investment contract, and therefore a security. Below, this section discusses
a few of the most common investment contracts issues that pertain to real
estate interests.
D. Investments in Wholly Owned Entities.
Real estate advisers could advise about investing in a wholly owned
entity either by holding real estate investments through wholly owned
entities of funds, such as for tax-planning purposes, or alternatively,
sometimes real estate advisers could purchase real estate investments on
behalf of a fund by purchasing wholly owned entities that own real estate
investments instead of purchasing the real estate investments themselves
directly.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 938-39.
United Hous. Found, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837(1975).
Id. at 852.
Id.
LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(i)(4), at 950.
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973); see also
LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(i)(4), at 950, n. 172 (stating that this standard “has
been widely adopted in the circuits.”).
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If a real estate investment adviser invests in a wholly owned
partnership or limited liability company, the wholly owned partnership or
limited liability company would be analyzed under the “investment
contract” framework. Such interests would likely not be “securities” as
there would be neither horizontal nor vertical commonality, since that form
of investment would neither have a promoter nor pooling.164 Thus, real
estate investment advisers could likely invest in a wholly owned
partnership or limited liability company that owned real estate, without
advising about “securities.”
In the event a real estate investment adviser invests in a corporation,
the general issues regarding “stock” discussed above would result. Courts
have generally not been forgiving with the entire sale of “stock” in a
corporation in a sale of a business transaction. In Landreth Timber, the
Supreme Court rejected defendant’s contention that a sale of a business was
not a “security,” even though a sale of a business was not a passive
investment.165 Nonetheless, the Court in Landreth Timber did suggest that
a “stock” sale of a business could not be a “security” if the “stock” didn’t
possess the traditional characteristics of “stock.” The Court noted that “the
fact that instruments bear the label ‘stock’ is not of itself sufficient to
invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that we must also
determine whether those instruments possess ‘some of the significant
characteristics typically associated with’ stock . . . .’”166
Real estate advisers that find a need to invest in a wholly owned
entity, if desiring to avoid “securities” issues, should invest in wholly
owned non-corporate entities, such as limited liability companies or
partnerships. Obviously, limited partnerships would present “securities”
problems, and there is no tactical reason to prefer a wholly owned limited
partnership to a wholly owned limited liability company. In the alternative,
real estate investment advisers seeking to avoid “securities problems” that
invest in wholly owned corporations could try to structure the stock so as to
avoid bearing the major characteristics of “stock” under the Supreme
Court’s analysis, thereby avoiding triggering “securities” issues. There are
not a lot of cases evaluating this second type of structuring effort, so noaction relief may be desirable, given the readiness of the Court to identify
“stock” as a form of “securities.” While investing in wholly owned limited
liability companies or partnerships is preferable from a securities
standpoint, investing in limited liability companies or partnerships may be
disadvantageous from a tax standpoint, such as, without limitation, in a

164. For more detail about investment contracts and both kinds of pooling, see supra
note 145.
165. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985).
166. Id. at 686.
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situation where a real estate adviser desires to use a corporate blocker in
one of its funds.
Of course, if the wholly owned entity that would not otherwise be
considered a “security” in turn invested in “securities,” then the real estate
investment adviser would likely be considered an “investment adviser” by
indirectly advising about securities, since Section 208(d) of the Advisers
Act prohibits doing indirectly what cannot be done directly.167 Thus, there
are limits to legitimate structuring attempts to avoid advising about
“securities.”
E. Investments in Limited Partnerships.
Investments in limited partnership interests are generally considered to
be investments in “securities.”168 Professor Loss notes that “if [the] owners
participate actively in running the business,” then a limited partnership
would not be a security.169 It is possible that real estate investment advisers
who advise about investing in limited partnerships controlled by an
investor would not be considered to be advising about securities. Though
not in the Advisers Act context, appellate precedent suggests that potential
control is not sufficient to take a limited partnership outside of the
securities laws; rather, the investor must have actual control.170
Thus, if an investment adviser advises a fund to invest in a classic
limited partnership, which in turn invests in real estate, the investment
adviser will likely advise about “securities.” Only rare limited partnership
investments would not implicate “securities” issues.
If investors actually actively participated in running or controlling a
business structured as a limited partnership that was not a “security,” and
that limited partnership invested in “securities,” then the real estate
investment adviser would likely be considered an “investment adviser” by
indirectly advising about securities because, as aforementioned, Section
208(d) of the Advisers Act prohibits doing indirectly what cannot be done
directly.171 Thus, again, we see that there are limits to legitimate
structuring attempts to avoid advising about “securities.”

167. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 208(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(d) (2006).
168. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(iii), at 969-82 (stating that limited
partnerships have been treated as “securities” in both the public and private context).
169. Id. at 983.
170. See Rodeo v. Gillman, 787 F.2d 1175, 1178 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Potential managerial
control (at least as conditioned here) – even if easily assumed – is not enough to take a
limited partnership out of the reach of the securities laws.”).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(d).
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F. Investments in Other Partnerships and Joint Ventures.
In United States v. Wetherald, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit noted:
A general partnership or joint venture interest can be designated a
security if the investor can establish, for example, that (1) an
agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands
of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes
power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or
venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business
affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his
partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so
dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability
of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of
the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or
venture powers.172
Otherwise, an investment in a partnership or a joint venture would likely
not be considered a security. In Wetherald, the court concluded that the
partnerships amounted to securities.173 However, the facts forming the
basis for this conclusion were egregious. Among other factors, the
investors had no knowledge or experience with respect to the business; the
investors did not vote on major decisions; partnership committees were
symbolic; investors’ time commitment was minimal; investors did not
control disbursements; investors had no say in operations; and finally,
investors had no ability to obtain company information.174
In another recent case, Nunez v. Robin, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted:
[There is a] strong presumption that a general partnership or joint
venture interest is not a security. A party seeking to prove the
contrary must bear a heavy burden of proof. . . . Although general
partners and joint venturers may not individually have decisive
control over major decisions, they do have the sort of influence
which generally provides them with access to important
information and protection against a dependence on others.175
The court further stated, “[T]he securities laws do not extend to every
person who lacks the specialized knowledge of his partners . . . without a

172. United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal
citations omitted).
173. Id. at 1327.
174. Id. at 1326.
175. Nunez v. Robin, 415 F. App’x 586, *589 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
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showing that this lack of knowledge prevents him from meaningfully
controlling his investment.”176 The court looked to a meaningful exercise
of authority in this regard, such as signing checks or contracts on behalf of
the partnership or joint venture, managing finances, active management of
the investment, or having access to financial information in determining
whether the partner had meaningful control over his investment.177 The
court also considered whether any managerial decisions were made and
whether the promoter was “uniquely capable,” as well as whether the
investor was a mere passive investor.178
Loss also notes that a general partnership may be considered a
“security” when it operates de facto like a limited partnership, even if it is a
de jure partnership.179
On the whole, a general partnership is a superior vehicle to investment
advisers from the point of view of avoiding “securities” issues when
advising about investing in real estate. However, as shown above, a
partnership doesn’t always guarantee avoiding securities implications. An
additional problem with general partnerships is that they give rise to passthrough taxation, and therefore cannot be used as corporate blockers.
G. Investments in Notes
To the extent that a real estate investment adviser is in the business of
advising a person or entity about investing in notes, complex issues arise
surrounding whether such notes are securities. On the one hand, the
definition of security in Section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act includes the
term “note.”180 However, the Second Circuit has stated that “not all notes
are securities.”181 Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court, in analyzing
whether a note was a security, began with the “presumption that every note
is a security.”182
The Supreme Court in Reves v. Ernst & Young stated that this
presumption could be rebutted if the note were not a true investment, and
176. Id. at *590.
177. See id. at *590-91 (describing plaintiff’s active participation in the joint venture as
demonstrative of his meaningful involvement in the enterprise).
178. See id. at *591 (considering several factors in determining whether appellant’s
ownership interest was an investment contract).
179. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(iii), at 985 (“The pivotal criterion for
distinguishing partnership or joint venture interests, as well as limited liability company
membership interests, that are securities from those that are not usually will be the profits
‘solely [or substantially] from the efforts of others’ element in the Howey test.”) (internal
footnote omitted).
180. Id. § 80b-2(a)(18).
181. LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(b)(i), at 882.
182. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990) (internal footnote omitted).
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discussed an attempt by the Second Circuit to divide investment notes from
notes that are not securities.183 The following notes were not generally
securities:
“[T]he note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by
a mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a
small business or some of its assets, the note evidencing a
‘character’ loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by
an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply
formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course
of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer of a
broker, it is collateralized)”.184
A later case added to this list “notes evidencing loans by commercial banks
for current operations.”185
While the Supreme Court in Reves acknowledged that the above types
of notes were not securities, the Supreme Court thought more guidance was
needed as to what other types of notes may not be securities.186 The
Supreme Court stated:
It is impossible to make any meaningful inquiry into whether an
instrument bears a “resemblance” to one of the instruments
identified by the Second Circuit without specifying what it is
about those instruments that makes them non-“securities”.
Moreover, as the Second Circuit itself has noted, its list is “not
graven in stone,” and is therefore capable of expansion. Thus,
some standards must be developed for determining when an item
should be added to the list.187
It also set forth what is known as the “family resemblance test”:
First, we examine the transaction to assess the motivations that
would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it. If the
seller’s purpose is to raise money for the general use of a
business enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the
buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is expected to
generate, the instrument is likely to be a “security.” If the note is
exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor asset or
consumer good, to correct for the seller's cash-flow difficulties,
183. See id. at 65-66 (noting that the “presumption [that every note is a security] cannot
be irrebutable” and discussing the Second Circuit’s attempt to identify notes that do not fall
into security category).
184. Id. at 65 (quoting Exch. Nat’l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138
(2d Cir. 1976)).
185. Id. (quoting Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.
1984)).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 65-66 (internal citations omitted).
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or to advance some other commercial or consumer purpose, on
the other hand, the note is less sensibly described as a “security.”
Second, we examine the “plan of distribution” of the instrument
to determine whether it is an instrument in which there is
“common trading for speculation or investment.” Third, we
examine the reasonable expectations of the investing public: The
Court will consider instruments to be “securities” on the basis of
such public expectations, even where an economic analysis of the
circumstances of the particular transaction might suggest that the
instruments are not “securities” as used in that transaction.
Finally, we examine whether some factor such as the existence of
another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the
instrument, thereby rendering application of the Securities Acts
unnecessary.188
In summarizing its view, the Court concluded:
A note is presumed to be a “security,” and that presumption may
be rebutted only by a showing that the note bears a strong
resemblance (in terms of the four factors we have identified) to
one of the enumerated categories of instrument. If an instrument
is not sufficiently similar to an item on the list, the decision
whether another category should be added is to be made by
examining the same factors.189
In a prior no-action letter issued in the context of Section 202(a)(18)
of the Advisers Act, the SEC staff implied that when a person in the
business of giving advice about investments gives advice about a mortgage
note (that is, a note evidencing debt on the acquisition of real estate), that
mortgage note would “be a security pursuant to Section 202(a)(18) [of the
Advisers Act].”190 Note that this no-action letter was issued prior to the
Reves decision, but the decision in Reves may only apply in the context of
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.191 Furthermore, the SEC’s position
only takes place in the context of a no-action letter, and a court could
potentially decide otherwise, based on Reves.
However, a post-Reves federal district court case strongly suggests
that a mortgage-backed note that “the lender or other commercial assignee
transfers . . . to a retail broker/dealer, who then sells it to her customer,”
would likely not be treated merely as a mortgage secured by a home, but
188. Id. at 66–67 (internal citations omitted).
189. Id. at 67.
190. Ken Flood, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1976, at *3 (Mar. 2,
1984).
191. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 73 (“[W]e conclude that the demand notes at issue here fall
under the ‘note’ category of instruments that are ‘securities’ under the 1933 and 1934
Acts.”).
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would be presumed to be a security unless shown not to be under the Reves
family resemblance test.192 The court in that case concluded that the notes
“b[ore] little resemblance to the mortgage-backed note given by a borrower
to his lender in a typical home equity loan transaction,” and that therefore
the mortgage-backed notes were securities.193
In a more recent SEC administrative action, an issuer sold promissory
notes “to individual investors to raise the funds necessary for the purchases
of [mobile home] parks.”194 The SEC stated:
[T]his four-factor analysis reveals that the [issued] notes do not
sufficiently resemble a “note secured by a mortgage on a home”
to be considered a non-security under that category. The Supreme
Court contemplated only mortgage-backed notes issued in the
context of a traditional face-to-face transaction between a
borrower and commercial or consumer lender.”195
Thus, it seems safe to conclude that a mortgage-backed note purchased as
an investment will likely be a security.
H. Investments in Loan Participations Interests.
“The term ‘[loan] participation’ commonly refers to an undivided
fractional interest and participation in a loan, along with the interest and
fees paid. This is in contrast to another popular structure where the loan is
split into separate A and B loans, each with its separate promissory
note.”196
Real estate advisers will likely be considered to advise persons or
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing
in loan participation interests. Real estate advisers could potentially
purchase loan participation interests in mortgages and construction loans.
In a no-action letter to Putnam Diversified Premium Income Trust, the SEC
staff took the position that in the context of the Investment Company Act of
1940, loan participations are “securities” because the term “security” under
the Act “means ‘any note . . . evidence of indebtedness, transferable share,
investment contract . . . or any certificate of interest or participation in . . .
any of the foregoing.’”197 The definition of “security” in the Advisers Act
192. Mercer v. Jaffe, 736 F. Supp. 764, 769-770 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
193. Id. at 770.
194. In re. Alvin W. Gebhart, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 53,136, 2006 SEC LEXIS
93 (Jan. 18, 2006).
195. Id.
196. Mark S. Fawer & Michael J. Waters, Purchasing Loan Participations: The Devil is
in the Details, REAL EST. FIN. J., 38 (Winter 2009) .
197. Putnam Diversified Premium Income Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 834, at *3, n. 1 (July 10, 1989) (alteration in original); Investment Company
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reads in pari materia in these respects with the Investment Company
Act,198 thus it would seem highly likely that the SEC staff would view loan
participation interests as “securities” under the Advisers Act.
The SEC staff in its no-action letter to Putnam Diversified went on to
explain what it meant by loan participation. In that letter, a fund would
invest in:
[P]articipating interests purchased from banks in a loan made by
a syndicate of banks, represented by an agent bank that has
negotiated and structured the loan, to corporate borrowers to
finance internal growth, mergers, acquisitions, stock repurchases,
leveraged buy-outs, and other corporate activities. The loan
participations may extend for the entire term of the loan or only
for short “strips” that correspond to a quarterly or monthly
floating rate interest period on the loan. They may take the form
of (1) a true assignment or novation that shifts to the assignee the
direct debtor-creditor relationship with the corporate borrower, or
(2) a participating interest that does not shift the debtor-creditor
relationship to the assignee, who must rely on the original lender
to collect sums due and otherwise to enforce its rights against the
corporate borrower or the agent bank that administers the loan.199
The SEC staff identified the Fund’s apparent rationale for why the
loan participation interests were “securities.” First, the SEC staff pointed
to “the risk of insolvency of the corporate debtor or the issuing bank, or
both, and the risk that the corporate debtor will prepay principal if interest
rates fall.”200 Second, “[e]xcept for its investigation of the creditworthiness
of the corporate borrower, the Fund will have no involvement in the
commercial transactions underlying the original loans.”201 Third, “the Fund
will purchase loan participations solely for investment purposes.”202 The
gist of these points is that the loan participation interests were passive
investments for the buyer.
In another no-action letter, the SEC staff took the position that
participation in a construction period mortgage loan, e.g. a loan secured by
a short-term mortgage on an unfinished construction project, was a
security, analogizing it to a note.203 In yet another no-action letter, the SEC
Act of 1940 § 2(a)(36), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (2006).
198. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18)
(2006) (“security means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest . . .”).
199. Putnam Diversified, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 834 at *1-2.
200. Id. at *2.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Northwestern Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Found., SEC No-Action Letter,
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staff took the position in the Investment Company Act context that
participating interests in notes or bonds are securities when they are
purchased on the secondary market and “secured by whole home
mortgages and mortgages on apartment projects, shopping centers, office
buildings, and other commercial enterprises.”204
I.

Investments in Mortgage Backed Securities.
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are debt obligations that
represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans,
most commonly on residential property. Mortgage loans are
purchased from banks, mortgage companies, and other
originators and then assembled into pools by a governmental,
quasi-governmental, or private entity. The entity then issues
securities that represent claims on the principal and interest
payments made by borrowers on the loans in the pool, a process
known as securitization.205

Mortgage-backed securities are interests in pools of mortgages,
whereas a loan participation interest could be simply a passive investment
in a single loan, potentially even an unsecured loan.
Real estate advisers will likely be considered to advise persons or
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing
in mortgage-backed securities. Although there is limited precedent to
support this proposition in the context of the Advisers Act, these types of
investments would usually be analyzed under the “investment contract” or
“notes” framework. In the event there is any doubt whether mortgagebacked securities are “securities” under the Advisers Act, Section
202(a)(18) of the same provides that the term “security” includes “any
interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’ . . .”206

1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1505, at *4 (May 21, 1984) (“The definition of the term
‘security’ in section 2(a)(36) of the Investment Company Act includes any note or
participation in any note. A construction period mortgage loan, or any participation in such
a loan, would, therefore, come within the definition of a security contained in section
2(a)(36).”).
204. ROBERT H. ROSENBLUM, INVESTMENT COMPANY DETERMINATION UNDER THE 1940
ACT: EXEMPTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS § 2.3.13, at 59 (2d ed. 2003) (citing Mortgage-Backed
Income Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 3551 (Aug. 30, 1979)).
205. Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last modified July 23, 2010).
206. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006).
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J. Investments in Real Estate Sale-Leaseback Transactions
Real estate advisers will likely not be considered to advise persons or
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing
in real estate sale-leaseback transactions. A real estate sale-leaseback
transaction is a transaction where the seller sells a real estate asset to a
buyer, and then the buyer leases it back to the seller long term. In this way,
the transaction functions as a loan, with payments taking the form of rent.
Sale-leaseback transactions often give developers quick capital. For
example, a developer could “sell [his or her] model homes and lease them
back from their buyers for anywhere from a few months to a few
years.”]”207 The Sixth Circuit, applying the horizontal commonality
approach, has concluded that sale and leaseback arrangements are not
securities, even though the purchaser purchased in the apparent belief that
the model homes would appreciate in value.208 However, the Sixth
Circuit’s view does not rule out the possibility of concluding that a saleleaseback transaction is a “security” under the vertical commonality
approach. It should be noted that the SEC recently brought administrative
proceedings finding that sale-leaseback transactions were “investment
contracts” in certain cases, and thus “securities.”209
K. Investments in Industrial Development Bonds.
Industrial development bonds are
[m]unicipal debt securities issued by a government agency on
behalf of a private sector company and intended to build or
acquire factories or other heavy equipment and tools. . . .
Industrial Development Revenue Bonds are issued by a
government to assist a private company that might otherwise be
unable to obtain financing for its industrial venture or unwilling
to undertake the project on its own. The government’s goal in
providing the debt securities is to improve the economic and
employment conditions of its region.210

207. Lew Sichelman, Sale-Leaseback, PRIVATECOMMUNITIES.COM (Oct. 15, 2010)
http://www.privatecommunities.com/second-home-buying/sale-leaseback.htm.
208. Hart v. Pulte Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1002 (6th Cir. 1984).
209. See, e.g., In the Matter of Phil D. Kerley, Exchange Act Release No. 56033, 2007
WL 1988419, at *1 (July 9, 2007) (finding that respondent “sold investment contract
securities in the form of sale-leaseback transactions”); In the Matter of William P. Sauer,
Exchange Act Release No. 55948, 2007 WL 1814113, at *1 (June 25, 2007) (finding that
respondent “sold investment contract securities in the form of sale-leaseback transactions”).
210. Industrial
Development
Revenue
Bonds
–
IDRBs, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/idrb.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
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Real estate advisers will likely be considered to advise persons or entities
about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing in
industrial development bonds. In an interpretive release, the SEC noted
that industrial development bonds fall within specific categories of
securities under the Advisers Act.211
L. Investments in Time Share Condominiums and Analogous Real Estate
Investments.
A real estate adviser will likely be considered to advise persons or
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing
in time-share condominiums and analogous real estate investments. Short
of investments in fractional undivided interests in real estate, investments
in condominiums can also present securities issues when they are “lived in
during a limited part of the year but rented out during most of the year.”212
Professor Paredes notes that the same “[types of securities issues apply] to
offerings of all types of units in real estate developments which have
characteristics similar to [condominiums that give rise to securities
issues].”213
Parades states:
[T]he offering of condominium units in conjunction with any one
of the following will cause the offering to be viewed as an
offering of securities in the form of investment contracts:
1. The condominiums, with any rental arrangement or other
similar service, are offered and sold with emphasis on the
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the
managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or
arranged for by the promoter, from rental of the units.
2. The offering of participation in a rental pool arrangement;
and
3. The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby the
purchaser must hold his unit available for rental for any part of
the year, must use an exclusive rental agent or is otherwise
materially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his unit.
In all of the above situations, investor protection requires the
application of the federal securities laws.
If the condominiums are not offered and sold with emphasis on
211. See Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Investment
Advisors Act Release No. IA-1092, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2555 (Oct. 8, 1987)
(clarifying that an investment advisor’s provision of “‘specific investment advice’ includes a
recommendation, analysis or report about specific securities or specific categories of
securities” such as industrial development bonds, among other instruments).
212. LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(iv), at 992.
213. Id.
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the economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the
managerial efforts of others, and assuming that no plan to avoid
the registration requirements of the Securities Act is involved, an
owner of a condominium unit may, after purchasing his unit,
enter into a nonpooled rental arrangement with an agent not
designated or required to be used as a condition to the purchase,
whether or not such agent is affiliated with the offeror, without
causing a sale of a security to be involved in the sale of the unit.
Further a continuing affiliation between the developers or
promoters of a project and the project by reason of maintenance
arrangements does not make the unit a security.
In situations where commercial facilities are a part of the
common elements of a residential project, no registration would
be required under the investment contract theory where (a) the
income from such facilities is used only to offset common area
expenses and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to
the project as a whole and are [sic] not established as a primary
income source for the individual owners of a condominium or
cooperative unit.214
M. Investments in Undeveloped Lots.
A real estate adviser will usually not be considered to advise persons
or entities about investing in “securities” if the advice is about investing in
undeveloped lots, but lurking securities issues remain. “[W]hile the sale of
undeveloped lots normally would not involve a security, an investment
contract may be found where the lots were sold for investment rather than
residential use with emphasis on economic inducements in oral or written
promotional materials.”215 In McCown v. Heidler, the 10th Circuit noted
that,
land, as such, is not a security and that a land purchase contract,
simply because the purchaser expects or hopes that the value of
the land purchased will increase, does not fall automatically
within the confines of the Securities Acts. However, we do not
agree that land or its purchase necessarily negates the application
of the Securities Acts.216
In McCown, the plaintiffs purchased vacant undeveloped lots. The
plaintiffs argued that “[t]he vacant lots were of little value unless, by the
sole efforts of [developers], the development obligations of [the
developers] were fulfilled. Each of the purchasers of a . . . lot invested his
214. Id. at 992-93.
215. Id. at 995-96.
216. McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204, 208 (10th Cir. 1975).
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money in a common scheme which depended solely upon the efforts of [the
developers].”217 The plaintiffs argued that “[t]he lots were purchased in
expectation that fulfillment of the promise to improve them by [the
developer] would result in a substantial increase in the value of the lots.”218
The plaintiffs further argued that “[t]he lots were sold as, and purchased
for, investment.”219 The plaintiffs presented evidence that the developers
competed with Wall Street for investment money, held its real estate out to
the public as an investment and referenced the enhancement of the value of
the land through its managerial efforts.220 The court held that “there [was]
a factual question as to whether the sale of [the] lots constitutes sales of
securities.”221
As a result, real estate investment advisers need to be careful when
they advise about investing in undeveloped lots. Real estate advisers
should pay particular attention to whether they are relying upon the
managerial efforts of others for enhancing the value of the undeveloped
lots, and whether the lot is marketed to them as an investment.
N. Investments in Fractional Undivided Interests in Oil, Gas or Other
Mineral Rights.
In order to understand what fractional interests in oil and gas are, one
needs to understand how the typical oil and gas project is structured.
Typically, speculators will acquire leases on,
[O]il and gas rights on as many of the individual tracts as they
can. The tracts have typically been ‘granted, demised, leased and
let’ to the lessee ‘for the sole and only purpose of mining and
operating oil and gas and laying pipelines’ during a stated term of
years. In these instances, the lessor has typically received, in
addition to an immediate cash bonus in some cases, a promise on
the part of the lessee to pay a stated rental per acre for every year
in which a well is not drilled, and a further promise of a stated
percentage, usually 1/8, of the oil and gas actually produced and
sold or its value at the prevailing market price.222
This 1/8 interest held by the landlord is called the landowner’s royalty
interest, “and it has commonly found its way into the securities markets in
lots of fractional undivided portions after having been transferred to banks

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 209-10.
Id. at 211.
LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(c), at 903-04.

156

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 16:1

as collateral for loans or having been sold to an oil royalty dealer.”223 The
7/8 interest held by the lessee is called the working interest. The lessee
[M]ay sell fractional undivided shares of the lease to raise
working capital, or it may give a part interest in the lease to a
drilling contractor, who in turn may sell all or part of his share to
finance the drilling. As in the case of the landowners’ royalty
interests, which are fractions of the customary 1/8 portion, these
working interests, which are fractions of the 7/8 portion, may
normally have given rights of participation either in the oil or gas
or in the proceeds from its sale.224
A real estate adviser will likely be considered to advise persons or
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing
in fractional undivided interests in oil, gas or other mineral rights.
Investments in fractional undivided interests in oil, gas or other mineral
rights are expressly included as “securities” by Section 202(a)(18) of the
Advisers Act.225Prof. Paredes notes that the Federal Trade Commission
posited that,
The word ‘rights’ is broad enough to make the definition
applicable to interests which are regarded as giving
ownership of the oil or gas in place as well as to interests
which merely afford the owner the right to produce oil or
gas. However, there is no fractional undivided interest if
the whole landowner’s royalty interest is transferred, even
though under the terms of the lease the holder may be
entitled to only 1/8 or some other portion of the
production.226
O. Leases
A real estate adviser could under certain circumstances be considered
to advise persons or entities about investing in “securities” if they advise
them about investing in fractional undivided interests in leases. Professor
Paredes notes that, “[a] lease arrangement normally will not involve a
security. However, as illustrated by [SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.],
the combination of a lease and other economic inducement whose value is

223. Id. at 904.
224. Id.
225. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006).
226. LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(c), at 905 (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
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substantially dependent on the efforts of a promoter or other parties can
create an investment contract.”227 In Joiner,228
[A]n oil prospector named Joiner organized a one man
corporation that acquired by assignment oil and gas leaseholds in
a 3000 acre tract in Texas. The tract was given the name Joiner
Paramount Development. In order to finance the drilling of a
well, Joiner offered to sell to the public in widely scattered areas
throughout the country instruments purporting to be assignments
of leaseholds in specific portions of the tract . . . [T]he purchasers
generally had no choice as to the location of the land covered by
their leases.
They were invited to purchase leases on
undescribed, unlocated acreage that was selected in each case by
the promoters. It was represented in the selling literature that a
test well was being drilled, and the literature was clearly aimed at
creating the impression that investors would earn a profit through
the efforts of Joiner in bringing in oil, although nothing specific
was said about what arrangements would be made if the well
should prove successful.229
In Joiner, the defendants first tried to argue that the assignments of
leaseholds in specific portions of the tract were not “securities” because
they were not typical forms of securities. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument and suggested that such assignments of leaseholds were
“investment contracts.”230 Next, the defendants attempted to argue that
such assignments of leaseholds were not “securities” because they were not
fractionalized interests in oil and gas, since parcels subdivided the
leaseholds. The Court again rejected this argument and suggested that such
assignments of leaseholds were “investment contracts.”231 Third, the
defendants attempted to argue that such assignments of leaseholders were
not “securities” because the leases and assignments under state law
conveyed interests in real estate. The Court responded as follows:
In applying acts of this general purpose, the courts have not been
guided by the nature of the assets back of a particular document
or offering. The test rather is what character the instrument is
given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of
distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the
prospect. In the enforcement of an act such as this it is not
inappropriate that promoters’ offerings be judged as being what

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. § 3-A-1(d)(iv), at 995.
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(c), at 913.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. at 350-51.
Id. at 352.
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they were represented to be.232
This latter point made by the Supreme Court suggests that any type of
fractional interests in real estate leases could give rise to “securities”
concerns under certain circumstances, not just fractional interests in oil and
gas leases.
P.

Investments in REITs

Over the last two or three decades, REITs emerged as an important
type of real estate investment. “The term REIT refers to a ‘real estate
investment trust’ as set forth in subchapter M of chapter 1 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.”233 REITs can include different forms of entities.
“The net effect [of REIT rules] is that an entity formed as a trust,
partnership, limited liability company or corporation can be a REIT.”234
REITs are essentially companies that are required to have most of their
income and assets tied to real estate, and which are then permitted to
achieve special federal income tax consequences.
A real estate adviser would likely be considered to advise persons or
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing
in REITs. From a securities standpoint, investments in most REITs would
give rise to “securities” issues as the investments would be considered
“stock” or “investment contracts.” For wholly owned REITs, the concerns
expressed regarding wholly owned entities in general would apply.
Q. Investments in TICs
Today, tenancies in common (“TICs”) are a popular medium of real
estate investment. The Securities Division of the State of Washington
notes that “a tenancy in common is a form of property ownership in which
multiple persons each own an undivided fractional interest in the entire
property.”235 Typically, the investors in a TIC don’t retain managerial
control.
[A]n investment contract is involved in the public offering of
fractional undivided interests in a building — whether an office

232. Id. at 352-53.
233. Frequently Asked Questions About Real Estate Investment Trusts, MORRISON &
FOERSTER LLP 1, http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/FAQ_REIT.pdf (last visited
Oct. 14, 2013).
234. Id. at 3.
235. Alert: Tenancy-in-Common Interests as “Securities”, STATE OF WASH., DEP’T OF
FIN. INSTS., SEC. DIV., (Sept. 8, 2005), http://dfi.wa.gov/sd/pdf/tenancy_in_common.pdf
[hereinafter Tenancy-in-Common Interests as “Securities”].
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building or an apartment building in which equity ownership is
not synonymous with occupancy — under some sort of
arrangement by which the promoter or a nominee assumes the
responsibility of physical management of the property and
distribution of the profits to the co-owners.236
A real estate adviser would likely be considered to advise persons or
entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about investing
in tenancy in common investments (TICs). The Securities Division of the
State of Washington has concluded that “[t]enancies in common may
constitute ‘securities’ under the ‘investment contract’ test.”237
At a 2007 Tenants in Common membership symposium, David Lynn,
the chief counsel in the SEC Division of Corporate Finance “stated that
SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corporation, 408 F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005), which
dealt with viatical contracts, reflected the SEC’s opinion that significant
pre-purchase managerial activities undertaken to insure the success of the
investment in themselves may well make the TIC interests securities.”238
“Of course, it would be extremely difficult for a sponsor to offer TIC
interests without taking pre-purchase activities to aid the success of the
investment.”239 However, the Supreme Court has not definitively resolved
the issue yet.
One point to note is that recently, a federal district court considered
whether TICs were “securities” in San Francisco Residence Club. The
court applied the “investment contract” framework, and concluded that
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be denied, since plaintiffs
did not present “undisputed facts to establish that . . . the TIC interests were
securities . . . .”240 That case hinged on the factual issue of how much
managerial control was retained by plaintiffs.
This case therefore suggests that a real estate fund potentially could
invest in TICs without definite securities problems if the fund retained
adequate managerial control. Another possibility employed by sponsors of
TICs to avoid securities issues is to hire independent management for the
TIC. However, given the uncertainties in this area, seeking no-action relief
under such circumstances would be advisable.

236. LOSS ET AL., supra note 139, § 3-A-1(d)(iv), at 991.
237. Tenancy-in-Common Interests as “Securities”, supra note 235.
238. Tenants-in-Common Arrangements and the Securities Law, METHVEN & ASSOCS.,
http://www.methvenlaw.com/Practice-Areas/Real-Estate/Tenants-In-CommonArrangements-and-Securities-Laws.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
239. Id.
240. San Francisco Residence Club, Inc. v. Amado, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55134, at
*15 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2010).
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R. Investments in Real Estate Derivatives
“A derivative is a contract between two or more parties whose value is
based on an agreed-upon underlying financial asset, index or security.
Common underlying instruments include: bonds, commodities, currencies,
interest rates, market indexes and stocks.”241
A real estate adviser could potentially be considered to advise persons
or entities about investing in “securities” if they advise them about
investing in real estate derivatives. Section 202(a)(18) of the Advisers Act
states that the term “security” includes
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security
(including a certificate of deposit) or any group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency
. . . .242
The Advisers Act suggests that a real estate derivative based on real
estate that is not a security may not be a “security.” However, given that,
as shown above, many real estate investments are “securities,” it is very
probable in many cases that a real estate derivate would be based on a
“security.” Also, real estate advisers may want to invest in foreign
currency derivatives for hedging purposes, which could put it within the
realm of the Advisers Act.
S. Investment in Real Estate Funds
There are many different types of real estate funds, such as public
mutual funds or private equity real estate funds.A real estate adviser would
likely be considered to advise persons or entities about investing in
“securities” if they advise them about investing in real estate funds. Real
estate funds invariably fall within the “investment contract” analysis under
the Advisers Act.
T. Investment in the Fund Itself
A real estate fund investment adviser could be considered an
“investment adviser” if he recommends investment in a fund that he
sponsors, potentially even if the fund solely invests in non-securities real

241. Jean Folger, Frequently Asked Questions: What is a derivative?, INVESTOPEDIA
(July 11, 2012), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/12/derivative.asp.
242. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(18), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(18) (2006).
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estate.243 In this case, a real estate adviser can potentially mitigate the risk
by limiting his advice about securities to one-off advice to invest in his
fund, and explicitly stating to investors both orally and in writing that the
real estate investment adviser is neither holding itself out, nor representing
that he is an investment adviser.244 To be even safer, the real estate
investment adviser should not provide recommendations to invest in the
fund, and could explicitly state that he is not able to do so.
U. Conclusion
This discussion was not intended to be exhaustive of every potential
scenario that could lead to a real estate investment adviser being considered
an “investment adviser.” The takeaway lesson from this analysis is that if a
private equity real estate investment adviser belongs to one of the fortunate
categories of real estate advisers that don’t advise about “securities,” then
such private equity real estate adviser will shed the title of an “investment
adviser” within the meaning of the Advisers Act and will thus not be
subject to the burdensome registration and compliance regime of the
Advisers Act. Such advisers would likely also not be subject to the
Investment Company Act and the Volcker Rule.
However, the above analysis shows that any time a private equity real
estate adviser advises about real estate investments that fall within
“securities,” the adviser becomes subject to the Advisers Act. The analysis
above shows that a wide range of real estate investments can potentially be
“securities,” including both entities and non-entity investments in real
estate. Private equity real estate advisers will also need to consider that
under Section 208(d) of the Advisers Act, if they restructure their
operations from direct investments to indirect investments in securities, not
only will they fail to reach the goal of shearing off their titles of “advisers”
but their actions would be deemed illegal circumventions under the
Advisers Act.245 For example, if any subsidiary entities were to own
“securities,” the investment adviser could not avoid the Advisers Act by
owning “securities” through those entities, even if those entities are not
“securities.” However, Section 208(d) should generally not prohibit
legitimate structuring attempts, which generally means structuring the real
estate adviser’s fund’s investments so that they are not directly or indirectly
243. See LEMKE & LINS, supra note 131, § 1:7 (“[A]dvice about interests in entities that
own or hold non-securities . . . would generally be considered giving advice about
securities . . .”).
244. See id. § 1:5 (noting that the SEC staff looks at whether the person holds him or
herself “out to the public as an investment adviser.”).
245. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(a)(d) (prohibiting indirect actions that would be unlawful,
under the statute, if done directly).
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“securities,” without creating affiliates to invest in “securities” to evade the
Advisers Act.
Unsurprisingly, sidestepping the Advisers Act is easier said than done.
Oftentimes, private equity real estate investment advisers cannot walk this
road, even if their goal is really just to invest in operating and developing
real properties, and not in securities. Private equity real estate investment
advisers should recognize that there might be considerable drawbacks to
structuring their investment advice to sidestep the Advisers Act. First,
structuring to avoid the Advisers Act will severely limit what types of real
estate investments a private equity real estate adviser can advise on.
Private equity real estate investment advisers will need to consider whether
being subject to registration and regulation under the Advisers Act (and
potentially state law) is worth the burden of not being able to advise about
“securities.” Second, determining whether a real estate investment is a
“security” may involve a lot of time, energy, and expense. Third,
determining whether a real estate investment is a “security” may involve
compliance uncertainty. Private equity real estate investment advisers
should understand that if they decide to structure their operations so that
they are not “investment advisers” on the basis that they do not generally
advise about “securities,” that there could be considerable uncertainty
regarding what would be considered advising about “securities.” Private
equity real estate investment advisers wanting to sidestep the Advisers Act
in this way should consult their counsel.
Note, private equity real estate fund investment advisers who need to
advise about “securities” in a limited capacity can reduce, but perhaps not
eliminate, the risk that they would be considered “investment advisers” by
limiting any advice about “securities” to one-off advice and explicitly
stating to investors both orally and in writing that the real estate investment
adviser is neither holding himself out nor representing himself as an
investment adviser.
III. THE ABILITY OF A PRIVATE EQUITY REAL ESTATE ADVISER TO
SIDESTEP THE PORTIONS OF THE DODD-FRANK THAT SUBJECT
PRIVATE FUNDS INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO ADDITIONAL
REGULATIONS
If it is impractical for private equity real estate funds to avoid
investing in securities and be exempt from the Advisers Act, is it possible
for the advisers to reduce the burdens imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act in
any other respects? The answer is that the Dodd-Frank Act burdens, in
particular, investment advisers to “private funds.” “Private funds,” a term
added to the Advisers Act by Dodd-Frank, includes an investment fund that
would be an investment company as defined in Section 3 of the Investment
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Company Act246 but for the exemptions in Sections 3(c)(1)247 or 3(c)(7)248
thereof. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) were the
most frequently relied upon exemptions by private equity funds.
In the next portion of this article, we will consider new paths for
private equity real estate investment advisers to sidestep the parts of the
Dodd-Frank Act that burden investment advisers to “private funds,” most
significantly Volcker Rule and Form PF.
This article predicts that private equity real estate investment advisers
may likely want to restructure their funds’ exemptions to take advantage of
non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exemptions, different from
those that are typically relied upon. If the private equity real estate
investment adviser advises Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and
3(c)(9) exempt funds under the Investment Company Act, the adviser
won’t be considered advising “private funds” and thus should have the
ability to avoid the Dodd-Frank Act provisions that target “private funds”
advisers. It should be noted that private equity real estate investment
advisers, in particular, will have the option of considering the Sections
3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) exemptions.
Before diving into the benefits of advising Section 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1),
3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) exempt funds under the Dodd-Frank
Act, it is worth noting that there are also potential benefits intrinsic to the
Investment Company Act itself. Section 3(c)(1) exempt funds have the
advantage that the suitability requirements of Section 3(c)(1) are not as
heightened as for Section 3(c)(7) exempt funds. Section 3(c)(7) exempt
funds require “qualified purchasers,” a type of super accredited wealthy
investor. Section 3(c)(1) exempt funds, however, have the drawback that
the fund can be, “[B]eneficially owned by not more than one hundred
persons.”249

246. The definition of an “investment company” is beyond the scope of this article, but
subject to certain exceptions, generally includes, without limitation, most types of
companies that (i) invest more than 40% of their total assets (excluding government
securities and cash) in securities on an unconsolidated basis, or (ii) hold themselves out as
primarily engaged in the business of investing in securities. Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A),(C).
247. Per Section 3(c)(1), the definition of “investment company” does not include
“[a]ny issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially
owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not
presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.” Investment Company Act of
1940 § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006).
248. Per Section 3(c)(7), the definition of “investment company” does not include
“[a]ny issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at
the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making
and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such securities.” Id. § 80a3(c)(7)(A).
249. Id. § 80a-3(c)(1).
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Since the Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and
3(c)(9) exemptions are neither limited to funds with not more than one
hundred persons, nor funds with qualified purchasers, the Sections 3(a)(1),
3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9) exemptions offer some
attractive features under the Investment Company Act. However, the
Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9)
exemptions have often been overlooked by practitioners due to their supercomplex securities structuring problems that they pose, which potentially
means (A) more compliance time, energy and expense, and (B) more
compliance uncertainty. Nonetheless, it may now be the time for private
equity real estate investment advisers to give them a harder look.
For private equity real estate investment advisers seeking to rely upon
the new “private funds” exemption created by Dodd-Frank,250 the
investment adviser may need to act as an investment adviser solely to
“private funds,” in which case the investment adviser may desire not to
advise Section 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9)
exempt investment companies, which are not “private funds.” Pursuant to
Rule 203m-1, an investment adviser seeking nonetheless to utilize the
Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) and 3(c)(9)
exemptions and the “private funds” exemption could still do so if “the
investment adviser treats the issuer as a private fund under the [Advisers]
Act (15 U.S.C. 80b) and the rules thereunder for all purposes.”251
Below, this article considers how a private equity real estate
investment adviser could minimize the new burdens that the Dodd-Frank
imposes on advisers to “private funds,” by considering the specific benefits
of advising non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds. Private equity advisers seeking
to restructure their funds in this way may wish to seek SEC staff no-action
relief to confirm the legal bases for these possibilities.
A. Benefit 1 – Form PF
Beyond subjecting many investment advisers to the existing record
keeping and reporting requirements framework under the Advisers Act, the
Dodd-Frank Act imposes additional record keeping and reporting
requirements with respect to “private funds.” Under Section 404 of the
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC may require any registered investment adviser to

250. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(m)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-3(m)(1)
(Supp. 2012) (“The Commission shall provide an exemption from the registration
requirements under [the Advisers Act] to any investment adviser of private funds, if each of
such investment adviser acts solely as an adviser to private funds and has assets under
management in the United States of less than $150,000,000.”).
251. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-1(d)(5) (2013).
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be subject to certain recordkeeping and reporting requirements with respect
to “private funds.”252
Registered investment advisers who manage one or more “private
funds” are now required to file Form PF if the adviser or its related persons,
collectively, have “at least $150 million in private fund assets under
management as of the last of [the adviser’s] most recently completed fiscal
year.”253 Advisers must report on Form PF certain information regarding
the “private funds” they manage, and this information is intended to
complement information the SEC collects on Form ADV. . . .254 “Rule
204(b)-1 will require SEC-registered investment advisers who manage
private funds to report risk exposure statistics on a consistent basis . . . on
Form PF.”255
As the definition of “private funds” under Section 402 of the DoddFrank Act does not include funds exempt under Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1),
3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9), registered private equity real estate
investment that advise non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) funds should not be subject to
Form PF.256
Not subjecting private equity real estate to Form PF was likely
intended by the regulators, since private equity real estate doesn’t pose
systemic risks. This is confirmed by the fact that the regulators have
already finalized Form PF, and there is no indication that it applies to
private equity real estate utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions.
B. Benefit 2 – Future Regulation on the Horizon
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the comptroller general of the United
States to conduct “a study of the feasibility of forming a self-regulatory
organization (“SRO”) to oversee private funds . . . .”257 In addition, the
Dodd-Frank Act requires the comptroller general to conduct “a study on the
appropriate criteria for determining the financial thresholds or other criteria
needed to qualify for accredited investor status and eligibility to invest in
private funds . . . .”258

252. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010).
253. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF 1, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
254. Id.
255. Risky Reporting: Form PF in a Nutshell, ERNST & YOUNG 1 (Jan. 2012),
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Risky_reporting_Form_PF_in_a_nutshell/$FI
LE/Risky%20reporting_Form%20PF%20in%20a%20nutshell.pdf.
256. See Dodd-Frank Act § 404 (explaining that private funds must disclose certain
required information).
257. Id. § 416.
258. Id. § 415.
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On July 11, 2011, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
released a study regarding the feasibility of forming an SRO to oversee
investment advisers to “private funds.”259 The study indicated that such an
SRO could be done, but concluded that it would require legislation and
would not be without challenges.260 Thus, it does not appear likely that
such an SRO is on the horizon.
However, if there ever were further regulation of “private funds,”
private equity real estate investment advisers that advise exempt funds
other than “private funds,” such as Section 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2),
3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) exempt funds, would likely not be subject to
such SRO oversight or increased suitability thresholds.
Not subjecting private equity real estate to a future SRO was likely
intended by the regulators, since private equity real estate doesn’t pose
systemic risks.
C. Benefit 3 – Foreign Private Advisers
Foreign private equity real estate investment advisers may seek to rely
upon the revised Section 203(b)(3) exemption from registration under the
Advisers Act for “foreign private advisers,” as defined in Section
202(a)(30) thereof.261 The Dodd-Frank Act defines the term “foreign
private adviser” to mean any investment adviser who, among other things,
“has, in total, fewer than 15 clients and investors in the United States in
private funds advised by the investment adviser.”262
Thus, if a foreign private equity real estate investment adviser advises
Investment Company Act exempt funds other than “private funds,” a
foreign private equity real estate investment adviser would likely be able to
advise fewer than fifteen funds in the United States, and the number of
investors in the United States in those would not be restricted, since the
statute only restricts the number of investors in “private funds.” Thus, if a
foreign private equity real estate investment were to structure its funds as
Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) exempt
funds, that would make it easier for them to fit within the foreign private
adviser exemption under the Advisers Act.
It should be noted that an additional advantage of this type of
structuring is that foreign private advisers would additionally not be subject
to either the old or the new Advisers Act record keeping and reporting
259. Private Fund Advisers: Although a Self-Regulator Organization Could Supplement
SEC Oversight, It Would Present Challenges and Trade Offs, U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE (July 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320886.pdf.
260. Id. at 11.
261. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(30), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30) (2006).
262. Dodd-Frank Act § 402(a).
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provisions, including Form PF, since they wouldn’t be registered
investment advisers.
The ability of private equity real estate to more easily satisfy the
“foreign private advisers” exemption was likely intended by the regulators,
since private equity real estate doesn’t give rise to systemic risk concerns.
D. Benefit 4 – Intrastate Advisers
The Dodd-Frank Act added that the intrastate adviser exemption in
Section 203(b)(1) of the Advisers Act cannot be utilized by investment
advisers that advise “private funds.”263 Following the Dodd-Frank Act,
Section 203(b)(1) provides an exemption from registration under the
Advisers Act to “any investment adviser, other than an investment adviser
who acts as an investment adviser to any private fund, all of whose clients
are residents of the State within which such investment adviser maintains
his or its principal office and place of business. . . .”264 As a result, an
intrastate investment adviser seeking to avoid registration under the
Advisers Act could potentially advise funds exempt under Sections 3(a)(1),
3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) of the Investment Company
Act.
The ability of private equity real estate to more easily satisfy the
“intrastate advisers” exemption was also likely intended by the regulators,
since, as discussed above, private equity real estate doesn’t give rise to
systemic risk concerns.
E. Benefit 5 – Volcker Rule
Regardless of whether an investment adviser is an “investment
adviser” within the meaning of the Advisers Act, the new Volcker Rule
provides, subject to certain limited exceptions, that “a banking entity shall
not – (A) engage in proprietary trading; or (B) acquire or retain any equity,
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a
private equity fund.”265 In addition, subject to certain carve-outs, the
Volcker Rule provides that,
Any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board that
engages in proprietary trading or takes or retains any equity,
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsors a hedge
fund or a private equity fund shall be subject, by rule . . . to
additional capital requirements for and additional quantitative
263. Id. § 403.
264. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1) (2006).
265. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(B) (2012).
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limits with regards to such proprietary trading and taking or
retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or
sponsorship of a hedge fund or a private equity fund . . . .266
The Volcker Rule generally defines both “hedge funds” and “private equity
funds” to include any issuers that rely on the exclusion from the definition
of investment company under Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment
Company Act or “such similar funds” as determined by the SEC,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or appropriate federal
banking agencies.267
Currently, these agencies are considering promulgating rules that
would broadly define “such similar funds” in such a way as to subject
Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exempt funds, as well as other types of exempt
funds and entities, to the above provisions of the Volcker Rule. If the joint
agencies limit their discretion and promulgate rules that exclude from the
scope of the Volcker Rule most exempt funds, other than Sections 3(c)(1)
and 3(c)(7) exempt funds, then private equity real estate investment
advisers would find it particularly advantageous to advise Sections 3(a)(1),
3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) exempt funds.
In 2011, the joint agencies promulgated a joint release that set forth a
proposed rule, but these agencies have yet to issue a final rule. In the joint
release, these agencies stated as follows: “The proposed rule follows the
scope of the statutory definition by covering an issuer only if it would be an
investment company, as defined in the Investment Company Act, but for
section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.”268 In footnote 222 of the joint
release, the agencies noted:
Under the proposed rule, if an issuer (including an issuer of assetbacked securities) may rely on another exclusion or exemption
from the definition of “investment company” under the
Investment Company Act other than the exclusions contained in
section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, it would not be considered a
covered fund, as long as it can satisfy all of the conditions of an
alternative exclusion or exemption for which it is eligible.269
Thus, there is reason to be optimistic that the agencies will choose to limit
their discretion and not apply the Volcker Rule against private equity real
estate advisers utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions when they eventually
promulgate a final rule. For the reasons discussed in the policy analysis

266. Id. § 1851(a)(2).
267. Id. § 1851(h)(2).
268. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,897
(Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Volcker Rules Release].
269. Id. at n.222.
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section, this paper strongly urges the regulators not to apply the Volcker
Rule against private equity real estate advisers utilizing non-(c)(1)/(c)(7)
exemptions.
IV. A COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVATE EQUITY REAL
ESTATE ADVISERS SEEKING TO UTILIZE NON-(C)(1)/(C)(7)
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT EXEMPTIONS
Following the Dodd-Frank Act, given the potential benefits of
advising non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds discussed in Part II, private equity
real estate investment advisers clearly will want to consider structuring
their private equity real estate funds so that they are exempt under Sections
3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or Section 3(c)(9) of the
Investment Company Act. This will allow a private equity real estate
investment adviser to take the position that it does not advise “private
funds.”
However, utilizing the Sections 3(a)(1), 3(b)(1), 3(b)(2),
3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or Section 3(c)(9) Investment Company Act exemptions
involves complex securities considerations, so private equity real estate
investment advisers will need to weigh the costs and benefits of this type of
structuring.
Below, this part briefly summarizes these considerations. These
summaries are meant only to be an introduction to the structuring
considerations. The requirements of these exemptions are complex and
legal counsel should be sought. For more information on Investment
Company Act exemptions structuring considerations, consult Robert H.
Rosenblum’s seminal treatise, Investment Company Determination under
the 1940 Act: Exemptions and Exceptions.270The reader should note in the
discussion below that when the term “issuer” or “company” is used, it
refers to the potential funds that a private equity real estate adviser would
advise.
A. Section 3(a)(1)
The term “investment company” means, under Section 3(a)(1),
[A]ny issuer which — (1) is or holds itself out as being engaged
primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; (2) is engaged or
proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such
business and has any such certificate outstanding; or (3) is
270. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204.
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engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing,
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or
proposes to acquire investment securities having a value
exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer's total assets
(exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an
unconsolidated basis.271
“Investment securities,” as used in Section 3, “includes all securities
except (A) Government securities, (B) securities issued by employees'
securities companies, and (C) securities issued by majority-owned
subsidiaries of the owner which (i) are not investment companies, and (ii)
are not relying on the exception from the definition of investment company
in paragraph (1) or (7) of subsection (c).”272
“Securities” under the Investment Company Act are described by the
Investment Company Act in exactly the same way as under the Advisers
Act. “Security” is defined under the Investment Company Act to mean
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest
in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege on any security (including a certificate of deposit) or
on any group or index of securities (including any interest therein
or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing.273
Even though the definition of “securities” is nearly the same as under
the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), an instrument may be a security for
Investment Company Act purposes even if it is not for purposes of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that bank certificates of deposit are not necessarily securities
271. Investment Company Act of 1940 §§ 3(a)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(a)(1)(A)-(C)
(2006). While this article provides a brief introduction to Section 3(a)(1) issues, the reader
should consult the Rosenblum treatise, supra note 204, §§ 3-5, for a more general discussion
of Section 3(a)(1) issues.
272. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(a)(2).
273. Id. § 80a-2(a)(36).
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for purposes of the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.274 Nonetheless, the
SEC has said that bank certificates of deposit may be securities for
purposes of the Investment Company Act:
While the language in the Investment Company Act’s definition
of the term “security” is identical to that in the Securities Act, the
regulatory context under the Investment Company Act differs
fundamentally from that under the Securities Act and the
Securities Exchange Act. . . . Since the bank regulatory statutes
generally do not apply to the operation of [money market] funds,
and since the exclusion of certificates of deposit from the
definition of security in the Investment Company Act would
seriously undermine the protections contemplated by Congress,
the SEC believes that the relevant context requires that the term
“security” take on a “different coloration” under the Investment
Company Act.275
In the context of real estate, the SEC staff has sometimes taken the
position that an interest in real estate is not a “security” under the
Investment Company Act. According to the SEC staff in Pruco, investing
in “traditional non-securities real estate investments” did not require
registration under the Investment Company Act, since these investments
were not considered securities.276 However, other types of real estate
interests could potentially be “securities,” which would likely entail a
similar analysis as set forth in Part I of this article.
In the Investment Company Act context, the SEC staff has indicated
that when a real estate fund invests in a company that invests in real estate,
that investment may be a security as well.277 The Two-Tier Real Estate
Companies release (discussed below) sets forth no-action criteria for
relying upon Section 3(a)(1) when a parent partnership is a two-tier real
estate company by virtue of its investments in other limited partnerships.278
Certain real estate funds may thus fall outside the definition of
“investment company” under Section 3(a)(1), while others potentially
could fall within that definition, depending on the type of real estate
investments that they make, and on whether those real estate investments
274. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982) (“We therefore hold that the
certificate of deposit . . . . is not a security.”).
275. Joel H. Goldberg, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2460, at *1-2
(May 6, 1982) (internal citations omitted).
276. Pruco Life Real Property Account, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2730, at *6 (Sept. 18, 1986). See also ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 2.3.13, at 59
(explaining that the SEC Staff does not hold an interest in real estate as a security).
277. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 2.3.13, at 59 (explaining the SEC staff’s
position that interests in a company that invests in real estate are securities).
278. Two-Tier Real Estate Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-8456,
39 Fed. Reg. 32,129 (Sept. 5, 1974).
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are securities investments. To the extent a real estate fund falls outside of
the definition of “investment company” in Section 3(a)(1), the SEC staff
has suggested that regular monitoring is required to ensure that the issuer
continues to fall outside of that definition.279 To the extent a real estate
fund falls within the definition of “investment company” under Section
3(a)(1), investment advisers seeking not to advise “private funds” as a
result of the Dodd-Frank Act will need to consider using Sections 3(b)(1),
3(b)(2), 3(c)(5)(C), 3(c)(6) or 3(c)(9) for an exemption from the Investment
Company Act.
The drawback for real estate investment advisers of trying to fall
outside the definition of “investment company” in Section 3(a)(1) is that a
Section 3(a)(1) exemption would likely place severe limitations on the
types of investments that a real estate fund could invest in, not to mention
the ongoing monitoring requirements.
B. Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2)
Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) of the Investment Company Act exempt
issuers from the basic definition of an “investment company” contained in
Section 3(a)(1)(C) (discussed above).280
Nonetheless, the Commission has taken the position that a
determination under Section 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2) that an issuer is
primarily engaged in a non-investment company business also
necessarily is a determination that the issuer is engaged in a
noninvestment company business for purposes of Section
3(a)(1)(C) and that the issuer therefore is not an investment
company under Section 3(a)(1)(A).281
The Rosenblum treatise adds that the Staff would not allow a
company to rely upon the Sections 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2) exemptions in the
event an issuer “holds itself out as an investment company.”282 Companies
that are not exempt under either Section 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2) always have the
option of seeking Section 6(c) exemptive relief as a fall-back option.283
279. See Pruco Life Real Property Account, supra note 276, at *1 (discouraging
enforcement action provided that the fund regularly monitor its accounts).
280. Section 3(b)(2) is a related exception to section 3(a)(1)(C), but it is not discussed,
since Section 3(b)(2) is not self-operating.
281. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.2, at 157.
282. Id. While this article provides a brief introduction to Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2)
issues, the reader should consult Rosenblum, supra note 204, §§ 6-7, for a more general
discussion.
283. See id. § 6.4, at 181 (explaining that the Commission may grant exemptive relief
under Section 6(c) if the exemption is in the public interest and consistent with the
protection of investors and purpose of the Investment Company Act).
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Section 3(b)(1) exempts from the definition of investment company in
Section 3(a)(1)(C) “any issuer primarily engaged, directly or through a
wholly-owned subsidiary or subsidiaries,284 in a business or businesses
other than that of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in
securities.”285 That is, issuers that conduct an operating business through
wholly-owned subsidiaries are exempted from the definition of an
investment company, even though over 40 percent of their total assets
technically consist of securities. The SEC takes the view that the Section
3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) exceptions are “not available to an issuer that holds
itself out as an investment company.”286
Section 3(b)(2) of the [Investment Company] Act is closely
related to Section 3(b)(1) and . . . . authorizes the Commission to
declare by order that an issuer is not an investment company as
defined in Section 3(a)(1)(C) if the issuer is primarily engaged in
a business or businesses other than that of investing, reinvesting,
owning, holding, or trading in securities either directly, through
majority-owned subsidiaries, or through controlled companies
conducting similar types of businesses. . . .287
The Commission has stated:
[C]ertain operational differences exist between section 3(b)(1)
and section 3(b)(2). Section 3(b)(1) is self-operating, while
section 3(b)(2) requires a Commission order. Additionally,
section 3(b)(1) applies only to companies operating either
directly or through wholly owned subsidiaries, while section
3(b)(2) applies additionally to companies operating through
majority-owned subsidiaries and certain controlled companies. . .

284. Section 2(a)(43) of the Investment Company Act defines a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a person as “a company 95 per centum or more of the outstanding voting
securities of which are owned by such person, or by a company which, within the meaning
of this paragraph, is a wholly owned subsidiary of such person.” Investment Company Act
of 1940 § 2(a)(43), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(43) (2006).
Section 2(a)(42) defines a “voting security” as “any security presently entitling the
owner or holder thereof to vote for the election of directors of a company.” Id. § 80a2(a)(42).
[T]he Staff has suggested that a limited partnership (the ‘subsidiary’) may be
deemed to be a wholly owned subsidiary of a parent partnership, even if the
limited partnership interests are not voting securities, when the parent
partnership owns at least 95 percent of the limited partnership interests of the
subsidiary and the general partner of the parent partnership also will serve as the
general partner of the subsidiary. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.5, at 185.
285. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(1) (2006).
286. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.2, at 157.
287. Id. § 6.1, at 155.
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.288
In order to rely upon either Section 3(b)(1) or Section 3(b)(2),
an issuer initially must establish that it is engaged in some
noninvestment business. If an identifiable noninvestment
business exists, the inquiry shifts to whether that business is
primary. An issuer that is primarily engaged in one or more noninvestment company businesses may be eligible to rely upon
Section 3(b)(1) or Section 3(b)(2). By contrast, an issuer that is
engaged, but not primarily engaged, in a noninvestment company
business may not rely upon Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2). . . .289
The determination of whether an issuer is primarily engaged in a
non-investment company business for purposes of Section
3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) generally is based upon the five-factor test
established in the Commission’s 1947 decision in Tonopah
Mining Co. . . . The five factors examined under the Tonopah
test are (1) the issuer’s historical development, (2) its public
representations of policy, (3) the activities of its officers and
directors, (4) the nature of its present assets, and (5) the sources
of its present income.290
Occasionally, the SEC uses a different test than the Tonopah test. As
related to real estate, “in certain exemptive applications involving oil, gas,
and other mining companies, the Commission has from time to time looked
at financial tests other than simply the percentage of assets invested in and
income derived from investment securities.”291
As far as non-investment company businesses are concerned, the SEC
has permitted certain real estate activities to count as non-investment
company businesses when the company was primarily engaged in certain
real estate activities. The SEC has, at least under certain facts, permitted
engaging in real estate secured lending,292 owning an office building,293
owning single family homes,294 engaging in the business of servicing loans
288. Id. at 156 (internal quotation omitted).
289. Id. § 6.3, at 158 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
290. Id. at 158-59 (internal footnotes omitted).
291. Id. § 6.3, at 173.
292. See, e.g., In re Baldwin Sec. Corp., Investment Company Act Release No. IC15747, 1987 SEC LEXIS 4662, at *1 (May 20, 1987) (ordering that applicant who engaged
in primary real estate secured lending is not considered an investment company).
293. See, e.g., In re Fed. Power & Light Co., Investment Company Act Release No. 298,
1942 SEC LEXIS 718, at *10 (Jan. 19, 1942) (ordering that applicants who owned stock in
a realty company that engaged solely in the operation of a office building to be
noninvestment companies).
294. See, e.g., Hereth, Orr and Jones, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2951, at *14 (Sept. 2, 1983) (concluding that a company that provided a pool of
investment funds to be used to purchase single family homes is not an investment
company).
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secured by mortgages,295 and investing in mortgages or being primarily
engaged in the business of servicing loans secured by such mortgages.296 In
a no-action letter, the SEC staff gave broad relief for a variety of real estate
activities where the company’s business primarily consisted of:
(1) originating real estate mortgage loans for sale to permanent
lenders pursuant to commitments from permanent lenders to
purchase such loans, (2) servicing loans for permanent lenders,
(3) real estate brokerage, (4) sales of various forms of insurance,
primarily to borrowers, (5) residential and commercial property
management, and (6) real estate investment and development,
primarily as a general partner in various limited partnerships
formed for the purpose of owning multi-family and commercial
real estate.297
In addition, certain kinds of oil, gas, and mining businesses are also
considered non-investment company businesses.298 However, when a real
estate fund invests in real estate activities that are “securities,” then it is
unlikely that the real estate fund would be considered a non-investment
company business.
There are some barriers to relying upon Sections 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2).
At times, “[t]he Commission and the Staff . . . have taken the position that
companies other than industrial companies and industrial holding
companies are not eligible to rely upon Sections 3(b)(1) or 3(b)(2).”299 In
addition, “the Commission and the Staff have taken the position that
Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) are not available to the types of issuers that are
included among the various exemptions in Section 3(c) of the [Investment
Company] Act.”300 However, “[i]n a number of instances . . . the
Commission and the Staff have implicitly have taken the opposite position”
and “the Staff has permitted issuers to rely upon Section 3(b)(1) when they
have engaged . . . in certain real estate activities, even though Section

295. See e.g., First Deed Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2565,
at *24 (Mar. 29, 1979) (concluding that a company primarily engaged in the business of
investing in mortgages need not register under the Investment Company Act of 1940).
296. See, e.g., Financial Mortgage & Realty Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 1921, at *15-16 (July 18, 1977) (concluding that a company primarily
engaged in the business of servicing loans secured by mortgages need not register under the
Investment Company Act of 1940).
297. H. & Val J. Rothschild, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1928, at *4 (Sept. 5, 1976).
298. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.4, at 176-77 (noting noninvestment
businesses can include exploration, development, and distribution of oil, gas, and precious
metals).
299. Id. at 179.
300. Id.
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3(c)(5)(C) of the [Investment Company] Act applies to similar
companies.”301
The SEC staff has also allowed a company to fall under the Section
3(b)(1) exemption when that company owned shares of a mineral
subsidiary whose business consisted “of owning or holding oil, gas, and
other mineral royalties or leases or fractional interests in oil, gas, or other
mineral royalties or leases within the meaning of Section 3(c)(9)” of the
Investment Company Act.302
Issuers that operate non-investment real estate companies indirectly
through wholly owned subsidiaries may rely upon Section 3(b)(1).
Section 3(b)(1) excepts an issuer from the definition of
investment company if the issuer is primarily engaged, either
directly or through a wholly owned subsidiary or subsidiaries, in
a noninvestment company business. Section 3(b)(1) does not
apply to issuers engaged in noninvestment company businesses
through majority-owned or controlled subsidiaries, although such
issuers may apply to the Commission for an exemptive order in
Section 3(b)(2).303
Section 2(a)(43) of the [Investment Company] Act defines a
wholly owned subsidiary of a person as: a company 95 per
centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of which are
owned by such person, or by a company which, within the
meaning of this paragraph, is a wholly owned subsidiary of such
person.304
“Thus, under Section 2(a)(43), a wholly owned subsidiary may be
owned either directly by the parent company or indirectly through one or
more wholly owned subsidiaries of the parent company.”305 It should be
noted, relevant to the real estate fund context, that:
[T]he Staff has suggested that a limited partnership . . . may be
deemed to be a wholly owned subsidiary of a parent partnership,
even if the limited partnership interests are not voting securities,
when the parent partnership owns at least 95 percent of the
limited partnership interests of the subsidiary and the general
partner of the parent partnership also will serve as the general
partner of the subsidiary.306

301. Id.
302. The Energy Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 4427,
at *1 (Dec. 13, 1972).
303. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 6.5, at 184 (internal footnote omitted).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 185.
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To the extent that the wholly owned subsidiaries themselves engage in nonoperating businesses, the exception provided by Section 3(b)(1) would
likely not be available, since Section 48(a) of the Investment Company Act
prohibits doing indirectly what cannot be done directly.307
The drawback for real estate investment advisers of utilizing the
exemptions in Sections 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) is that, like utilizing the Section
3(a)(1) exemption, the Section 3(b)(1) and 3(b)(2) exemptions also would
likely place severe limitations on the types of investments that a real estate
fund could invest in.
C. Section 3(c)(5)(C)
1. Generally
Section 3(c)(5)(C) generally excludes from the definition of
investment company, “[a]ny person who is not engaged in the business of
issuing redeemable securities, face-amount certificates of the installment
type or periodic payment plan certificates, and who is primarily engaged in
. . . purchasing or otherwise acquiring mortgages and other liens on and
interests in real estate.”308 Below, this section discusses Section 3(c)(5)(C)
in more detail.
2.

Mortgage-Related Pools Concept Release

Section 3(c)(5)(C)
[W]as enacted in 1940 to exclude from regulation under the
Investment Company Act companies that were engaged in the
mortgage banking business and that did not resemble, or were not
considered to be, issuers that were in the investment company
business. Since that time, as the mortgage markets have evolved
307. See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 48(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47(a) (2006) (“It
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to cause to be done any act or thing
through or by means of any other person which it would be unlawful for such person to do
under the provisions of this subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder.”).
308. Id. § 80a-3(c)(5)(c). Section 3(c)(5) of the Investment Company Act also excludes
from the definition of investment company, “Any person who is not engaged in the business
of issuing redeemable securities, face-amount certificates of the installment type or periodic
payment plan certificates, and who is primarily engaged in one or more of the following
businesses: (A) Purchasing or otherwise acquiring notes, drafts, acceptances, open accounts
receivable, and other obligations representing part or all of the sales price of merchandise,
insurance, and services; (B) making loans to manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers of,
and to prospective purchasers of, specified merchandise, insurance, and services . . . .” Id. §
80a-3(c)(5).
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and expanded, a wide variety of companies, many of them
unforeseen in 1940, have relied upon Section 3(c)(5)(C). The
statutory exclusion from the definition of investment company
provided by Section 3(c)(5)(C) does not have an extensive
legislative history and has not been comprehensively addressed
by the Commission. Section 3(c)(5)(C) has been addressed in
staff no-action letters on a case-by-case basis. . . .309
Many different types of companies that engage in a variety of
businesses rely on this exclusion. Such companies include:
Those that originate and hold mortgages and participations of
mortgages that they originated; companies engaged in the
business of acquiring from affiliates or third parties mortgages
and mortgage-related instruments (such as mortgage
participations, mezzanine loans and mortgage-backed securities);
companies that invest in real estate, mortgages and mortgagerelated instruments; and companies whose primary business is to
invest in so-called agency securities and other mortgage-backed
securities.310
The Commission refers to these types of companies as mortgage-related
pools, many of which are REITs.311
In September 2011, the SEC published a concept release and request
for public comment focusing on, among other things, whether mortgagerelated pools should be able to rely upon the Section 3(c)(5)(C)
exemption.312 The Concept Release asks for views about how this
exclusion should apply to mortgage-related pools, whom the Commission
suggested were making judgments about their status under the Investment
Company Act without sufficient Commission guidance.313
The
Commission was concerned that “some types of mortgage-related pools
might interpret the statutory exclusion provided by Section 3(c)(5)(C) in a
broad manner, while others might interpret the exclusion too narrowly,
suggesting that there may be confusion among some mortgage-related
pools about when the exclusion applies.”314 The Commission was also
“concerned that the staff no-action letters that have addressed the statutory
exclusion in Section 3(c)(5)(C) may have contained, or led to,
309. Companies Engaged in the Business of Acquiring Mortgages and MortgageRelated Instruments, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-29778, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,300,
55,301 (Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Mortgages Concept Release].
310. Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
311. See id. at 55,302 (“Many, if not most, mortgage-related pools are corporations or
business trusts that have elected to be treated as REITs for purposes of their tax status under
the Internal Revenue Code.”).
312. Id. at 55,300.
313. Id. at 55,301.
314. Id.
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interpretations that are beyond the scope of the exclusion and inconsistent
with investor protection.”315 Furthermore, the Commission was “concerned
that certain types of mortgage-related pools today appear to resemble in
many respects investment companies such as closed-end funds and may not
be the kinds of companies that were intended to be excluded from
regulation under the Act by Section 3(c)(5)(C).”316
Thus, any Section 3(c)(5)(C) discussion in this article that relates to
mortgage-related pools could be subject to change in the near future.
3.

Asset-Backed Issuers Concept Release

Asset-backed issuers usually hold a pool of financial assets, which
subjects them to the “investment company” definition in Section 3(a)(1).
[C]ertain asset-backed issuers rely on the exclusion from the
definition of investment company in Section 3(c)(5) of the
Investment Company Act rather than on Rule 3a-7. Section
3(c)(5) was intended to exclude from the definition of investment
company certain factoring, discounting and mortgage companies,
and did not specifically contemplate asset-backed issuers, which
generally did not exist at the time Congress adopted the
Investment Company Act in 1940.317
Nevertheless,
[M]any issuers of mortgage-backed securities have sought to rely
on Section 3(c)(5). These asset-backed issuers include issuers of
securities backed by whole residential mortgage loans and home
equity loans (two of the most commonly securitized assets),
whole commercial mortgages, participated mortgage interests,
and “whole pool certificates” issued or guaranteed by Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae.318
In August 2011, the SEC published a concept release and request for
public comment “revisiting the ability of asset-backed issuers to rely on the
exclusion provided by Section 3(c)(5) . . . in the aftermath of the recent
financial crisis . . . .”319 Accordingly, the Commission sought comment on
“whether Section 3(c)(5) should be amended to limit the ability of asset-

315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Treatment of Asset-Backed Issuers under the Investment Company Act, Investment
Company Act Release, No. IC-29779, 76 Fed. Reg. 55,308, 55,320 (Sept. 7, 2011)(internal
footnote omitted) [hereinafter Asset-Backed Issuers Concept Release].
318. Id. at 55,320-21 (internal footnotes omitted).
319. Id. at 55,321.
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backed issuers to rely on Section 3(c)(5).”320Thus, any Section 3(c)(5)(C)
discussion in this article that relates to asset-backed issuers could be subject
to change in the near future.
4.

Securities That May Not Be Issued under Section 3(c)(5)(C)

The Section 3(c)(5)(C) exclusion does not apply to issuers that are
“engaged in the business of issuing redeemable securities, face-amount
certificates of the installment type or periodic payment plan
certificates.”321Concerns about issuing face-amount certificates of the
installment or periodic payment plan certificates are generally not
applicable to most modern real estate funds. Nonetheless, in one no-action
letter, “[A] company’s proposed method of distributing . . . which
contemplated annual payments for ten years and a guarantee of a maturity
value at the end of the tenth year, involved the issuance of a periodic plan
certificate for purposes of Section 3(c)(5).”322
Under Section 2(a)(32), “redeemable security” means,
[A]ny security, other than short-term paper, under the terms of
which the holder, upon its presentation to the issuer or to a person
designated by the issuer, is entitled (whether absolutely or only
out of surplus) to receive approximately his proportionate share
of the issuer's current net assets, or the cash equivalent thereof.323
The purpose of this statutory restriction was to regulate companies that
invested in certain kinds of “notes, commercial paper, and mortgages and
other liens on real estate [that] ‘attempted to capitalize on the popularity of
open end [investment] companies by issuing redeemable securities.’”324
What is a redeemable security under Section 2(a)(32) can entail a highly

320. Id.
321. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5) (2006).
Under the Investment Company Act Section, “periodic payment plan certificate” means (A)
any certificate, investment contract, or other security providing for a series of periodic
payments by the holder, and representing an undivided interest in certain specified securities
or in a unit or fund of securities purchased wholly or partly with the proceeds of such
payments, and (B) any security the issuer of which is also issuing securities of the character
described in clause (A) of this paragraph and the holder of which has substantially the same
rights and privileges as those which holders of securities of the character described in clause
(A) have upon completing the periodic payments for which such securities provide.” Id. §
80a-2(a)(27).
322. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 404, n. 8 (discussing Georgia Int’l. Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1938 (May 10, 1972)).
323. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(32).
324. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 404-05 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-184, at 37
(1969)).
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complex and fact specific analysis.325 Below, some of the key issues for
real estate funds are traced out, but such summary is not necessarily
exhaustive of every potential Section 2(a)(32) claim that can arise for real
estate funds aspiring to rely upon Section 3(c)(5)(C).
[N]otwithstanding the requirement in Section 2(a)(32) that a
redeemable security must entitle the holder to approximately his
or her proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets, or the
cash equivalent thereof, the Staff has taken the position that a
security may be a redeemable security even if a portion of the
issuer’s income is excluded from the redemption rights.326
In one early no-action letter, the SEC took the position that securities
were redeemable securities where the fund would “offer to purchase,
during a 30 day period following mailing of the year-end valuation of the
limited partnership interests, any limited partnership interests tendered to it
at a price equal to 90% of the their value . . . .” 327 Clearly, a redemption
option for 90% of the value of the interests is very nearly for the
proportionate share of the issuer’s current net assets, or cash equivalent
thereof. It is difficult to predict how the SEC staff would view, for
example, a redemption option 50% of the value of the interests.
The Rosenblum treatise notes:
The Staff also takes the position that a fixed-income security
entitles its holders to receive approximately their proportionate
share of the issuer’s current net assets, within the meaning of
Section 2(a)(32), if the holders are entitled to receive the stated
dollar amount of the fixed-income security plus the accrued
return on that security.328
The reason for this view is that in the Citicorp no-action letter, the SEC
staff stated that “[i]t is the staff’s position that the net asset value (or its
equivalent) of fixed-income securities can be calculated by reference to
their stated dollar amount plus accrued return.”329 On the other hand, the
SEC staff previously indicated that “bonds were not redeemable securities
when, among other things, their redemption price was based on the
principal amount of the Bonds and not on the Bond holders’ proportionate
shares of the issuer’s current net assets.”330 Under the statutory restriction,

325. See id. at 405-06 (providing details on what is a redeemable security within the
meaning of Section 2(a)(32)).
326. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
327. Georgia Int’l Corp., 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at *11.
328. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 406.
329. Citicorp Sec., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 683, at *10,
n. 12 (Aug. 4, 1995).
330. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 407, n.19 (discussing DSM Co., SEC No-
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“a security is redeemable only if it is redeemable at the option of the
holder. A security is not a redeemable security within the meaning of
Section 2(a)(32) if it is redeemable only at the option of the issuer.”331
As a general rule of thumb, this requirement is much more
problematic for open-end companies than for private equity real estate
funds. Most private equity real estate funds are closed-end funds, which,
by definition, means that their redemption is subject to a lock-up period
during which investors are not permitted to redeem. The Rosenblum
treatise notes that “the Staff has taken the position that a security that may
be presented to the issuer by the holder is not a redeemable security if. . .
substantial restrictions are placed upon the right of redemption. . . .”332 For
real estate funds, this would clearly be the most important Section 2(a)(32)
issue.
In one relatively recent no-action letter, Nebraska Higher Education
Loan Program, a loan program issued three series of variable rate demand
bonds to finance the purchase of student loans from originating lenders.333
The SEC staff took the position that the bonds subject to a three-year
holding period (essentially the same thing as a lock-up) were not
redeemable securities for purposes of Section 2(a)(32), but the SEC staff
declined to conclude that the bonds subject to a two-week or thirty-day
holding period were not redeemable securities.334 In between thirty-days
and three years there is a considerable gray area. However, one would
hope that, at a minimum, two-year lock-up periods, which tend to be at the
lower end of private equity fund lock-up periods, would still not be
redeemable securities for purposes of Section 2(a)(32).
Other no-action letters are promising for private equity real estate
funds with various types of lock-up periods on the redeemable securities
issue. In Citicorp Securities, the SEC staff wrote:
You believe that the Trust will not be issuing redeemable
securities within the meaning of Section 2(a)(32) because of the
limitations placed on an investor’s ability to withdraw all or a
portion of its investment from the Trust prior to the targeted
maturity date. Withdrawals will not be permitted during the first
six months following an investment in the Trust, and thereafter, a
notice period of 180 days will be required. In addition, no
withdrawal will be honored if, prior to the date of honor, the
Trust had received notice requiring it to honor a commitment to
Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2880, at *11 (Nov. 5, 1986)).
331. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.2, at 405.
332. Id. at 406.
333. Neb. Higher Educ. Loan Program, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 464, at *2 (Apr. 3, 1998).
334. Id.
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purchase Long-term Assets.
We agree that, in these
circumstances, the Trust will not be issuing redeemable
securities.335
It should be noted that in that letter, in the alternative, “[i]nvestors will be
permitted to sell their beneficial interests at any time to qualified thirdparty purchasers that are not affiliated with the Trust or its administrator,
but only if other investors representing at least 51% of the remaining
beneficial interests consent in writing to the sale.”336
In Redwood Mortgage Investors VII, the SEC staff gave no-action
relief on the redeemable securities issue when a limited partnership formed
as a mortgage lender gave the following withdrawal rights.337 First, limited
partners could withdraw their capital after one year from the date of
purchase, subject to a 10% early withdrawal penalty. The balance would
be distributed in four quarterly installments. Second, limited partners could
withdraw their capital commencing five years after their purchase of
interests in the partnership. The capital could be withdrawn in twenty
quarterly installments or longer beginning the last day of the quarter
following the quarter in which the investor gives notice of the intent to
withdraw. Third, after five years, limited partners could withdraw their
capital from the partnership in four equal quarterly installments subject to a
10% early withdrawal penalty. The 10% penalty would be applicable to
any such withdrawal prior to the time when such sums could have been
withdrawn pursuant to the five-year (or longer) withdrawal period.
Payments under the four payment plan also would begin on the last day of
the quarter following the quarter in which the investor gave notice of his
intent to withdraw from the partnership and liquidate his capital account.338
The partnership’s obligation to pay withdrawing investors would be
satisfied solely from the available cash flow of the partnership. The cash
flow would be available for payment to withdrawing investors after all
current expenses of the partnership have been paid and adequate provisions
have been made for the payment of monthly, quarterly or annual cash
distributions to those investors who elect such distributions upon
subscription for units. Any cash flow remaining after satisfying the above
obligations would be available to pay the withdrawing investors. If the
partnership’s cash flow were not sufficient to liquidate capital accounts in
the above time period, the partnership would pay whatever cash flow is
available to liquidate the capital accounts but would not liquidate any
existing mortgage loans to pay early withdrawing investors. The
335. Citicorp Sec., Inc., 1995 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at *10.
336. Id. at n.11.
337. Redwood Mortg. Investors VII, a Cal. LTD P’Ship, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 33, at *1 (Jan. 5, 1990).
338. Id. at *6-*7.
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partnership would not, in any twelve month period, liquidate more than
20% of the total capital accounts outstanding at the beginning of such
twelve month period. It should be noted that in granting no-action relief,
the SEC staff particularly pointed to the fact that there was a one-year
holding period.339
In California Dentists’ Guild Real Estate Mortgage Fund II, the SEC
staff gave no-action relief on the redeemable securities issue when a real
estate mortgage fund made the following key representations:
(1) the Fund will invest substantially all of its assets in mortgage
loans secured by mortgages or deeds of trust on real property; (2)
no investor may withdraw funds during the first 12 months
following his initial investment in the Fund; (3) thereafter, an
investor may withdraw funds only at the end of each calendar
quarter, and only after prior notice of at least 90 days; (4) any
such withdrawal by an investor will be limited to the lessor of $
100,000 or 25% of the investor’s account per calendar quarter;
(5) during any calendar year, the Fund will not use more than
20% of the value of its outstanding units at the beginning of such
calendar year to fund withdrawals; (6) withdrawal payments will
be made only to the extent that the Fund has cash available which
is not invested in mortgage loans; (7) the Fund will not establish
a reserve fund and in no event will any mortgage loans be sold or
otherwise disposed of, or will any proceeds from the sale of new
units be used, to provide cash for making withdrawal payments to
investors; and (8) if the total amount of withdrawals requested
exceeds available cash, individual withdrawal requests will be
satisfied in proportion to the total amount of withdrawals
requested.340
As an alternative to permitting withdrawal only to the extent that a fund
had cash available that was not invested in real estate and mortgage loans,
the SEC staff granted no-action relief where “funds were available from
principal payments or prepayments on mortgage loans, or from the
liquidation of mortgage loans for reasons other than the need to meet
investor redemption requests.”341

339. Id.
340. Cal. Dentists’ Guild Real Estate Mortg. Fund II, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 39, at *1-2 (Jan. 4, 1990).
341. Neb. Higher Educ. Loan Program, Inc., 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at *10, n. 11
(citing U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 641 (May
1, 1989)).
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The “Primarily Engaged” Requirement / Types of Assets (the
55/25 Test)

As discussed above, “Paragraph (C) of Section 3(c)(5) requires an
issuer to be primarily engaged in purchasing or otherwise acquiring
mortgages and other liens on and interests in real estate."342The SEC staff
has taken the position that in order to satisfy the “primarily engaged”
requirement of Section 3(c)(5)(C), an issuer “must invest at least fifty-five
percent of its assets in mortgages and other liens on and interests in real
estate (‘qualifying interests’).”343 The staff has interpreted the primarily
engaged requirement also to require that “[a]n additional twenty-five
percent of the issuer’s assets must be in real estate related assets [(“Real
Estate Related Assets”)], although this percentage may be reduced to the
extent that more than fifty-five percent of the issuer’s assets are invested in
qualifying interests.”344 The remaining 20% of the issuer’s assets may be in
unrestricted miscellaneous assets.345
6.

Temporarily Satisfying the 55/25 Test

The SEC staff has not objected if an issuer continues,
[T]o rely upon Section 3(c)(5)(C) if it temporarily does not
satisfy the 55/25 percent test discussed above if (1) its failure to
satisfy the test results from receiving additional cash, such as
from an offering of its securities or as a result of the sale of an
underlying asset and (2) the issuer intends to liquidate or to use
the cash to purchase additional qualifying interests as soon as
possible but generally within one year.346
In one no-action letter, the SEC staff stated that,
Whether a longer period also would be deemed temporary would
depend on such factors as (1) whether the failure of the company
to become primarily engaged in a non-investment business or
excepted business or liquidate within one year was due to factors
beyond its control; (2) whether the company’s officers and
employees during that period tried, in good faith, to effect the
company’s investment of its assets in a non-investment business
342. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4, at 413.
343. Id. at 414 (quoting DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PROTECTING
INVESTORS: A HALF CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 68 (1992) [hereinafter
PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT]).
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 415. “[T]he Staff has stated that under certain circumstances a period longer
than a year may be permissible.” Id.
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or excepted business or to cause the liquidation of the company;
and (3) whether the company invested in securities solely to
preserve the value of its assets.347
7.

Effect of Qualifying Interests and Real Estate Related Assets
Held through Corporate Subsidiaries on the 55/25 Test

The staff has addressed situations where companies holding
Qualifying Interests and Real Estate Related Assets are held through
subsidiaries of an issuer. If the issuer is a two-tier partnership, then the
more specific no-action guidance on two-tier partnerships discussed in the
next section applies. If the issuer is a corporation holding a subsidiary
corporation or partnership, or the issuer is a partnership holding a
subsidiary corporation, then presumably the more generalized guidance
outside of the two-tier partnerships no-action letters applies. This more
generalized guidance is discussed in this section.
Generally, an issuer’s interest, for purposes of determining the 55/25
test,
[I]n any real estate that is owned by a wholly owned or majority
owned subsidiary of [an issuer] or by a general partnership in
which the [issuer] or a wholly owned subsidiary owns an interest
will be determined by the percentage ownership interest of the
[issuer] in the subsidiary or the general partnership.348
However, if,
Real estate [is] owned by a minority owned subsidiary or by a
general partnership in which [the issuer] or a wholly owned
subsidiary is not actively involved in the management and
operation of the general partnership or in which the agreement of
the [issuer] or a wholly owned subsidiary for all major decisions
affecting the general partnership,349
then the real estate investment “will be considered . . . a miscellaneous
investment.”350
Under Section 2(a)(24) of the Investment Company Act, a
“‘[m]ajority-owned subsidiary’ of a person means a company 50 per
centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of which are owned by

347. Medidentic Mortg. Investors, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1506, at *3-4 (May 23, 1984).
348. NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 820, at *3435 (June 20, 1991).
349. Id.
350. Id. at *35.
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such person, or by a company which, within the meaning of this paragraph,
is a majority-owned subsidiary of such person.”351
8. Two-Tier Real Estate Companies
Two-tier real estate partnerships are partnerships, rather than
corporations, that invest in partnerships that engage in real estate activities.
“In recent years, the question of the applicability of the [Investment
Company] Act to two-tier real estate companies has arisen most often in
connection with limited partnerships which invest, as limited partners, in
limited partnerships engaged in the real estate business.” 352
“In a 1974 Release . . . the Staff . . . stated that under certain
conditions it would not recommend enforcement against companies that
invested in partnership interests and that did not register under the
[Investment Company] Act.”353 The SEC staff analogized two-tier
partnerships to “securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries, which
are not investment securities for purposes of Section 3(a)(1)(C).”354 “The
Two-Tier Real Estate Companies release primarily dealt with two-tier real
estate companies — that is, limited partnerships and other companies that
invest in interests of other limited partnerships engaged in the real estate
business.”355 “[H]owever, . . . ‘the interpretive positions expressed in [the]
release would apply to other types of business ventures such as cattle
breeding and raising and agricultural activities.’”356
The staff’s guidance said that two-tier partnerships, “will not be
deemed to be an investment company under either Section 3(a)(1)(A) or
Section 3(a)(1)(C) . . . when the parent partnership is a two-tier real estate
company by virtue of its investments in other limited partnerships (the
‘subsidiary partnerships’) that invest in real estate” when certain conditions
are met.357 In the Two-Tier Real Estate Companies release, the SEC staff
provided the following conditions:
(1) such company owns more than 50 percent of the limited
partnership interests in all the limited partnerships in which it
invests and has the right to dismiss and replace the general
partners of such underlying companies and the limited partners of
351. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(24), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(24) (2006).
352. Two-Tier Real Estate Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-8456,
39 Fed. Reg. 32,129, 32,130 (Sept. 5, 1974).
353. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 36.1, at 783 (citing Two-Tier Real Estate Cos., 39
Fed. Reg. at 32,129).
354. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 36.1, at 783.
355. Id.
356. Id. (quoting Two-Tier Real Estate Companies, 39 Fed. Reg. at 32,130).
357. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 36.2, at 784.
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such company have the right to dismiss and replace their general
partner or partners; (2) such company is not an investment
company within the meaning of Section 3(a)(1) of the
[Investment Company] Act; and (3) such company does not
register under the [Investment Company] Act in reliance upon an
opinion of counsel that it is not an investment company within
the meaning of Section 3(a)(3) of the [Investment Company]
Act.358
Rosenblum notes that “a parent partnership could be an investment
company under Section 3(a)(1)(A) if, for example, it held the interests in
the subsidiary partnerships as passive investments, as opposed to being
actively engaged in the activities of the subsidiary partnerships . . . .”359
In the Two-Tier Real Estate Companies release, the Staff also
stated that a two-tier limited partnership that does not own
majority interests in each of its underlying partnerships might
nonetheless be eligible for an exemptive order pursuant to
Section 3(b)(2) of the [Investment Company] Act if the two-tier
partnership actually is engaged in the real estate business through
its control of the underlying partnerships.360
In order to qualify for the Section 3(b)(2) exemption,
[T]he business activities of the two-tier partnership would have to
be carried out for the partnership by its general partner and, . . .
an issuer would have to demonstrate that in carrying on such
activities its general partner would be acting on behalf of the
partnership and not on its own behalf.361
The history of the two-tier partnership and its general partner,
the type of compensation of the general partner, the control by
the limited partners of the two-tier partnership over its general
partner and over the general partners of the underlying
partnerships, may be relevant, together with other factors, to the
determination of whether the general partner of a two-tier
company, in engaging in activities related to the business of the
underlying limited partnerships, is doing so on behalf of the twotier partnership or on its own account.362
Finally, the staff has stated that a two-tier partnership that invests “in
limited partnerships engaged in the development and building of housing
for low and moderate income persons may qualify” for an order under

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Two-Tier Real Estate Cos., 39 Fed. Reg. at 32,130 (internal footnote omitted).
ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 36.2, at 784.
Id. § 36.3, at 785.
Two-Tier Real Estate Cos., 39 Fed. Reg. at 32,130-31.
Id. at 32,130, n.5.
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Section 6(c) exempting it from all the provisions of the Investment
Company Act.363 However, this type of exemption requires that interests in
the parent partnership are “sold only to persons for whom investment in
limited profit, essentially tax-sheltered investments would not be unsuitable
. . . .”364 In addition, “requirements for fair dealing by the general partner
of the issuer with the limited partners of the issuer should be included in
the basic organizational documents of the company.”365
9. Joint Ventures
The SEC staff has concluded that certain joint venture investments of
an issuer that invests in fee interests in real estate and mortgage loans
secured exclusively by real estate, or some combination of the foregoing,
would count toward the issuer’s Qualifying Assets.366 In United States
Property Investments, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a company that would own interests in joint
ventures that were formed to acquire fee interests in real estate and to make
mortgage loans secured exclusively by real estate, or some combination of
the foregoing.367 The company’s interests in joint ventures would consist
exclusively of general partnership interests in joint ventures with up to
three partners and in which the company’s proportionate interest would
depend on its capital contribution to the joint venture. The company would
have a right of first refusal to acquire the interests of the other partners.
The company would be active in the management and operation of each
joint venture formed to acquire interests in real estate and the agreement of
the company would be required for all major decisions affecting each such
joint venture. In joint ventures formed to make mortgage loans, each
partner would contribute funds to be loaned and each loan would be
secured exclusively by a mortgage on real estate. Although the company
would acquire as little as 10% interest in the mortgage loan joint ventures,
the company would have the right, by itself, to foreclose the mortgage
securing the loan in the event of default.

363. Id. at 32,131.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 641, at
*19 (May 1, 1989).
367. Id. at *25.
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10. Satisfying the 55% Qualifying Interests Test
a. Qualifying Interests in General
As discussed above, Qualifying Interests generally include “mortgages
and other liens on and interests in real estate.”368 There are several
common types of Qualifying Interests. This article summarizes some of
the major types of real estate interests that the SEC staff has suggested
would constitute Qualifying Interests. Since these SEC staff positions are
based on relatively old no-action letters, the views of the SEC staff may no
longer be the same. Furthermore, not every single letter has been
exhaustively summarized, but rather the focus has been on summarizing the
most important letters. One final thing to note is that the SEC staff has
generally permitted entities seeking relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) to
invest in multiple types of Qualifying Interests at the same time.369
b. Fee Interests
It appears clear that, unquestionably, all forms of traditional fee
interests in real estate are Qualifying Interests. In United States Property
Investments, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C)
on the Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a corporation that invested
in fee interests in real estate.370 In one letter, it was clear that ownership
interests in shopping centers were Qualifying Interests, but that point
follows from the fact that fee interests in real estate are generally
Qualifying Interests.371
c. Leases
Investing in properties that are leased from a lessor, as well as leasing
out properties owned or leased by the entity seeking to avoid the
Investment Company Act, appears to receive no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue. In Burger King Investors
Master, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the
Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a partnership that would acquire

368. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4, at 413.
369. See id., § 15.4, at 417 (citing NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 820 (June 20, 1991)(issuer invested in real estate, whole pool mortgagebacked securities and certain real estate loans)).
370. U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS, at *25.
371. MSA Realty Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1913, at *5*8 (Mar. 19, 1984).
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leases.372 In that letter, the partnership would both lease properties from
Burger King Corporation and, in turn, lease the properties to Burger King
franchisees.373 In City National Bank, the SEC staff gave no-action relief
under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to an issuer holding individual
municipal real estate leases.374 In Gustavus Adolphus, the SEC staff gave
no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a fund as lessor
that would lease its fractional interests in land and buildings to a lessee,
thereby generating income for the fund.375 In that letter, the lessee’s
obligations to make rental payments were secured by real estate, but that
representation does not appear to be necessary for no-action relief, based
on an analysis of other SEC no-action letters where a company invested in
real estate leases.
d. Mortgage Loans and Deeds of Trust Secured by Real Estate
In United States Property Investments, the SEC staff gave no-action
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue with
respect to a corporation that invested in mortgage loans secured by real
estate.376 The types of letters that have received no-action relief contain a
variety of factual representations, but this article attempts to explicate the
key issues from these letters in terms of what types of mortgage loans
secured by real estate would receive no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue.
In terms of permitted types of loans, the SEC staff has given no-action
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to either bonds or notes secured
by mortgage collateral.377 In one no-action letter, as a condition to noaction relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue, the
SEC staff required that bonds “be secured by a lien on real estate giving the
holder the right to foreclose in the event of default.”378 From the
perspective of obtaining no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the
Qualifying Interests issue, it would be advisable for all mortgage collateral
372. Burger King Investors Master L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1883, at *1 (Mar. 5, 1986).
373. Id.
374. City Nat’l Bank, SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1831, at *1
(March 9, 1984).
375. Gustavus Adolphus Coll. Pooled Income Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 2578, at *1-2 (Oct. 19, 1987).
376. U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS at *25.
377. See Am. Dev. Fin. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2275, at
*1 (July 23, 1987) (providing no-action relief to issuer that invested at least 55% of its
assets in notes and bonds secured by mortgages on real estate).
378. M.L. Stern & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2309, at *2
(May 21, 1984).
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to give the bond holder or note holder rights to foreclose in the event of
default.
In terms of subordination, in American Housing Trust I, the SEC staff
gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests
issue with respect to a trust that held loans secured by first lien mortgages
and deeds of trust on real estate.379 In California Dentists’ Guild, the SEC
staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying
Interests issue when a fund invested in mortgages on real estate, even
though the fund sometimes invested in second or third mortgages or deeds
of trust on real estate.380
In terms of collateral, in Breen Mortgage Fund, the SEC staff granted
no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue
when the loan collateral included single-family residences, commercial
property and unimproved land, but presumably all fee interest real
collateral could result in no-action relief.381 In Embarcadero Mortgage
Fund, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the
Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a limited partnership that
originated mortgage loans, which were secured by deeds of trust on real
property.382 Thus, it appears that real estate mortgages could be either
originated or purchased, and still receive no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C).383 It also appears that deeds of trust on fee interests will suffice
as mortgage collateral and still receive no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C).
In most no-action letters where no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) is granted on the Qualifying Interests issue, the loans have been
fully collateralized, but in one no-action letter in the non-profit economic
development context, each loan would generally be collateralized on at
least a 75% loan-to-value ratio.384 In a recent no-action letter, Capital
Trust, the SEC staff noted that “[it] generally take[s] the position that an

379. Am. Hous. Trust I, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 751, at *1-3
(May 21, 1988).
380. Cal. Dentists’ Guild Real Estate Mortg. Fund II, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 39, at *1-2 (Jan. 4, 1990).
381. Breen Mortg. Fund I, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 85, at *1-2
(Jan. 20, 1988).
382. Embarcadero Mortg. Fund I, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
2879, at *1 (Nov. 5, 1986).
383. Other SEC no-action letters accord with this view. See, e.g., Redwood Mortg.
Investors, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2721, at *6 (Aug. 25, 1986)
(company would “make loans secured by deeds of trust on real property . . . .”).
384. Am. Dev. Fin. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2275, at *1,
*12 (July 23, 1987).
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asset is not a [Qualifying Interest] if it is not fully secured by [real]
estate.”385
e. Loan Participations
In Dayton Area Building, the SEC staff gave no-action relief when a
trust invested in participation interests in construction period mortgage
loans where each loan was fully secured by real property.386 The
participation interests held by the trust were sufficient to give its trustee the
right to foreclose the mortgage securing the loan in the event of default.
In a later no-action letter, Capital Trust, the SEC clarified that,
[A]n [asset] issuer that is engaged primarily in purchasing or
otherwise acquiring participations or fractionalized interests in
individual or pooled mortgages or deeds of trust is not entitled to
rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C). We have, however, taken the position
that an issuer that holds mortgage participation interests may
nevertheless rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C) if the mortgage
participation interests have attributes that would classify them as
being interests in real estate rather than as being interests in the
nature of a security in another person engaged in the real estate
business.387
Discussing construction period mortgage loans, the SEC stated that,
[E]ach mortgage participation interest held by the trust was an
interest in real estate because the participation interest was in a
mortgage loan that was fully secured by real property and the
trustee had the right by itself to foreclose on the mortgage
securing the loan in the event of default.388
In MGIC Mortgage Corporation, the SEC staff granted no-action
relief when the entity seeking relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the

385. Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 491, at *10,
n.12 (May 24, 2007) [hereinafter Capital Trust 2007]
386. Dayton Area Bldg. and Constr. Indus. Found., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 2034, at *1, *27 (May 7, 1987); see also Northwestern Ohio Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Found., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1505, at *4-5
(May 21, 1984) (“Because it is represented that each loan would be fully secured by real
property and that the participation interests held by a trust would give the foundation, as
trustee for the trust, the right by itself to foreclose the mortgage securing the loan in the
event of default, it appears that a trust would be primarily engaged in purchasing or
otherwise acquiring mortgages and other liens on and interests in real estate.”).
387. Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 281057, at *5 (Feb. 3, 2009)
[hereinafter Capital Trust 2009].
388. Id.
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Qualifying Interests issue invested in participations or fractional interests in
individual or pooled mortgages or deeds of trust, provided that:
(1) such interests are created by the fractionalization of whole
mortgage loans or pools of whole mortgage loans which have
been purchased by [the entity]; (2) [the entity] retains a
continuing percentage ownership interest of at least 10% in each
whole mortgage loan or pool thereof which it has fractionalized;
(3) [the entity] alone is the formal, record owner of the
mortgages; and (4) [the entity] throughout the life of the
participation has complete supervisory responsibility with respect
to the servicing of mortgage loans included in a participation and
has sole discretion as to enforcement of collections and the
institution and prosecution of foreclosure or similar legal
proceedings as set forth in paragraph 7 of the Participation
Agreement.389
The SEC staff stated that,
These conditions are intended to insure that if [the entity]
engages primarily in acquiring undivided interests in whole
mortgages or pools thereof . . . [the entity] will have a substantial
continuing ownership interest in such mortgages and pools and
unrestricted control over the enforcement of the lien and other
matters with respect to such mortgage loans so that the interest
retained by [the entity] would be an interest in real estate within
the meaning of Section 3(c)(5)(C) of the Act rather than an
interest in the nature of a security in another person engaged in
the real estate business.390
f.

B-Notes

In Capital Trust 2009, the SEC staff granted no-action relief under
Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue when a REIT proposed
to invest in B-Notes.391 B-Notes are a type of note that is used in A/B
financings, which the SEC staff described as follows:
[I]n an A/B financing, the principal balance of a single
commercial mortgage loan is divided between two or more
mortgage lenders as a means of spreading the credit risk
associated with the mortgage loan between the lenders. . . .
[U]nlike a mortgage loan participation where each loan
participant has a pari passu interest in the mortgage loan, an A/B
389. MGIC Mortg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 98, at *1-2
(Aug. 1, 1974).
390. Id. at *2.
391. Capital Trust 2009, 2009 WL 281057, at *7-8.
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financing is a senior/subordinated structure.
The senior
participation, called the “A-Note,” has priority over the junior
participation, called the “B-Note,” with respect to the allocation
of payments made on the mortgage loan. . . . [A]ll periodic
payments made by the borrower on the underlying mortgage loan
are allocated first to the A-Note holder, as senior lender, in
accordance with the terms of the A/B financing and then to the
B-Note holder, as junior lender. . . . [I]n the event of a default on
the mortgage loan, all collections or recoveries on the loan are
allocated first to the A-Note holder until the A-Note holder has
been fully paid before any payments are made to the B-Note
holder. . . . [A]ny losses incurred with respect to the loan are
allocated first to the B-Note holder and then to the A-Note
holder. . . . [T]he loan is fully secured by a mortgage on the
underlying commercial property and the value of the underlying
commercial property at the time of the A/B financing always
exceeds the combined principal balance of the B-Note and the ANote.392
[I]n the typical A/B financing in which the [REIT] invests, a
lender enters into a mortgage arrangement with a borrower and
then participates [in] the mortgage loan to form an A/B financing
structure. The lender, who holds legal title to the mortgage loan
and is listed as the lender of record, retains the A-Note but sells
the B-Note to the [REIT]. . . . [T]he [REIT] as B-Note holder
obtains the right to receive from the A-Note holder the [REIT’s]
proportionate share of the interest and the principal payments
made on the mortgage loan by the borrower at the time such
payments are made, and the [REIT’s] returns on its B-Note
investment are based on the principal and interest payments made
by the borrower.393
[I]n some A/B financings, the B-Note holder’s participation
interest is evidenced by a separate note issued by the borrower to
the B-Note holder and which is directly secured by the mortgage.
. . .394 [I]n these types of A/B financings, the [REIT] as B-Note
holder is in contractual privity with the borrower with respect to
the underlying mortgage loan and thus payment on the B-Note
should not be affected in the event of the bankruptcy of the ANote holder. . . . [I]n other A/B financings in which the [REIT]
392. Id. at *1.
393. Id. at *2.
394. “[T]he B-Note is different from a second mortgage loan because the B-Note
represents a participation interest in a single mortgage loan, whereas a second mortgage loan
represents the issuance and administration of a separate loan. . . . [T]he separate note issued
by the borrower evidences a participation in a mortgage loan and not an interest in a whole,
unparticipated mortgage loan held by a single mortgagee.” Id. at *2, n.2.
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invests, the B-Note holder holds a participating beneficial
ownership interest in the mortgage loan and mortgage loan
proceeds. The participation interest, however, is not evidenced
by a separate note from the borrower and thus the [REIT] as BNote holder is not in contractual privity with the borrower. . . .
[T]he [REIT] arguably could have difficulty obtaining payment
in the event that the A-Note holder files for bankruptcy. . . .
[W]ith the exception of the bankruptcy issue, the two types of
A/B financings are similar in all other material respects.395
[T]he [REIT] as B-Note holder enters into an agreement with
the A-Note holder that sets forth the rights and obligations of the
parties (“Agreement”). . . . [U]nder the Agreement, the A-Note
holder is afforded the sole and exclusive authority to administer
and service the mortgage loan so long as the mortgage loan is a
performing loan. The Agreement, however, provides the [REIT]
as B-Note holder with approval rights with respect to any
decisions relating to material modifications to the loan
agreements, or in connection with any material decisions
pertaining to the administration and servicing of the mortgage
loan.396
[T]he Agreement also grants the [REIT] as B-Note holder the
right to control the administration and servicing of the loan in the
event that the loan becomes a non-performing loan (“control
rights”). . . .397 [T]hese control rights include the right to appoint
a special servicer to manage the resolution of the non-performing
loan, including any proposed foreclosure or workout of the loan. .
. . [T]he [REIT] generally will have the right to advise, direct, or
approve certain actions to be taken by the special servicer,
including those with respect to any modification or forgiveness of
principal or interest in connection with the defaulted loan, any
proposed foreclosure of the mortgage loan or acquisition of the
underlying property by deed-in-lieu of foreclosure or any
395. Id. at *2.
396. Id. at *3.
397. “[T]he B-Note holder may exercise its control rights under the terms of the
Agreement either directly or indirectly by appointing a third party (called an operating
advisor) to administer its rights. . . . [G]enerally the B-Note holder retains these control
rights only so long as its position in the mortgage loan is deemed to have ‘value,’ based
upon an appraisal. . . . [T]he B-Note has ‘value,’ for this purpose, if the initial principal
amount of the B-Note (adjusted for prepayments, debt write-downs and appraisal reduction
amounts applied to the B-Note) exceeds 25% of the initial principal amount of the B-Note
(adjusted for prepayments). . . . [A]n ‘appraisal reduction amount,’ for this purpose,
generally is the amount by which the full outstanding mortgage indebtedness exceeds 90%
of the appraised value of the underlying real property. If the appraisal indicates that the BNote does not have ‘value,’ the B-Note holder’s control rights are forfeited to the A-Note
holder.” Id. at *3, n.6.
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proposed sale of a defaulted mortgage loan. . . . [T]he special
servicer is generally obligated to follow the [REIT’s] decisions
unless the special servicer believes that doing so would violate
any applicable law or provisions of any agreement applicable to
the financing arrangement. In addition, . . . the special servicer is
subject to the limitations prescribed by a “servicing standard,”
which requires the special servicer to act in the best interests of
both the A-Note holder and the [REIT] as B-Note holder and in a
commercially reasonable manner. The [REIT], however, for any
reason has the right to terminate and replace the special
servicer.398
[T]he [REIT] as B-Note holder has the right to receive written
notice with respect to the performance of the mortgage loan and
all reasonably requested information in connection with the
exercise of the B-Note holder’s rights. . . . [T]he [REIT] also has
the right to cure any monetary and non-monetary defaults on the
mortgage loan. . . . [T]he [REIT] may purchase the A-Note at a
price of par plus interest in the event that the loan becomes nonperforming.399
Before proceeding to evaluate whether it would grant no-action relief
with respect to the B-Note assets, the SEC reiterated its position that,
[A]n issuer that is engaged primarily in purchasing or otherwise
acquiring participations or fractionalized interests in individual or
pooled mortgages or deeds of trust is not entitled to rely on
Section 3(c)(5)(C). [The SEC staff] has, however, taken the
position that an issuer that holds mortgage participation interests
may nevertheless rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C) if the mortgage
participation interests have attributes that would classify them as
being interests in real estate rather than as being interests in the
nature of a security in another person engaged in the real estate
business.400
Thus, the goal of the REIT’s arguments made to the SEC staff was to
convince the SEC that the B-notes were true interests in real estate rather
than interests in the nature of a security in another person engaged in the
real estate business.
The REIT argued,
[T]hat a B-Note is a participation interest in a mortgage loan that
is fully secured by real property, and is not a loan extended to the
A-Note holder. . . . [T]he B-Note is not an interest in the A-Note
holder with payment depending on the profits generated by the
398. Id. at *3 (internal footnote omitted).
399. Id. at *4.
400. Id. at *5.
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A-Note holder’s operations. Rather, . . . the B-Note is based on
the interest and principal payments made by the borrower on the
underlying mortgage loan. . . .401 [T]he [REIT] invests in a BNote only after performing the same type of due diligence and
credit underwriting procedures that it would perform if it were
underwriting the entire mortgage loan. . . .402 [T]he A-Note holder
does not guarantee payment of the B-Note holder’s share of
interest and principal payments received from the borrower on
the underlying mortgage loan.403 Accordingly, . . . the B-Note
holder looks to the borrower for payment on its B-Note and not
to the A-Note holder.404
The REIT also argued that,
[T]he [REIT] as B-Note holder has rights with respect to the
administration and servicing of the mortgage loan that further
suggest that the B-Note is an interest in real estate. Although the
A-Note holder has the exclusive authority to administer and
service the mortgage loan as long as the loan is a performing
loan, . . . the [REIT] as B-Note holder has approval rights in
connection with any material decisions pertaining to the
administration and servicing of the loan, including decisions
relating to leasing and budget requests from the borrower. . . .
401. “[I]n the event that the A-Note holder becomes bankrupt and the B-Note holder is
treated as an unsecured creditor of the A-Note holder, the B-Note holder may not receive its
full payment on the B-Note notwithstanding the fact that the borrower has been making full
and timely payments on the underlying mortgage loan. . . . [I]n the event that this will occur,
the B-Note will no longer be considered [Qualifying Interests]. . . .” Id. at *6, n. 22.
402. “[L]ike the procedures for investing in whole mortgages, the procedures that the
[REIT] performs prior to investing in B-Notes include hands-on analysis of the underlying
collateral for the loan, market analysis, tenant analysis, financial analysis, visits to the
property, borrower background checks, and lease and contract review. . . . [T]he [REIT]
performs its own independent analysis and does not rely on the A-Note holder’s analysis or
conclusion on the creditworthiness of the mortgage loan borrower.” Id. at n. 23.
403. “[T]he following additional factors indicate that the B-Note is a mortgage loan
participation interest and not a loan extended to the A-Note holder: (1) there is no difference
in term to maturity contained in the B-Note and the underlying mortgage loan; (2) the total
payments made by the borrower on the underlying mortgage loan do not exceed the
aggregate payments made on the A-Note and the B-Note; and (3) there is no difference in
scheduled payment terms between the borrower and the A-Note holder, and between the ANote holder and the [REIT], except for the priority in the allocation of interest and principal
payments granted to the A-Note holder by virtue of its position as senior participant.
Furthermore, . . . although there is a difference in the interest rate due on the underlying
mortgage loan and the B-Note, the difference is due to the legitimate risk premium that the
B-Note holder receives on assuming first loss. . . . [The writer’s] view that the B-Notes
described in [the no-action] letter are true participations and not loans extended to the ANote holder is based on an evaluation of the factors that the courts have considered in
similar cases.” Id. at n. 24.
404. Id. at *6.
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[T]he B-Note holder has approval rights with respect to any
material modification to the loan agreements.405
Finally, the REIT argued,
[A]s B-Note holder[, it] has effective control over the remedies
relating to the enforcement of the mortgage loan, including
ultimate control of the foreclosure process, in the event that the
loan becomes non-performing. . . . [T]he [REIT] has such rights
notwithstanding the fact that the [REIT] does not have the
unilateral right to foreclose on the mortgage loan, or that the
special servicer is required to act in the best interests of both the
A-Note holder and the B-Note holder under the special servicing
standard. In particular, . . . the [REIT] as B-Note holder has the
right to select the special servicer, and often appoints its wholly
owned subsidiary to act in that role. . . . [I]n the event that the
mortgage loan becomes non-performing, the [REIT] is able to
pursue the remedies it desires by advising, directing or approving
the actions of the special servicer. If the [REIT] is dissatisfied
with the remedy selected by the special servicer, . . . the [REIT]
may: (1) terminate and replace the special servicer at any time
with or without cause; (2) cure the default so that the mortgage
loan is no longer non-performing; or (3) purchase the A-Note at
par plus accrued interest, thereby acquiring the entire mortgage
loan.406
When the SEC staff granted no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C)
on the Qualifying Interests issue when a REIT proposed to invest in BNotes, it noted that its position was based, in particular, on the following
representations:
(1) a B-Note is a participation interest in a mortgage loan that is
fully secured by real property; (2) the [REIT] as B-Note holder
has the right to receive its proportionate share of the interest and
the principal payments made on the mortgage loan by the
borrower, and . . . the [REIT’s] returns on the B-Note are based
on such payments; (3) the [REIT] invests in B-Notes only after
performing the same type of due diligence and credit
underwriting procedures that it would perform if it were
underwriting the underlying mortgage loan; (4) the [REIT] as BNote holder has approval rights in connection with any material
decisions pertaining to the administration and servicing of the
loan and with respect to any material modification to the loan
agreements; and (5) in the event that the loan becomes nonperforming, the [REIT] as B-Note holder has effective control
405. Id. at *7.
406. Id.
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over the remedies relating to the enforcement of the mortgage
loan, including ultimate control of the foreclosure process, by
having the right to: (a) appoint the special servicer to manage the
resolution of the loan; (b) advise, direct or approve the actions of
the special servicer; (c) terminate the special servicer at any time
with or without cause; (d) cure the default so that the mortgage
loan is no longer non-performing; and (e) purchase the A-Note at
par plus accrued interest, thereby acquiring the entire mortgage
loan.407
One final thing to note about Capital Trust 2009 is that the SEC staff
declined to express a view on whether an A-Note, as described in the noaction letter, is a Qualifying Interest. The SEC implied, on the A-Note
issue, that it was concerned about the fact that “the B-Note holder has
effective control over the remedies relating to the enforcement of the
mortgage loan, including ultimate control of the foreclosure process, in the
event that the loan becomes non-performing.”408
g. Tier 1 Mezzanine Loans
In Capital Trust, Inc., the SEC staff granted no-action relief under
Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue when a REIT proposed
to invest in Tier 1 mezzanine loans made specifically and exclusively for
the financing of real estate.409 The SEC staff described the Tier 1
mezzanine loans as follows:
[I]n a Tier 1 mezzanine loan arrangement, the [REIT] lends
money as mezzanine lender to a special purpose bankruptcy
remote entity (“mezzanine borrower”) whose sole purpose is to
hold all of the ownership interests of another special purpose
entity that owns the commercial real estate being financed and
that is subject to a mortgage loan secured by the property
(“property-owning entity”). . . .410 [U]nder the terms of their
respective organizational documents and loan documents, the
property-owning entity may not engage in any business other
than owning and holding the underlying property and the
mezzanine borrower may not engage in any business other than
owning and holding the ownership interests in the propertyowning entity. . . . [T]he ownership interests held by the
407. Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
408. Id. at n.25.
409. Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 491, at *1213 (May 24, 2007).
410. “[M]ezzanine loans are junior to the senior position of the mortgage holder but
senior to the equity position of the owner of the underlying real property.” Id. at *2, n.2.
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mezzanine borrower has no value apart from the underlying real
property that is held by the property-owning entity other than
incidental assets related to ownership of the property.411
The request for relief noted that there “may be multiple tiers of
mezzanine loans made in connection with the financing of a property,” but
the request for relief was “limited to mezzanine loans that are granted to a
mezzanine borrower that directly owns interests in the entity that owns the
property being financed,” hence the idea of “Tier 1” mezzanine loans, as
opposed just to mezzanine loans.412
[T]he mezzanine borrower enters into an agreement with the
[REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender pursuant to which it pledges
its entire ownership interests in the property-owning entity to the
[REIT] as collateral for the mezzanine loan.413 The [REIT]
obtains a first priority perfected security interest in the ownership
interests in the property–owning entity414 . . . . [I]f the mezzanine
borrower were to default on the mezzanine loan, the [REIT] has
the right to foreclose on the collateral and, through its 100%
ownership of the property-owning entity, become the owner of
the underlying real estate. . . .415
[T]he [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender also enters into an
intercreditor agreement with the mortgage lender in connection
with the issuance of the Tier 1 mezzanine loan that sets forth the
relative priority of rights between the two parties with respect to
claims on the underlying property being financed. Among other
things, . . . . the [REIT] obtains rights under the intercreditor
agreement that allow it to readily cure defaults or purchase the
mortgage loan in the event of a default on the mortgage loan . . . .
[T]he agreement also gives the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine
lender various control rights over the management of the

411. Id. at *1-2. Incidental assets included “cash generated from rental payments and
held for short periods of time pending distribution or disbursement to meet operating
expenses.” Id. at *2, n.2.
412. Id. at n.1
413. “[T]he aggregate principal balance of a [mortgage] loan and mezzanine loan at
origination would be less than the value of the underlying property so that the mezzanine
loan would be fully secured by the underlying [real] property.” Id. at *3, n. 3.
414. “[T]ypically both the mezzanine borrower and the mezzanine lender are limited
liability companies. . . . [I]n very rare cases the property-owning entity may be organized as
a limited partnership. In such cases, the mezzanine borrower would own all of the limited
partnership interests in the property-owning entity as well as all of the ownership interests in
the general partner of the property-owning entity. The mezzanine borrower would pledge
the ownership interests in both the property-owning entity and the general partnership as
collateral for the mezzanine loan.” Id. at n.4
415. Id. at *3.
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underlying property.416
[I]n the commercial real estate financing industry second
mortgages have effectively been replaced in part by Tier 1
mezzanine loans . . . . [S]econd mortgages are rarely offered as a
result of the increased practice of securitizing senior commercial
mortgages . . . . [T]he nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations (“NRSROs”) have expressed an unwillingness to
assign the highest ratings to securities issued by a trust holding a
pool of senior commercial mortgages when the underlying
properties associated with these mortgages are encumbered by
second mortgages. . . . [T]he NRSROs are concerned that the
presence of a second mortgage may negatively impact the trust’s
remedies in the event that the senior mortgage should default,
which in turn could impede payments made to the trust’s
securities holders. . . . [S]uch concerns are not found in the Tier 1
mezzanine loan arrangement because . . . . the absence of a
second lien on the underlying property minimizes the likelihood
that payments made to the trust’s securities holders might be
affected in the event of a default of a senior mortgage in the
pool.417
Before proceeding to evaluate whether it would grant no-action relief
to the Tier 1 mezzanine loan assets, it noted that the REIT had argued “that,
except for the lack of a mortgage loan against the property, such a
mezzanine loan is the functional equivalent of, and provides its holder with
the same economic experience as, a second mortgage.”418
More
specifically, the REIT argued as follows:
Tier 1 mezzanine loans that the [REIT] holds are the functional
equivalent of second mortgages because, except for the lack of a
mortgage lien on the property, all of the principal terms and
features of a second mortgage loan are present. . . . [B]oth are
loans, made specifically and exclusively for the financing of real
estate, that are junior to the first mortgage loan but senior to the
equity position of the owner of the property. . . . [S]econd
mortgages and Tier 1 mezzanine loans are underwritten based on
the same considerations and after the lender performs a hands-on
analysis of the underlying commercial property, including,
among other things, inspection of the property, review of revenue
leases and property agreements, analyses of local commercial
real estate market conditions, and review of the financial
performance of the property. . . . [A]s is typically the case with a
second mortgage lender, the [REIT] exercises ongoing control
416. Id. at *4-5.
417. Id. at *5-6.
418. Id. at *7.
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rights over the management of the underlying property, such as
rights relating to the approval of major leases, budget
improvements, capital expenditures and the application of
insurance proceeds or condemnation awards, as well as the right
to replace the property manager in case of default on the loan.
Finally, . . . . the [REIT] has rights under the intercreditor
agreement to readily cure defaults or purchase the mortgage loan
in the event of a default on the mortgage loan.419
[T]he economic experience of the [REIT] as a Tier 1 mezzanine
lender is no different from the economic experience of a second
mortgage lender. Although the [REIT] holds as collateral the
ownership interests of the property-owning entity rather than the
property itself, . . . . the value of the collateral is economically the
same under both loan forms. In essence, . . . . the ownership
interests in the property-owning entity have no economic value
apart from the underlying real property (other than incidental
assets related to the ownership of the property) because the
property-owning entity in a Tier 1 mezzanine loan arrangement is
not permitted to engage in any business except the ownership of
the real property. Consequently, the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine
lender, like the second mortgage lender, looks to the underlying
real property as the true measure of the value of its collateral. . . .
[D]espite the absence of a mortgage lien, the [REIT] has the right
to foreclose on the collateral and, through its ownership of the
property-owning entity, become the owner of the underlying real
estate.420
When the SEC staff granted no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C)
on the Qualifying Interests issue when a REIT proposed to invest in Tier 1
mezzanine loans, it noted that its position was based, in particular, on the
following representations:
(1) a Tier 1 mezzanine loan is a subordinated loan made
specifically and exclusively for the financing of real estate; (2)
both second mortgages and Tier 1 mezzanine loans are
underwritten based on the same considerations and after the
lender performs a hands-on analysis of the property being
financed; (3) the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender exercises
ongoing control rights over the management of the underlying
property; (4) the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender has the right
to readily cure defaults or purchase the mortgage loan in the
event of a default on the mortgage loan; (5) the true measure of
the collateral securing the Tier 1 mezzanine loan is the property
being financed and any incidental assets related to the ownership
419. Id. at *7-8.
420. Id. at *8-9.
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of the property; and (6) the [REIT] as Tier 1 mezzanine lender
has the right to foreclose on the collateral and through its
ownership of the property-owning entity become the owner of the
underlying property . . . .421
h. Real Estate Mortgage-Backed Securities
According to the Rosenblum treatise,
[T]he Staff has taken the position that securities representing an
interest in a pool of mortgages (that is, mortgage-backed
securities) may be qualifying interests if the holder of those
securities will have the same economic experience as a person
holding the underlying mortgages (including the receipt of
principal and interest payments and the risk of prepayment on the
underlying mortgages).422
In particular, the SEC staff has granted no-action relief in the case of
certain industrial development bonds, whole pool mortgage-backed
securities and agency whole pool certificates,423 which are each discussed
below.
i.

Real Estate Mortgage-Backed Securities: Industrial
Development Bonds

The SEC staff has granted no-action letters when the entity seeking
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue invested in
industrial development bonds, which is not surprising since industrial
development bonds are simply a form of bonds or notes secured by
collateral. In Merrill Lynch, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under
Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a pool created by Merrill Lynch that
would invest in industrial development obligations in the form of notes or
bonds (“Loans”).424 The pool would own one or more irrevocable standby
letters of credit, which Merrill Lynch arranged for banks to issue and which
would guarantee the payment of the full principal and interest payments of
all the loans held by the pool. The loans of the pool that were treated as
Qualifying Interests (calculated on the basis of principal amount) would be
secured exclusively by first mortgages or deeds of trust on real property. 425
The loans in the pool would in all instances consist of the entire issue of
421. Id. at *12-13.
422. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4, at 417.
423. Id. (citing PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 331).
424. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 4235, *1-3 (Nov. 4, 1981).
425. Id.
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such loans and not portions thereof.426 The loans would not be of the type
of security for which secondary markets exist.427 Once the pool was
formed, it would be fixed and loans could not be added, withdrawn or
substituted.428 Each loan would be a purchase money mortgage with the
proceeds thereof being used to develop the properties that would serve as
the security for such loan.429 There would be at least a 100% loan to value
ratio (minus transactional expenses) with respect to the mortgaged property
for each loan. Each loan would be assigned in its entirety to the trustee for
the pool.430 The trustee of the pool would have the right to foreclose
against the mortgage property securing the loans.431 Since Merrill Lynch
involved mortgage pass-through certificates being sold to the investors in
the pool, additional representations to obtain no-action relief were made,
which are likely not necessarily relevant to real estate funds.
The SEC staff has also granted no-action letters when the entity
seeking relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue
invested in loan participation interests in industrial development bonds. In
Salomon Brothers, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a trust that would hold fractional undivided
interests in real mortgages the interest on which is exempt from Federal
income tax.432 The real estate interests would exist in the form of industrial
development bonds or other obligations (“Mortgage Bonds”) secured at the
time of their issuance by purchase money mortgages or deeds of trust on
real estate.433 Each of the Mortgage Bonds would be primarily secured by
purchase money mortgages or deeds of trust on real property acquired or
developed with the proceeds of the Mortgage Bonds, and had a loan to
value ratio at the time the Mortgage Bonds were issued of not more than
100 percent.434 Mortgage Bonds treated as Qualifying Interests would be
secured, at the date of their issuance and at the date of issuance of the
Certificates, exclusively by interests in real estate.435 Such Mortgage
Bonds would represent the entire outstanding issue of one or more issues of
Mortgage Bonds.436 In those cases where the mortgages or deeds of trust
securing the Mortgage Bonds run to an indenture trustee for the benefit of
426. Id.
427 . Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Salomon Brothers, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2283, at *1-2
(June 17, 1985).
433 . Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
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the holders from time to time of the Mortgage Bonds, the Trust will have
the right, as the holder of the entire issue of such bonds, to direct the
indenture trustee to foreclose on the real property covered by such
mortgages or deeds of trust.437 In all other cases, the mortgages or deeds of
trust securing the Mortgage Bonds would be assigned, and title to such
mortgages transferred to the trustee, who would have the right to foreclose
on the real property subject to such mortgages or deeds of trust.438 The
Mortgage Bonds would not be readily tradable in any currently-existing
secondary market. Since Salomon Brothers involved mortgage passthrough certificates being sold to investors in the trust, additional
representations to obtain no-action relief were made, which are likely not
necessarily relevant to real estate funds.
In American Development Finance Inc., the SEC staff gave no-action
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with lighter representations with respect to a
non-profit organization that would invest in local industrial development
bonds.439 The non-profit was organized for the purpose of advancing the
functions of economic development, job creation and community
revitalization.440 A series of industrial development bonds for the borrower
and the related economic development project would be purchased from a
state or local economic development agency having the power to issue
industrial development bonds.441 The local industrial development bonds
would constitute a special, limited obligation of the local issuer payable by
the local issuer solely from the revenues derived from the project.442 The
revenues for payment of each bond would be derived typically from a
lease, installment sale agreement or loan agreement between the local
issuer and the borrower providing for an unconditional obligation on the
part of the borrower to make payments at least sufficient to pay the
principal of and interest on the industrial development bond as the same
respectively became due.443 The lease, installment agreement or loan
agreement would be assigned by the local issuer to the non-profit as holder
of the industrial development bond (or to a trustee for the benefit of the
non-profit), and debt service payments by the borrower would be made
directly to or for the account of the non-profit (or such trustee). As security
for the payment of the industrial development bond, a mortgage would be
given on the project being financed.444 Each loan would be secured by a
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Am. Dev. Fin. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2275, at *12 (July 23, 1987).
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id.
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mortgage or deed of trust on the property which is being or to be acquired,
constructed, renovated or otherwise developed through the proceeds of the
loan, i.e, “purchase money mortgages”. Each loan would generally be
collateralized on at least a 75% loan-to-value ratio. In many instances, the
loans would be overcollateralized, but none of the loans would be
materially undercollateralized.
In Citytrust, the SEC staff granted no-action relief when the entity
seeking relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue
invested in both mortgage loans in the form of industrial development
bonds (“Mortgage IDBs”) and equipment loans in the form of industrial
development bonds (“Equipment IDBs”).445
The Equipment IDBs represent loans made to fund the purchase
price of equipment and costs specifically related to equipment
acquisition such as installation expenses. The Mortgage IDBs
represent loans made to finance the acquisition or improvement
of real estate; they are secured by real estate and generally had an
original loan-to-value ratio of not more than 80%. In some cases,
the Mortgage IDBs are also secured by other collateral (generally
equipment located on the real estate premises where the subject
of the mortgage financing and, in some instances, by other assets
such as a certificate of deposit and a security interest in
receivables) or a guarantee (issued by the parent, another related
corporation, the principals, or the individual owner/operators of
the borrowing corporation).446
The SEC staff appeared to suggest that both the Mortgage IDBs and
Equipment IDBs were Qualifying Interests, but subject to the following
criteria:
(1) the original principal amount of the loan did not exceed 100%
of the value of its real estate collateral when the loan was made;
(2) the value of the real estate collateral was confirmed by an
appraisal prepared in connection with the original loan by a
qualified independent third-party appraiser retained to appraise
the particular properties; (3) [the lender] applied the same
underwriting criteria whether the loan was secured exclusively or
additionally by other collateral or a guarantee, and (4) a
Mortgage IDB benefitting from non-real estate collateral will be
disqualified as [Qualifying Interests] if, in connection with a
default, the amount recovered from non-real estate collateral
(including guarantees) exceeds 40% of the original principal
amount of the loan (the “40% test”). [The entity’s governing
445. Citytrust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1389, at *1-2 (Dec.
19, 1990).
446. Id. at 2.
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documents] will require that recovery may not be made against
non-real estate collateral on a Mortgage IDB otherwise
qualifying as [Qualifying Interests] if after giving effect to such
recovery (i) the 40% test will be violated with respect to such
Mortgage IDB and (ii) the consequence of such violation and
related disqualification would be to cause the [entity], based upon
the Mortgage IDBs that continue to qualify as [Qualifying
Interests] and the Equipment Loan IDBs, to fail the requirement
that at least 55% of the value of the [entity’s] assets at the time of
the issuance of the [interests in the entity] consisted of
[Qualifying Interests] . . . .447
“Further, to qualify as [Qualifying Interests] includable in the 55%,
the related IDB must represent the entire issuance of IDBs [i.e., a “whole”
interest].”448 “The [entity’s] assets will be fixed at the time [the bank]
conveys them to the [entity], and no substitution of [entity] assets will be
permitted.”449 The entity “will have the right unilaterally to direct the IDB
trustee to foreclose the mortgage securing the IDB in the event of
default.”450

447.
448.
449.
450.

Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *6.
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Real Estate Mortgage-Backed Securities: Whole-Pool
Mortgage-Backed Securities

The SEC staff has granted no-action letters when the entity seeking
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue invested in
whole-pool mortgage-backed securities notes. In Premier Mortgage Corp.,
Premier Mortgage proposed “to offer to the public non-redeemable series
of bonds and, with the proceeds of the offering, acquire non-recourse notes
of savings and loan associations (‘S & Ls’) having a total face amount
equal to the total face amount of the bonds.”451 In reaching its position, the
SEC staff noted the following critical representations:
Each note would be secured by a pool of whole mortgage loans,
which are first liens on real property, owned or originated by a
S&L, which would execute and deliver to [issuer] a master
assignment of the mortgage loans in recordable form and a UCC1 Financing Statement evidencing the debt created by the note.
In turn, Premier would assign the notes, the payments to be made
under each note, and the mortgage loans to a trustee under an
indenture for the benefit of the bondholders (“the trustee”). The
mortgage loans in a pool accepted by Premier as collateral would
be fixed after a cut-off date (which is the day immediately
preceding the effective date of the registration statement for the
bonds) and no mortgage loans could be added to, withdrawn
from, or substituted in the pool. On the S & L’s default, the
maturity of its note would be accelerated and the trustee could
sell the mortgage loans or retain them. If the trustee retains a
mortgage loan, it could foreclose it upon the mortgagor’s default.
Prepayments on, and adjusted proceeds of foreclosures of,
mortgage loans would flow through to the trustee to be applied to
the mandatory redemption of the bonds. Except to the extent that
the mortgage loans are prepaid, the notes could not be prepaid
without Premier’s written consent. The monthly debt service on
the notes would equal the adjusted scheduled monthly payments
of principal and interest on the mortgage loans. Similarly, the
principal and interest rate on the notes would be the same as the
principal and weighted average interest rate of the mortgage
loans.
Moreover, we understand that Premier will not proceed with its
proposed offering unless, among other things, the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board or the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation determines that, if and when a S & L is placed in

451. Premier Mortg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2145, at
*1 (Mar. 14, 1983).
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receivership, (1) Premier, as a secured creditor, would be entitled
to the full principal amount of the notes outstanding based either
on the notes’ face amount or their initial offering price plus that
portion of the initial issue discount amortized or (2) the receiver
would arrange for the continued servicing of the mortgage loans
and the continued payments on the notes.452
k. Real Estate Mortgage-Backed Securities: Agency Whole Pool
Certificates
The SEC staff has granted no-action letters when the entity seeking
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue invested in
agency backed whole pool certificates. In Security Mortgage Acceptance
Corp., the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with
respect to a company that issued bonds backed by guaranteed mortgage
pass-through certificates issued by Federal National Mortgage Association
(“Fannie Mae”) and/or Mortgage Participation Certificates issued by
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) in addition to
mortgage pass-through certificates fully guaranteed as to principal and
interest by Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”).453
The pass-through certificates treated as Qualifying Interests would consist
of certificates representing all of the certificates backed by an underlying
mortgage pool (“Whole Pool Certificates”). The letter suggested that
certificates representing less than all certificates backed by an underlying
mortgage pool (“Non-Whole Pool Certificates”) would not be Qualifying
Interests.
In NAB Asset Corp., the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a corporation that invested in whole pool
mortgage-backed securities, noting that the SEC staff had previously
granted no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) with respect to
investments in Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae),
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and/or Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) certificates comprising an
undivided interest in the entire pool of mortgages backing the certificates,
which the SEC staff defined as whole pool mortgage-backed securities.454
Each real estate loan that was included within Qualifying Interests would
meet the following criteria:
(1) the loan [would] be secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on
452. Id. at *1-3.
453. Sec. Mortg. Acceptance Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1936, at *1-2 (Mar. 24, 1986).
454. NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 820, at *4 n.7
(June 20, 1991).
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one or more tracts or parcels of real estate; (2) 100% of the
principal amount of the loan as indicated in the credit files of the
originating bank was secured by real estate at the time of
origination, and (3) 100% of the fair market value of the loan
[would] be secured by real estate at the time the Company
receives the loan. . . .
The value of the real estate securing the loans to be acquired by
the Company [would] be determined by recent independent third
party appraisals. The fair market value of the real estate loans to
be initially acquired by the Company [would] be determined at
the book value thereof on the books of the Bank. The fair market
value of the real estate loans to be acquired by the company in
the future [would] be based on the acquisition prices of such
loans.455
In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC stated that,
The [SEC] staff has expressed the view that “whole pool
certificates” that are issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac or Ginnie Mae (“agency whole pool certificates”) provide
the holder with the same economic experience as an investor who
purchases the underlying mortgages directly, [including the
receipt of both principal and interest payments and the risk of
prepayment on the underlying mortgage loans, notwithstanding
the guarantees provided by the agencies,] and therefore would be
[Q]ualifying [I]nterests. . . .456
In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC requested comment on
how it should treat agency whole pool certificates under Section 3(c)(5)(C),
including whether it should “revisit the staff’s view that agency whole pool
certificates may be treated as [Qualifying Interests].”457
l.

Loans Secured by Oil and Gas Interests

The SEC staff has extended its treatment of real estate loans to loans
secured by oil and gas interests with regard to whether it will grant noaction relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue. In
Apache Petroleum Co., SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a company that
invested in loans secured by oil and gas interests, such as working interests
and overriding royalties.458 The SEC further based its no-action relief on
455. Id. at *4, 6 (internal footnote omitted).
456. Mortgages Concept Release, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-29778, 76
Fed. Reg. 55,300, 55,305 (Sept. 7, 2011).
457. Id. at 55,307.
458. Apache Petroleum Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2462, at
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the fact that the combined loan interest would be comparable to market
rates at the time the loan was made, and that the repayment of the principal
as well as the fixed, additional, or contingent interest on the notes would be
100% secured solely by mortgages that will be exclusively on real estate, as
defined under state law.459 In Apache Petroleum Co., the oil and gas
interests were treated as real estate under state law. However, it is possible
that the SEC could reach a different conclusion if oil and gas interests were
not treated as real estate interests under applicable state law.460
m. Installment Land Sales Contracts
An installment land contract is merely an alternative method to
finance the purchase of real estate on a secured basis. In the case of an
installment land contract, however, the seller would retain outright legal
title to the property to be acquired, subject to its obligation to convey legal
title to the buyer upon the full payment of the purchase price over the term
of the contract.
Investing in installment land contracts appears to receive no-action
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue, since
installment land contracts are analogous to secured real estate loans. In
American Housing Trust I, the SEC staff gave no-action relief under
Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a trust
that invested in installment landed contracts on real estate.461
n. Condominium Units and Cooperative Residential Apartments
Investing in condominiums and occupied cooperative residential
apartments each appears to receive no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue. In D.B.G. Property Investors,
Inc., the SEC staff gave no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the
Qualifying Interests issue with respect to a partnership that invested in
condominium units and occupied cooperative residential apartments and
suggested that these investments were Qualifying Interests.462
o. Condominium and Cooperative Housing Loans and Notes
Secured by Ownership Interests in Cooperative Housing or
*1-2 (Apr. 30, 1982).
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. American Housing Trust I, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 751,
at *1, *27 (May 21, 1988).
462. D.B.G. Prop. Investors, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
3087, at *1 (Dec. 29, 1986).
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in Shares of Cooperative Housing
In Greenwich Capital Acceptance, Inc., the SEC staff gave no-action
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on a Qualifying Interests issue with respect
to a trust whose assets consisted “primarily of loans secured by ownership
interests in cooperative housing. . . .”463 In that letter, “[e]ach Coop Loan
[was] a purchase money loan secured fully and exclusively by the
borrower’s interest in a cooperative apartment (‘Coop Apartment’) . . . .” 464
The SEC staff gave no-action relief even though “the security interest held
by a lender in a Coop Loan [was] not technically a mortgage . . . .”465 In
another no-action letter, the SEC also gave no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) with respect to a corporation who planned “to engage in the
business of purchasing notes (or similar obligations, i.e. bonds) . . . .
secured by security interests in the shares of residential cooperative
apartments . . . .”466
p. Assets that are the Functional Equivalent of, and that
Provide their Holder with the Same Economic Experience as,
a Direct Investment in Real Estate or in a Loan or Lien Fully
Secured by Real Estate.
The SEC staff has on more than one occasion noted that it has
“provided no-action relief where an asset can be viewed as being the
functional equivalent of, and the asset provides its holder with the same
economic experience as, a direct investment in real estate or in a loan or
lien fully secured by real estate . . . .”467 Recall that the SEC staff in
Capital Trust agreed with the REIT’s argument that “except for the lack of
a mortgage loan against the property, such a [Tier 1] mezzanine loan is the
functional equivalent of, and provides its holder with the same economic
experience as, a second mortgage.”468
The SEC staff in Capital Trust discussed numerous no-action letters
where the SEC staff effectively concluded that an asset could “be viewed
as being the functional equivalent of, and the asset provides its holder with

463. Greenwich Capital Acceptance, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1003, at *1 (Aug. 8, 1991).
464. Id. at *5.
465. Id. at *5-6.
466. P&B Realty Dev. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2825,
at *1, *3 (Dec. 4, 1985).
467. Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 491, at *10
(May 24, 2007) (internal footnotes omitted).
468. Id. at *7.
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the same economic experience as, a direct investment in real estate or in a
loan or lien fully secured by real estate. . . .”469
11. Mortgages Concept Release
The SEC and staff are reviewing interpretive issues relating to the
status of mortgage-related pools under the Investment Company Act, and
may be in the process of changing such interpretive issues. “Mortgagerelated pools” are “companies that are engaged in the business of acquiring
mortgages and mortgage-related instruments and that rely on the exclusion
from the definition of investment company in Section 3(c)(5)(C) of the
[Investment Company] Act.”470 In the Mortgages Concept Release, the
SEC noted that:
Some mortgage-related pools have determined that certain other
assets constitute qualifying assets for purposes of that exclusion.
For example, we understand that mortgage-related pools
generally treat bridge loans, certain construction and
rehabilitation loans, wrap-around mortgage loans and
investments in distressed debt as qualifying interests, provided
that the loans are fully secured by real estate. We also
understand that some mortgage-related pools have determined to
treat a convertible mortgage (which is a mortgage plus an option
to purchase the underlying real estate) as two assets—a mortgage
469. See id. at *10 (discussing (1) Investors GNMA Trust, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action
Letter, 1983 WL 28500 (July 22, 1983), “where counsel opined that the issuer’s ownership
of GNMA Mortgage Pass-Through Securities representing 100% beneficial interests in
mortgage pools constitutes an investment in mortgages within the meaning of Section
3(c)(5)(C) because ownership of these securities ‘is the functional equivalent of ownership
of the underlying mortgage loans,’” (2) GEM Savings Association, SEC Staff No-Action
Letter, 1983 WL 28748 (Sept. 28, 1983), where “counsel argued that issuer’s ownership of
GNMA certificates is the ‘functional equivalent of ownership in an interest in real estate,’
thereby permitting the issuer to rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C), because the certificates represent
100% beneficial interests in each underlying mortgage pool, the payment of principal and
interest on the underlying mortgages is passed through to holders of GNMA certificates and
the certificates are secured by the real estate associated with the underlying mortgages,” (3)
NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 820 (June 20, 1991),
where “counsel stated that an issuer that has general partnership interests in partnerships that
hold real estate and loans backed by real estate should be ‘functional equivalents of direct
ownership in the real estate and loans held by the partnerships and not be ‘securities’ for
securities law purposes,’” (4) U.S. Prop. Invs., N.V., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 641 (May 1, 1989), where “counsel argued that issuer’s joint venture
investments in real estate and mortgages are the ‘functional equivalents of direct ownership
by the . . . . [issuer], and would not constitute ‘securities’ under the ‘investment contract
test’ used for securities law purposes.’”).
470. Mortgages Concept Release, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-29778, 76
Fed. Reg. 55,300, 55,300 (Sept. 7, 2011).
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loan (treated as a qualifying interest provided that it is fully
secured by real estate) and an option to purchase real estate
(which is assigned an independent value and treated as a real
estate-type interest).
With respect to certain other mortgage-related instruments, there
appears to be a degree of uncertainty or differing views among
mortgage-related pools as to the availability of the Section
3(c)(5)(C) exclusion. For example, it appears that some
mortgage-related pools that invest in certificates issued by pools
that hold whole loans and participation interests in loans that are
secured by commercial real estate (“CMBS") limit the amount of
CMBS that they hold, treating such assets as real estate-type
interests under Section 3(c)(5)(C), whereas others treat certain
CMBS as qualifying interests.471
In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC noted that,
The evolution of mortgage-related pools and the development of
new and complex mortgage-related instruments, the Commission
is reviewing interpretive issues relating to the status of mortgagerelated pools under the Investment Company Act and whether
mortgage-related pools potentially are making judgments about
their status under the [Investment Company] Act without
sufficient Commission guidance. It appears that some types of
mortgage-related pools might interpret the statutory exclusion
provided by Section 3(c)(5)(C) in a broad manner, while others
might interpret the exclusion too narrowly. . . . The Commission
also is concerned that staff no-action letters that have addressed
the statutory exclusion in Section 3(c)(5)(C) may have contained,
or led to, interpretations that are beyond the intended scope of the
exclusion and inconsistent with investor protection.472
In particular, in the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC sought
comment on the following issues:


Whether “Section 3(c)(5)(C) is generally being used consistent
with the purposes and policies underlying that provision and
investor protection?”473



Whether “certain mortgage-related pools may be giving too broad
an interpretation to [Section 3(c)(5)(C)]? If so, does such broad
interpretation result in companies that resemble traditional
investment companies avoiding regulation under the Act, and, if

471. Id. at 55,306.
472. Id. at 55,301.
473. Id. at 55,306.
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so, is it inconsistent with the purposes and policies underlying that
provision and investor protection?”474


Whether “certain companies may be giving to narrow an
interpretation to [Section 3(c)(5)(C)?”475



Whether the 55%/45% is “an appropriate approach to determining
an issuer’s primary engagement for purposes of Section
3(c)(5)(C)?”476



“[W]hether any of the staff’s analysis relating to the determination
of whether an asset is a ‘lien on or interest in real estate’ for
purposes of Section 3(c)(5)(C) would be relevant in formulating
Commission guidance for today’s mortgage-related pools.”477



“[S]hould certain mortgage participations be treated as interests in
real estate and, if so, what types of participations and why?”478



“Is a company whose primary business activity consists of holding
mortgage participations, the type of entity that should be excluded
from the definition of investment company? Why or why not, and
does it matter what type(s) of participations the company holds?”479



“If participations are to be treated as interests in real estate, what
features should be considered in making a determination about
such assets?”480



“Should the Commission revisit the staff’s view that agency whole
pool certificates may be treated as interests in real estate?”481



“[W]hether guidance is needed with respect to other mortgagerelated instruments. If so, which instruments and what should that
guidance provide? We note in particular the differing approaches
taken by certain mortgage-related pools as to the appropriate

474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55,307
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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treatment of certain types of CMBS482 for purposes of determining
a company’s ability to rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C).”483


“[W]hether a company whose primary business consists of
investing in CMBS, or any other type of mortgage-backed security,
is the type of entity that Congress intended to be encompassed by
the exclusion provided by Section 3(c)(5)(C).”484

12. Interests that are Not Qualifying Interests
“The Staff has taken the position that assets that do not represent
interests in or loans backed by real estate are not [Q]ualifying
[I]nterests.”485
a. Mortgage Placement Fees
A mortgage placement fee is generally a fee charged by a mortgage
broker for negotiating a loan between the lender and the borrower.In
G.A.B.E., the SEC staff declined to give no-action relief under Section
3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a company that was in the
business of acquiring mortgages on real estate because too much of the
company’s gross revenues may have been attributable to mortgage
placement fees rather than interest income from mortgages and other liens
acquired with funds from investors.486 Moreover, the holders of some of
the company’s securities had interests that lied exclusively in mortgage
placement fees.
Presumably, the SEC staff’s view is that the interest from a mortgage
is part of the investment in the mortgage, but the revenues earned from
placement fees are not Qualifying Interests. Similarly, the SEC staff’s
decision suggests that a company in “the business of making mortgage
placements” does not fall within Qualifying Interests.
b. Notes Not Secured Exclusively by a Mortgage or Deed of
482. In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC noted how “some mortgage-related
pools that invest in certificates issued by pools that hold whole-loans and participation
interests in loans that are secured by commercial real estate . . . .” Id. at 55,306. Such
certificates are what the SEC meant by CMBS.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4.2(ii), at 419.
486. G.A.B.E., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1784, at *1, *4
(Mar. 15, 1974).
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Trust on Real Property
In Newman and Associates, the SEC declined to give no-action relief
under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a trust that
invested in notes of the owner of a real estate project “where none of the
[notes] is secured exclusively by a mortgage or deed of trust on real
property.”487 The owner of the real estate project was the Borrower under
the notes. In that no-action letter, “[t]he Borrower [would] purchase a
surety bond, which [would] insure the availability to the [trust] of sufficient
moneys to pay the principal of and interest on the [bonds sold to trust
investors] when due in the event the Borrower defaults on the [notes].” 488
“The Borrower’s obligations to indemnify and hold the surety harmless
from all loss, cost, liability, or expense in connection with the [project] and
its financing [would] be secured by a first mortgage lien on the [project]
and certain other rights and properties which [would] be mortgaged,
assigned, or pledged to the surety (collectively, ‘Collateral Security’).”489
“The Trustee [would] be subrogated to the rights of the surety with respect
to the Collateral Security if (a) the surety is placed in receivership or (b) the
Borrower and the surety both default in making payments sufficient to pay
the principal of and interest on the Bonds.”490 None of these attempts,
however, remedied the fact that the notes did not fall within Qualifying
Interests since they were not secured exclusively by a mortgage or deed of
trust on real property.
c. Notes Not Fully Secured by Real Estate
In Prescott, Ball & Turben, the SEC staff declined to give no-action
relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a
company that would invest in notes that were not “fully secured solely by
real estate,” even though the notes were “primarily secured by real
estate.”491 Under certain limited circumstances, however, the SEC staff
appears to have granted no-action relief when notes were not fully secured
by real estate.

487. Newman & Assocs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2527,
at *1 (July 18, 1986).
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Prescott, Ball & Turben, SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1965,
at *1 (Feb. 19, 1982).
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d. Participations or Fractionalized Interests in Individual or
Pooled Mortgages or Deeds of Trust
As discussed above, in Capital Trust 2009, the SEC staff clarified
that,
[A]n issuer that is engaged primarily in purchasing or
otherwise acquiring participations or fractionalized
interests in individual or pooled mortgages or deeds of
trust is not entitled to rely on Section 3(c)(5)(C). We have,
however, taken the position that an issuer that holds
mortgage participation interests may nevertheless rely on
Section 3(c)(5)(C) if the mortgage participation interests
have attributes that would classify them as being interests
in real estate rather than as being interests in the nature of a
security in another person engaged in the real estate
business.492
In one no-action letter, the SEC staff denied no-action relief on the
Section 3(c)(5)(C) issue because the pool consisted of fractionalized
interests in notes representing less than all of the outstanding notes of that
issue and the pool would not be in a position to foreclose the mortgages
securing the notes.493 Instances in which participations or fractionalized
interests in individual or pooled mortgages or deeds of trust fall within
Qualifying Interests are discussed above.
e. Entities that Invest in Real Estate and Related Assets or that
are Engaged in the Real Estate Business
Investments in entities that invest in real estate and related assets or
that are engaged in the real estate business themselves do not count as
Qualifying Interests for the funds investing in those entities, even if the
entities in which the fund invests qualify under Section 3(c)(5)(C). In
M.D.C. Holdings, the SEC staff declined to give no-action relief under
Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a REIT that invested
“in various partnerships and trusts (‘Entities’) which invest in real estaterelated assets . . . .”494 In The Realex Capital Corp., the SEC staff declined
to give no-action relief under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests
492. Capital Trust, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 WL 281057, at *5 (Feb. 3, 2009).
493. Marion Bass Sec., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2473, at
*1 (July 9, 1984).
494. M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2091, at
*1 (May 5, 1987).
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issue to an issuer that “would be formed to invest in limited partnership
interests in an underlying limited partnership that would own and operate a
building.”495 Despite these concerns, however, the SEC staff has
occasionally, as discussed above, granted no-action relief on the Section
3(c)(5)(C) issue with respect to corporate subsidiaries, two-tier investment
companies, and joint ventures.
f.

Certain Whole or Partial Pool Certificates

In the Mortgages Concept Release, the SEC wrote that agency partial
pool certificates that represent “less than the entire ownership interest in a
mortgage pool” have not been considered Qualifying Interests because they
are “more akin to being an investment in the securities of an issuer holding
mortgages rather than an investment directly in the underlying mortgages . .
. .”496 “The rationale is that an investor in partial pool certificates obtains
greater diversification and is subject to a different prepayment risk than an
investor who purchases the underlying mortgages directly.”497 However,
entities may treat these types of assets as Real Estate Related Assets for
purposes of determining whether an issuer may rely on Section
3(c)(5)(C).498 Nonetheless, the SEC staff has concluded that whole or
partial pool certificates issued by private issuers are generally not
Qualifying Interests.499 It is unclear whether this SEC statement overrules
the Premier Mortgage no-action letter.500

495. The Realex Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1935,
at *1 (Mar. 19, 1984).
496. Mortgages Concept Release, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-29778, 76
Fed. Reg. 55,300, 55, 306 n. 55 (Sept. 7, 2011).
497. PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 343, at 73.
498. See id. (reporting that the fundamental protections of the Investment Company Act
of 1940 should remain intact with only minor adjustments for recent changes in financial
markets).
499. Id.
500. See Premier Mortg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2145,
at *1-3 (Mar. 14, 1983) (recommending the SEC take no action against mortgage
corporation attempting to buy fully secured loan notes with proceeds from public bond
offering since corporation’s investment in the notes would result in a substantially similar
investment experience as a direct investment in the underlying mortgages themselves).
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g. Private Residential Mortgage Loans Held by the Issuer under
Funding Agreements
“[T]he Staff has stated that private residential mortgage loans (as
opposed to loans issued by financial institutions) held by the issuer under
funding agreements are not qualifying interests.”501
h. Rights to Receive the Cash Flows On, and Beneficial
Interests In, Certain Mortgages When Another Legal Entity
Retained Legal Title to the Mortgages
The Rosenblum treatise notes that the SEC staff “appears to take the
position to rely upon Section 3(c)(5)(C), an issuer must have full ownership
of the [Q]ualifying [I]nterests.”502
In HUD Multifamily, the SEC staff declined to give no-action relief
under Section 3(c)(5)(C) on the Qualifying Interests issue to a trust whose
assets would “consist of the cash flows on, and beneficial interests in,
certain multifamily project mortgage loans.”503 In that letter, “(1) HUD
[would retain] ‘bare legal title’ to the mortgages . . . ; (2) HUD [would
control] the right to foreclose on the mortgages . . . ; and (3) HUD’s
obligations . . . may result in action or inaction that may not be consistent
with the economic interests of the [investors] . . . .”504 The SEC staff thus
concluded that an issuer must hold legal title, control the right to foreclose,
and be able to act in a manner that is consistent with the goals of interest
holders in the issuer in order to establish a Qualifying Interest.505
In another release, the SEC noted the following:
Defendants argued that they satisfied [Section 3(c)(5)(C)] by
acquiring, for a nominal sum, a residual interest in two trusts that
had issued mortgaged backed bonds to the public. By structuring
the transactions in a particular way, defendants were able to put
on their own books all of the mortgages in the trusts . . . even
though defendants did not own the mortgages. The Court
rejected this argument, held that defendants were unregistered
investment companies and appointed a trustee to take over the
management of the defendants’ business.506
501. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4.2(ii), at 421.
502. Id.
503. HUD Multifamily Project Mortg. Loans Asset Sale, SEC No-Action Letter, 1988
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1401, at *1 (Sept. 29, 1988).
504. Id. at 1-2.
505. Id. at *1-2.
506. SEC v. IBF Collateralized Finance Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 17870, 79
SEC Docket 118, 119 (Dec. 2, 2002).
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13. Section 6(c) Exemptive Orders
Congress has encouraged the proliferation of mortgage-backed
securities:
In 1984, Congress enacted the Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act of 1984 (SMMEA), in order to broaden “the
market for mortgage-backed securities by encouraging more
extensive involvement of the private sector in the formation of
conduits for the flow of mortgage capital from investors to
lenders and homebuyers.” In enacting SMMEA, Congress
recognized that the vast majority of the mortgage-backed
securities were (and are) issued or guaranteed by Ginnie Mae,
Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac and sought to reduce regulatory
barriers preventing private companies from also issuing
mortgage-backed securities.507
In addition, Congress expected the SEC to facilitate mortgage-backed
securities:
In enacting SMMEA . . . Congress also stated that it expected the
Commission to “monitor the private secondary mortgage market
and provide appropriate administrative relief from the provisions
of the [1940] Act if compliance with the Act unnecessarily
[hinders] development of the market.” In particular, Congress
noted the Commission authority under Section 6(c) of the 1940
Act to grant exemption from any provisions of that Act and stated
that it expected “the Commission will exercise this authority with
a view to encouraging a vigorous private secondary mortgage
market.”508
Following the enactment of SMMEA, the SEC has exempted many
mortgage-backed securities under Section 6(c), with a view to encouraging
private secondary mortgage market transactions.509 “Most of the exemptive
orders concern CMOs510 and REMICs511 whose assets consist primarily of
507. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.7, at 426 (internal footnotes omitted).
508. Id. at 427 (internal footnotes omitted).
509. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 98-293 9 (1984)).
510. “A CMO is a debt obligation whose structure allows the cash flows on the
underlying mortgage pools to be carved up into separate classes of securities, called
‘tranches,’ each with a specified coupon and stated maturity. Scheduled payments and
prepayments from the mortgage pool are allocated to retire the classes in the order of stated
maturities.” PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 343, at 8–9.
511. Many issuers elect to be treated as real estate mortgage investment conduits
(“REMICs”), which were created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. REMIC status affects
only the taxation of the issuer and the investors — the securities law and accounting
requirements remain the same. Only issuers of securitized mortgage products can elect
REMIC status.
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partial pool certificates and other mortgage-related assets that are not
qualifying interests under Section 3(c)(5)(C).”512 In addition to CMOs and
REMICs, the SEC stated that “exemptive orders have been issued to
special purpose corporations organized by home builders that wish to issue,
among other things, bonds secured by pledges of mortgage loans on single
family residences constructed by the builders, called ‘builder bonds.’”513
At the time of the Protecting Investors report, the SEC noted that “[t]he
Commission has issued approximately 125 orders under section 6(c)
exempting structured financings backed by mortgage-related assets.”514
14. Rule 3a-7
Following the enactment of SMMEA, “the Commission since has
adopted Rule 3a-7 under the 1940 Act, which provides that structured
financings, including issuers of mortgage-backed securities, that meet
specified conditions will not be deemed to be investment companies.”515
Although this article does not contain a detailed discussion of Rule 3a-7,
there is such a discussion in Ch. 30 of the Rosenblum treatise.
15. Satisfying the 25% Real Estate Related Assets Test
As discussed above, the 25% Real Estate Related Assets test may be
reduced by the amount that the 55% Qualifying Interests test is exceeded.
“Neither the [SEC] nor the Staff appear to have defined the term ‘real
estate related assets.’”516 Nonetheless, “[t]he Staff has taken the position . .
. that a loan will qualify as a real estate related asset if at least 55 percent of
the fair market value of the loan is secured by real estate at the time the
issuer acquires the loan.”517
The [SEC] Staff
pool certificates
agencies such as
representing less

also has taken the position that agency partial
(that is, certificates issued or guaranteed by
Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, or Freddie Mac that
than the entire ownership interest in a pool of

512. Id. at 73-74.
513. Id. at 74 n.272; see also, e.g., Am. Sw. Fin. Corp., Investment Company Act
Release No. 12771, 26 SEC Docket 764, 764-65 (Oct. 29, 1982) (describing the attempt of a
corporation dealing in mortgage-backed securities to seek SEC exemption from the 1940
Act under section 6(c)).
514. PROTECTING INVESTORS REPORT, supra note 343, at 74.
515. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.7, at 427.
516. Id. § 15.4.3, at 422.
517. Id. (citing NAB Asset Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
820 (June 20, 1991)).
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mortgages) and so-called residual interests—for example,
interests in securities backed by mortgages or other interests in
real estate, or interests in companies that invest in mortgages or
other interests in real estate—are real estate related assets.518
D. Section 3(c)(6)
Section 3(c)(6) excepts from the definition of an investment company
“[a]ny company primarily engaged, directly or through majority-owned
subsidiaries, in one or more of the businesses described in . . . [Sections
3(c)(3), 3(c)(4), or 3(c)(5)], or in one or more of such businesses (from
which not less than 25 per centum of such company’s gross income during
its last fiscal year was derived) together with an additional business or
businesses other than investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in
securities.”519 Section 3(c)(3) generally relates to banks and savings and
loans, while 3(c)(4) generally relates to any person who has substantially
all of his business confined to making small loans, industrial banking or
similar businesses.
“The principal effect of this Section is to except from the 1940 Act
diversified operating and holding companies that otherwise would be
deemed to be investment companies under any of the definitions in Section
3(a) of the 1940 Act, as well as bank holding companies, insurance
company holding companies, and similar holding companies.”520 A full
discussion of Section 3(c)(6) is beyond the scope of this article.521
The SEC has stated that the term “primarily engaged” in a business
means that “at least 55% of a company’s assets are employed in, and 55%
of a company’s income is derived from, that business.”522 Rosenblum notes
that the SEC’s current interpretation of Section 3(c)(6) would exempt a
fund if
that company devotes at least 55 percent of its assets to, and
derives at least 55 percent of its income from, a combination of
(1) one or more of the businesses described in Sections 3(c)(3),
3(c)(4) and 3(c)(5), from which the company derived at least 25
percent of its gross income during its last fiscal year, and (2) an
additional business or businesses other than investing,

518. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 15.4.3, at 422.
519. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(6) (2006).
520. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204, § 16.1, at 431.
521. For a more complete discussion of Section 3(c)(6), see ROSENBLUM, supra note
204, § 16.
522. Id. § 16.2, at 432.
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reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities.523
With respect to real estate funds, to the extent that an investment
adviser structured a sufficient part of the fund’s operations so that it did not
engage in “securities” transactions within the SEC’s current interpretation
of Section 3(c)(6), but still satisfied the other conditions of Section 3(c)(6),
the fund could potentially qualify for the Section 3(c)(6) exemption under
the Investment Company Act even where it could not qualify under Section
3(c)(5)(C). Therefore, Section 3(c)(6) could potentially help expand the
ability of certain real estate funds that were not heavily invested in
“securities” to achieve an Investment Company Act exemption, in
comparison with Section 3(c)(5)(C).
Presumably, Section 3(c)(6) would allow an Investment Company Act
exemption if the fund devotes at least 55% of its assets to, and derives at
least 55% of its income from, a combination of (1) 3(c)(5), from which the
company derived at least 25% of its gross income during its last fiscal year,
and (2) an additional business or businesses other than investing,
reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities.
Presumably, under Section 3(c)(6), assuming that the fund was
invested in an additional business or businesses other than investing,
reinvesting, ownership, holding or trading in securities, the fund would
need to own Qualifying Interests equal to 55% multiplied by 55%, or
30.25%. Real Estate Related Assets would presumably be adjusted based
on the 55% multiplier, down to 13.75%. However, an entity may need noaction relief to confirm this view. Finally, whether or not a non-investment
business existed would most likely be determined in a similar manner as
under Section 3(b)(1) and Section 3(b)(2), discussed above.
E. Section 3(c)(9)
Section 3(c)(9) of the Investment Company Act excepts from the
definition of an investment company “[a]ny person substantially all of
whose business consists of owning or holding oil, gas, or other mineral
royalties or leases, or fractional interests therein, or certificates of interest
or participation in or investment contracts relative to such royalties, leases,
or fractional interests.”524
Since most private equity real estate funds are not oil and gas funds,
this article does not elaborate on the compliance framework for Section
3(c)(9). Those interested in using Section 3(c)(9) should see the

523. Id. § 16.3, at 434.
524. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(9).
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Rosenblum treatise, Investment Company Determination under the 1940
Act: Exemptions and Exceptions.525
CONCLUSION
The Dodd-Frank Act will regulate many private equity advisers more
heavily, which private equity advisers will likely argue to be inconsistent
with the historical reasons for the light regulation of private equity, which
led to the fluidity of private equity investment strategies and higher
investment returns.
This paper argues that the Dodd-Frank Act attempted to prevent
against systemic risks in response to the financial crisis of 2008, but poses
over-regulation dangers on private equity real estate, even though
regulators have acknowledged that an inappropriate level of regulation on
private equity was not the cause of the financial crisis. In particular, the
author presents compelling evidence that private equity real estate does not
give rise to systemic risk concerns, yet Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act
threatens to subject private equity real estate advisers to tightened
regulations, which impose considerable compliance costs and which could
be particularly burdensome for small and/or start-up firms. Apart from all
this, too much regulation could potentially cause private equity funds that
cannot cope with the compliance costs and efforts to relocate to
jurisdictions where regulation is less intense, which is not advantageous for
the U.S. economy.
Applying the Volcker Rule against PERE would cut off a significant
source of capital to PERE funds, even though banks aren’t a gigantic
percentage of PERE’s investors. This is problematic, since PERE has had a
significant role in paving the way to the recovery of the real estate markets
after various financial crises.526
In the face of these changes, this paper predicts that private equity
advisers will not only comply, but also adapt. This said, this article also
predicts that traditional private equity investment advisers, who largely
advise about investments in non-real estate securities and whose funds
hence rely on (c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exemptions, will have
a very limited ability to adapt to Dodd-Frank and will have to comply in a
rather straightforward way.
However, this article predicts a more flexible adaptive approach for
private equity real estate investment advisers, rather than rigid compliance
525. ROSENBLUM, supra note 204.
526. “As in the 1990s, the recovery [after the financial crisis of 2008] in the commercial
property market was once again led by private equity funds and REITs seeking to buy
distressed assets at bargain prices or to place capital into safe, income-generating and
potentially inflation-hedging assets.” GELTNER ET AL., supra note 46, at 148.
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with the new rules. In order to alleviate over-regulation dangers for private
equity real estate, especially in light of the fact that private equity real
estate does not pose systemic risk concerns and possesses typically only
moderate investment risks, this article sets forth new paths for private
equity real estate advisers navigating through the new regulatory landscape.
In particular, this article predicts that private equity real estate will
potentially be able to legitimately (1) sidestep the Advisers Act, the
Investment Company Act and the Volcker Rule by avoiding advice about
“securities,” and (2) sidestep Dodd-Frank Act provisions that regulate
advisers to (c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exempt funds (notably
Form PF and the Volcker Rule) by advising non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exempt funds.
The author believes that these new paths will be acceptable to the
regulators, given the long-standing tradition of regulators classifying nonsecurities real estate investments as falling outside the scope of the
Advisers Act, and given both the absence of systemic risk concerns and the
typically only moderate investment risks of private equity real estate in
general. The absence of private equity real estate systemic risk concerns is
further evidenced by the gesture of the regulators in finalizing Form PF,
which exposes certain registered investment advisers to report risk
exposure statistics. However, there is no indication that this applies to
private equity real estate funds that utilize non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) exemptions.
From the angle of policy analysis, this article first examined private
equity real estate along three axes of potential systemic contributors by
analogy to a physical network of nodes, and ruled them out one by one.
The article then compared private equity real estate funds to hedge funds,
and showed that private equity real estate doesn’t generate systemic risk
concerns because private equity real estate funds don’t typically invest in
derivatives, have a relatively small aggregate size, don’t typically use
banks and investment banks as prime brokers, typically don’t do short
selling, typically utilize only moderate leverage, typically don’t invest
heavily in mortgage-backed securities and typically possess only moderate
investment risks. These facts support the argument that these new routes
through the regulatory landscape would be positive for society at large and
ease over-regulation dangers.
In regard to the Volcker Rule, the author urges the joint agencies
charged with issuing a final rule on the Volcker Rule to limit their
discretion and not apply the Volcker Rule against PERE funds utilizing
non-(c)(1)/(c)(7) Investment Company Act exemptions.
The article argues that (1) PERE itself carries no characteristics that
tend to generate systemic risks, (2) the possibility of a risk “ripple effect”
propagating from PERE through banks to the markets is low, given that, (a)
PERE investments typically pose moderate investments risks, except for
investments in land, which not all PERE funds invest in, and (b) the
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interconnection between banks and PERE is quite weak due to the
relatively tiny size of the banks’ investments in PERE and the minuscule
percentage that PERE occupies in the banks’ investment portfolios, and
isn’t likely to become strengthened in the future. Although some naysayers
might believe that leverage and land investments could potentially create
ripple effects, such effects would clearly be mitigated by the absence of
other systemic risk concerns, in particular given the fact that the
interconnectedness between PERE and banks isn’t sufficiently strong to
give rise to systemic effects.
Private equity real estate advisers should work with their counsel on
how to secure compliance with these exemptions. Private equity real estate
advisers seeking to explore these trailblazing possibilities may wish to seek
SEC staff no-action relief to confirm the legal bases for these possibilities,
but this article asserts that the SEC should accept these possibilities as part
of the new regulatory landscape for private equity real estate in light of the
policy reasons expressed in this article. If the SEC were to formally
recognize these new paths, it would increase transactional certainty for
private equity real estate and foster their freedom of choice to select the
best regulatory path, which would in turn avoid the dangers of overregulation for private equity real estate.
In this stagnant time of our economy, regulators should strive to find
the optimal balance between business freedom and regulation. As
discussed earlier, over-regulation— notably private equity real estate overregulation in this case—could potentially harm the economy and have other
harmful effects on society. Regulators and society will hopefully recognize
the absence of systemic risks posed by private equity real estate and the
great likelihood that the Dodd-Frank Act might over-regulate private equity
real estate if these new paths through the regulatory landscape are not
recognized. The author hopes that this article will lead to a more
prosperous and more balanced economy, where the true art of building a
flourishing macro-society lies.

